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Northeast Donetsk Oblast campaign

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Northeast Donetsk Oblast campaign
Part of the Luhansk Oblast campaign and eastern front of the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Ukrainian 81st Airmobile Brigade during the fighting for Bilohorivka, 2025
DateNovember 2024 — present
Location
Northeastern Donetsk Oblast and western Luhansk Oblast
Status Ongoing
Belligerents
Russia Ukraine
Units involved
Order of battle Order of battle

As part of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, military operations have taken place in the northeastern part of the Donetsk Oblast, on two fronts which are referred to as the Lyman front and the Siversk front after the nearby cities of Lyman and Siversk. Russian forces established a bridgehead over the Zherebets River in early January 2025, which was speculated by Ukrainian officials and Western analysts to be part of an attempt to capture Lyman.

Background

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Following Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the east in 2022, Russia failed its initial objective of encircling northern Donetsk Oblast, as its salient in eastern Kharkiv Oblast collapsed and the strategic cities of Lyman and Sviatohirsk were recaptured;[1][2] this forced Russian forces to pull back towards Luhansk Oblast. Following this withdrawal, the frontline began to stall and remained along the western border of Luhansk Oblast throughout the rest of 2022 and 2023 until offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast restarted in late 2024.[citation needed]

Lyman front

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Russian capture of Terny (November 2024–January 2025)

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By November 2024, Russian forces had begun efforts to capture the villages of Terny and Yampolivka [uk], but their attempts were repelled by the forces of Ukraine's 60th Mechanized Brigade.[3]

On 26 December, it was claimed in Russian media that Russian forces had taken control of up to 40% of the village of Terny.[4] On 28 December, Russian forces conducted a mechanized assault against the positions of Ukraine's 60th Brigade on the Lyman front for the first time in about a month, though daily infantry assaults had continued during that period.[5][6] However, they failed to advance as their logistics were poor and the open fields surrounding Terny exposed Russian movements, leading to them being detected by a Ukrainian reconnaissance drone.[7] Russian sources claimed to be in control of 90% of Terny on 31 December.[8]

Russian sources asserted on 2 January that Russian troops made gains in southern Terny.[9] By 5 January, Ukrainian forces had successfully recaptured positions in central Terny.[10][11]

On 14 January 2025, the Russian Defense Ministry claimed its forces had taken Terny.[12] The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) was unable to confirm Russian control over Terny until geolocated footage published on 18 and 19 January indicated that Russian forces had seized the village.[13]

On 1 May, Russian forces advanced to Pivnichna Street in northern Torske, which is east of Lyman.[14]

Russian bridgehead over the Zherebets River (January 2025–present)

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On 21 April, Ukrainian military observer Oleksandr Kovalenko gave a brief frontline prognosis and stated that, "If anyone is hoping that Russian occupation forces will agree to a "ceasefire" or a reduction in the intensity of combat operations – these are just fantasies and nothing more." This also meant that despite the "Easter Truce", the truce was meant to be an interim phase to create conditions for further escalation along the Lyman-Kupyansk direction. Ukrainian officials also claimed that the goal was to divert forces from Donetsk region, where Russian forces have concentrated the 8th Combined Arms Army and a part of the 51st Combined Arms Army.[15] Russian forces also reportedly used the truce to regroup and launch an large-scale infantry assault shortly after the end of the truce. Blyshchyk stated that , " A few hours after Putin announced the ceasefire, our positions came under massive artillery fire." He also claimed that Russian forces exploited the lull to reposition units and prepared for renewed assaults during the truce.[16] Ukrainian officials claimed that on victory day on 9 May, Russian forces would potentially attack the Lyman axis and that the Russia have amassed forces near the city of Lyman and preparing for an offensive.[17]

On 2 January 2025, Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces crossed the Zherebets River and advanced into fields west of Ivanivka [uk] northeast of Lyman.[9] On 4 January, Russian troops advanced, entering the central part of the village of Ivanivka, on the west bank of the Zherebets River.[11] Two days later, they fully seized Ivanivka.[18][19][20] Geolocated footage published on 18 and 19 January indicated that Russian forces had seized Ivanivka.[13]

Throughout February and March, Russian forces of the 3rd and 144th Divisions of the 20th Combined Arms Army slowly expanded the bridgehead. By 31 March, Russian forces had advanced to the southern outskirts of the village of Katerynivka, and in early April, they advanced southeast of the village of Nove.[21][22]

