Draft:Punjabization of Pakistan

Punjabization in Pakistan refers to the perceived process through which the Punjabi ethnic group has come to dominate the political, military, bureaucratic, economic, and cultural institutions of Pakistan. While Punjab is the most populous province in the country, critics argue that its dominance extends beyond demographic representation and is embedded in the state's power structures, national narratives, and resource distribution. The term is often used in political, academic, and nationalist discourse by voices from smaller provinces who argue that the federation has structurally favored Punjab since Pakistan's formation.

Historical Background

The origins of Punjab's institutional dominance in Pakistan can be traced to colonial policies implemented by the British Raj in the 19th and early 20th centuries. After the Indian Rebellion of 1857, British authorities deliberately restructured the colonial army and administrative systems to favor ethnic and regional groups deemed more "loyal" to the Empire. Punjabis—especially Muslim agrarian tribes from central and northern districts—were classified as a "martial race," a concept that racially and culturally ranked communities on their perceived soldierly traits..

By 1929, Punjabis made up over 62% of the British Indian Army's combat troops despite accounting for just a fraction of British India's population. This recruitment preference was not incidental—it was backed by British administrative policy, such as the Punjab Land Alienation Act of 1900, which preserved land ownership and social structure in rural Punjab, cementing the power of landed elites who also served as military recruitment agents.

This colonial favoritism extended beyond military recruitment. Punjab became the administrative darling of British India due to its agrarian productivity and relatively compliant landed aristocracy. The British invested in canal colonies and irrigation infrastructure in Punjab more heavily than in any other region. This resulted in long-term economic advantages that helped Punjab dominate Pakistan’s post-independence resource distribution, military hierarchy, and civil bureaucracy.

Many senior officers who later shaped Pakistan's army and state structure—including Ayub Khan, Pakistan’s first military ruler—came from rural Punjabi backgrounds molded by this colonial legacy.

Colonial Collaboration and Repression of Other Ethnic Groups

Under British rule, Punjabis—both Sikh and Muslim—were designated as one of the "martial races", a policy that awarded military favor and land rights in exchange for loyalty to colonial authority. Regiments like the 56th Punjabi Rifles and Guides Cavalry were regularly deployed to suppress resistance, notably in the Second and Third Anglo-Afghan Wars and during the Siege of Malakand (1897), reinforcing Punjabi military prominence.

During the Indian Rebellion of 1857, Punjabi soldiers played a key role in suppressing uprisings in the Punjab and North-West Frontier—fighting against Pashtun insurrections as well as Indian sepoys in garrisons like Peshawar, Jhelum, and Sialkot.

Local Punjabi notables—such as Rai Ahmad Khan Kharral and other chiefs—aligned with the British in quelling local revolts in Gogaira and across the Sandal Bar region; they were subsequently rewarded with land grants, pensions, and official titles. Colonial military campaigns were thus largely conducted by Punjabi troops against Pashtun, tribal, and rural Muslim and Hindu populations across the frontier and central Punjab.

This collaboration entrenched the Punjabi elite’s preferential position in the colonial military and bureaucracy—positioning them at the forefront of Pakistan’s post-independence power structures, while reinforcing perceptions among Pashtuns and others of Punjabi complicity in British imperial repression.

Punjabization of State Power and Federal Institutions

The 1955 'One Unit Scheme merged West Pakistan’s provinces—Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, and Balochistan—into a single administrative unit with Lahore as its capital. Critics argued it was a deliberate move by Punjabi and Muhajir elites to consolidate power and suppress regional autonomy.

The policy met fierce backlash from smaller provinces. Urdu- and Punjabi-speaking elites from Karachi largely supported it, while Sindhis, Pashtuns, Baloch, and Bengalis strongly opposed it as a move to “Punjabize” Pakistan, leading to demands for restoration of provincial status and autonomy.

The princely state of Bahawalpur, incorporated into Punjab in 1955 without referendum or consent, has seen persistent demands for restoration of its provincial status, citing distinct Saraiki identity and rights.

The Saraiki belt—southern Punjab regions like Multan, Dera Ghazi Khan, and Bahawalpur—remains underdeveloped compared to central Punjab. While accounting for over 30% of Punjab's population, the region receives a disproportionately small share of provincial budget and infrastructure development.

Public development show a glaring North–South divide: Southern Punjab records only 55% sanitation coverage', compared to the nearly 81% in central Punjab. It also hosts only 4 of the province’s 22 public universities and 5 of 11 medical colleges, despite comprising nearly half its area.

These administrative and financial biases have fueled provincial autonomy calls, such as the movement for a separate Saraikistan province—a demand aimed at correcting a century of structural marginalization under Punjab’s dominance.

Political and Military Punjabization

Punjab’s dominance in Pakistan’s state institutions stems from colonial-era recruitment patterns and has been reinforced through post-independence political and bureaucratic systems.

Military Dominance

• Martial race legacy: The British designated Punjabis (including Muslims and Sikhs) as a martial race, focusing recruitment in regions like Jhelum and Rawalpindi. Upon independence in 1947, Punjabis — making up ~25% of the population — constituted 72% of the Pakistan Army, while Bengali Muslims (~55% of the population) were virtually unrepresented.
• Ethnic composition trends: ISPR data indicates that while Punjabi share in the army decreased from 71% (2001) to 57% (2007), it remained disproportionately high compared to national demographics.
• Senior leadership: Since 2007, successive Pakistan Army chiefs (e.g., Raheel Sharif, Qamar Javed Bajwa) have been Punjabi-origin, reinforcing the province's institutional influence .
• Public perception: An article in The New Yorker cited US intelligence sources noting that “an estimated ninety percent of the officers are Punjabi,” underlining the perceived ethnic bias at the officer level .

Civil Service and Bureaucracy

- Quota system imbalance: Provincial quotas give Punjab 50% of CSS seats despite its ~43% share of the national population . - Dominance in results: In the 2020 CSS exam, Punjabis secured 90 of the 115 top positions, with candidates from smaller provinces largely absent . - Training infrastructure: Key institutions such as Lahore’s Civil Services Academy and numerous CSS coaching centers are concentrated in Punjab, giving Punjabi aspirants a clear structural advantage . - Policy analysis: PILDAT noted that Punjabi-heavy bureaucratic ranks exacerbate perceptions of regional marginalization, especially in Sindh, KP, and Balochistan .

Political Leverage

- Legislative majority: Punjab commands ~53.5% of seats in the National Assembly (183 out of 342 seats), guaranteeing legislative dominance. - Provincial seat share (2024): Punjab holds 173 out of 336 National Assembly seats following the 2023 census — the highest share of any province . - Military-backed regimes: Military coups led by Punjabi-origin officers (Ayub Khan, Zia-ul-Haq, Musharraf) reinforced provincial favoritism through centralized governance and patronage networks .