By early April 2025, ISW assessed that the purpose of the Russian bridgehead may have been to create conditions for the seizure of Lyman and Borova in the Kharkiv Oblast in the coming months.[21]

On 7 April, it was reported by pro-Ukrainian source DeepState that the situation near the villages of Nove, Katerynivka, and Nevske was "intensifying", as Russian forces reportedly had the advantage in this area. Russian forces conducted assaults near the village of Novomykhailivka [uk] and experienced "tactical success" in the vicinity of Nove and Nevske. Katerynivka was said to be under "constant pressure".[23]

On 20 April, DeepState reported that Katerynivka had been captured by Russian forces.[24]

On 1 May, Russian forces advanced east of Katerynivka.[14]

On 13th May, geolocated footage showed that Russian forces advanced in eastern Ridkodub, north of Lyman.[25]2 days later on May 15th, geolocated footage showed that Russian forces advanced in central Torske, east of Lyman.[26]However, on May 17th, Ukrainian forces conducted a counteroffensive operation which led to Ukrainian forces recapturing positions in central Torske, where Russian forces just 2 days ago advanced.[27][28]

On May 24th, Russian forces marginally advanced in central Lypove, north of Lyman.[29] Two days later on May 26th, geolocated footage published indicated that Russian forces advanced further into Ridkodub and reached southern outskirts of the village.[30]On May 28th, Ukraine's General Staff reported that Russian forces launched 32 assaults, with the goal of breaching Ukrainian defences near the Serebrianka Forest, the settlements of Nadiia, Novomykhailivka, Ridkodub, Kopanky, Katerynivka, Yampolivka, Zelena Dolyna , Hrekivka, Hryhorivka, Karpivka and Novyi Myr.[31]By May 29th, Russian forces seized the settlement of Ridkodub.[32]

Siversk front

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Russian capture of Bilohorivka (12 February–24 March)

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On 2 January, Russian forces advanced in the central part of the village of Bilohorivka.[9]

Starting on 12 February 2025, Russian forces renewed efforts to seize Bilohorivka, making advances in western and northern parts of the village throughout the following week.[33][34][35][36]

On 23 February 2025, geolocated footage showed that Russian forces had seized Bilohorivka and the quarry south of the village. The unit which reportedly seized Bilohorivka was the 123rd Separate Guards Motor Rifle Brigade of the 3rd Guards Combined Arms Army.[37]

During March 2025, after the capture of Bilohorivka, Russian forces advanced west of the village, south of the neighboring village of Hryhorivka, and north and south of the neighboring village of Verkhn'okam'yans'ke.[38][39][40][41][42][43][44]

After a very long operational pause on the Siversk front, geolocated footage indicated that Russian forces made advances in the eastern outskirts of Hryhorivka by 28 April 2025.[45] On 1 May, Russian forces attacked Serebrianka and Verkhn'okam'yans'ke with no success.[46] Russian forces advanced in the eastern outskirts of Hryhorivka on 1 May,[14] and in the northeastern part of the village on 3 May.[47][48] Intense fighting continued near Siversk on the same day.[48]

South of Siversk

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Footage released on 24 December 2024 indicated that Russian forces had likely taken control over the village of Ivano-Dar'yivka, southeast of Siversk.[8] Simultaneously, Russian forces advanced 900 meters south of Vyiimka.[8]

On 12 February and throughout the following week, south of Siversk, Russian forces advanced in north of the village of Mykolaivka, and in the southeastern part of the village of Fedorivka.[33][34][35][36]

South of Siversk, during March 2025, Russian forces advanced northwest of Sakko i Vantsetti and in the eastern part of the village of Vasiukivka.[38][39][40][41][42][43][44]

Siversk axis (8 May–present)

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On 8 May, since the start of Russia's unilateral ceasefire for the Victory Day holiday, Russian forces launched 2 attacks despite the ceasefire and thus, the attacks violated the ceasefire.[49]

Analysis

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In January 2025, during fighting for the village of Ivanivka, a spokesman for Ukraine's 60th Mechanized Brigade said that Russian forces were planning to capture Lyman in order to reach the major city of Sloviansk through the rural settlement of Raihorodok.[50]

In April 2025, a spokesperson for Ukraine's 66th Mechanized Brigade, fighting on the Lyman front, claimed that at times, they were outnumbered by Russian infantry by a 10:1 ratio.[51] Following this, many sources[which?] claimed that the massive Russian manpower advantage led to Russian forces being able to carry out successful attacks.[citation needed]

See also

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References

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  1. ^ region, Russian (October 2022). "Russian forces retreat from strategic Donetsk city a day after Moscow's annexation of the region". CNN.
  2. ^ divided, War (18 October 2022). "War in Ukraine: Russian occupation leaves Donbas town of Sviatohirsk deeply divided". France 24.
  3. ^ Сафронов, Тарас (23 November 2024). "Командування РФ відправило на смерть понад десяток штурмовиків біля Тернів". Militarnyi (in Ukrainian). Retrieved 14 May 2025.
  4. ^ says, Russian. "Russian fighters control about 40% of Terny in Donetsk region, military expert says". TASS.
  5. ^ Harward, Christina; Gasparyan, Davit; Evans, Angelica; Trotter, Nate; Kagan, Frederick W. (28 December 2024). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 28, 2024". Institute for the Study of War.
  6. ^ "На Лиманському напрямку росіяни вперше за довгий час пішли на механізований штурм". АрміяInform (in Ukrainian). 28 December 2024. Retrieved 14 May 2025.
  7. ^ Terny, Frontline (3 January 2025). "Frontline report: Tactical missteps doom Russian offensive on Terny". Euromaidan Press.
  8. ^ a b c Evans, Angelica; Wolkov, Nicole; Stepanenko, Kateryna; Trotter, Nate; Runkel, William; Kagan, Fredrick W. (31 December 2024). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 31, 2024". Institute for the Study of War.
  9. ^ a b c Mappes, Grace; Harward, Christina; Stepanenko, Kateryna; Trotter, Nate; Gibson, Olivia; Runkel, William; Barros, George (2 January 2025). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 2, 2025". Institute for the Study of War.
  10. ^ Zoria, Yuri (5 January 2025). "Russian troops advance in Toretsk and near five other Donetsk settlements, DeepState says". Euromaidan Press. Retrieved 24 April 2025.
  11. ^ a b "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 4, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved 24 April 2025.
  12. ^ Ukraine, Russia. "Russia claims it took control of 2 more settlements in Ukraine". Anadolu Ajansi.
  13. ^ a b Gasparyan, Davit; Gibson, Olivia; Evans, Angelica; Trotter, Nate; Runkel, William; Barros, George (19 January 2025). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 19, 2025". Institute for the Study of War.
  14. ^ a b c Evans, Angelica; Novikov, Daria; Gibson, Olivia; Gasparyan, Davit; Wolkov, Nicole; Hird, Karolina; Runkel, William; Trotter, Nate (1 May 2025). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 1, 2025". Institute for the Study of War.
  15. ^ "May 2025 may mark major Russian offensive shift in Ukraine". Еспресо.
  16. ^ "Russia used Easter truce to regroup in Lyman sector, launched offensive after, military says". Kyiv Independent. 22 April 2025.
  17. ^ "Kyrylo Sazonov: Putin seeks victory for May 9. Potential Russian strike and the threat of a Lyman cauldron". Odessa Journal.
  18. ^ "Three Ukrainian villages fall to Russian troops". New Voice. Retrieved 24 April 2025.
  19. ^ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, January 6, 2025". Institute for the Study of War. 6 January 2025. Retrieved 24 April 2025.
  20. ^ Zoria, Yuri (7 January 2025). "Russian forces capture three villages in eastern Ukraine, DeepState reports". Euromaidan Press. Retrieved 24 April 2025.
  21. ^ a b Hlushchenko, Olha (2 April 2025). "ISW analyses how Russians might use expansion of bridgehead near Lyman in Donetsk Oblast". Ukrainska Pravda. Retrieved 13 May 2025.
  22. ^ Velhan, Oleh (2 April 2025). "Russians expand foothold near Lyman - ISW reveals Russia's plans". RBC-Ukraine. Retrieved 13 May 2025.
  23. ^ Diakonov, Ivan (7 April 2025). "Situation intensifies on Lyman front – DeepState". Ukrainska Pravda. Retrieved 14 May 2025.
  24. ^ Тищенко, Катерина (20 April 2025). "Росіяни окупували Катеринівку на Лиманському напрямку – DeepState" [The Russians occupied Katerynivka on the Lyman front]. Ukrainska Pravda (in Ukrainian). Retrieved 14 May 2025.
  25. ^ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 13, 2025". Institute for the Study of War.
  26. ^ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 15, 2025". Institute for the Study of War.
  27. ^ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 17, 2025". Institute for the Study of War.
  28. ^ "ISW Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 17, 2025". Kyiv Post.
  29. ^ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 24, 2025". Institute for the Study of War.
  30. ^ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 26, 2025". Institute for the Study of War.
  31. ^ "Total of 216 clashes across front line, over half on Lyman, Pokrovsk and Novopavlivka fronts – Ukraine's General Staff". Ukrainska Pravda.
  32. ^ "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 29, 2025". Institute for the Study of War.
  33. ^ a b Evans, Angelica; Wolkov, Nicole; Gasparyan, Davit; Gibson, Olivia; Hird, Karolina; Kagan, Frederick W. (12 February 2025). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 12, 2025". Institute for the Study of War.
  34. ^ a b Evans, Angelica; Gasparyan, Davit; Wolkov, Nicole; Gibson, Olivia; Kagan, Frederick W. (13 February 2025). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 13, 2025". Institute for the Study of War.
  35. ^ a b Evans, Angelica; Harward, Christina; Gibson, Olivia; Kagan, Frederick W.; Trotter, Nate; Runkel, William (16 February 2025). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 16, 2025". Institute for the Study of War.
  36. ^ a b Wolkov, Nicole; Harward, Christina; Mappes, Grace; Kagan, Frederick W. (19 February 2025). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 19, 2025". Institute for the Study of War.
  37. ^ February, Russian. "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 23, 2025". Institute for the Study of War.
  38. ^ a b Evans, Angelica; Wolkov, Nicole; Mappes, Grace; Gibson, Olivia; Novikov, Daria; Kagan, Frederick W.; Trotter, Nate; Runkel, William (6 March 2025). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 6, 2025". Institute for the Study of War.
  39. ^ a b Evans, Angelica; Wolkov, Nicole; Harward, Christina; Gibson, Olivia; Barros, George; Trotter, Nate; Runkel, William (9 March 2025). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 9, 2025". Institute for the Study of War.
  40. ^ a b Mappes, Grace; Harward, Christina; Wolkov, Nicole; Novikov, Daria; Kagan, Frederick W.; Trotter, Nate (11 March 2025). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 11, 2025". Institute for the Study of War.
  41. ^ a b Evans, Angelica; Harward, Christina; Gibson, Olivia; Novikov, Daria; Barros, George; Kagan, Frederick W.; Trotter, Nate; Runkel, William (13 March 2025). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 13, 2025". Institute for the Study of War.
  42. ^ a b Evans, Angelica; Mappes, Grace; Gibson, Olivia; Novikov, Daria; Barros, George; Kagan, Frederick W.; Trotter, Nate; Runkel, William (14 March 2025). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 14, 2025". Institute for the Study of War.
  43. ^ a b Harward, Christina; Hird, Karolina; Wolkov, Nicole; Barros, George; Kagan, Frederick W.; Runkel, William (22 March 2025). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 22, 2025". Institute for the Study of War.
  44. ^ a b Harward, Christina; Evans, Angelica; Mappes, Grace; Gibson, Olivia; Novikov, Daria; Barros, George; Trotter, Nate (24 March 2025). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 24, 2025". Institute for the Study of War.
  45. ^ Evans, Angelica; Wolkov, Nicole; Novikov, Daria; Harvey, Anna; Harward, Christina; Kagan, Frederick W. (28 April 2025). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 28, 2025". Institute for the Study of War.
  46. ^ Vialko, Daryna (1 May 2025). "Russia-Ukraine war: Frontline update as of May 1". RBC-Ukraine. Retrieved 14 May 2025.
  47. ^ Gibson, Olivia; Novikov, Daria; Harvey, Anna; Harward, Christina; Evans, Angelica; Barros, George; Trotter, Nate; Runkel, William (3 May 2025). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 3, 2025". Institute for the Study of War.
  48. ^ a b "Russian forces push forward on five fronts, Ukraine counterattacks". The New Voice of Ukraine. 4 May 2025. Retrieved 14 May 2025.
  49. ^ "Since start of Putin's "ceasefire", Russians have launched over 100 attacks along front line". Українська правда.
  50. ^ Сафронов, Тарас (4 January 2025). "Для вибиття окупантів з Іванівки залучили танки". Militarnyi (in Ukrainian). Retrieved 14 May 2025.
  51. ^ Zadorozhnyy, Tim (8 April 2025). "Russian forces sometimes outnumber Ukraine 10 to 1 in Lyman sector, military says". Kyiv Independent. Retrieved 14 May 2025.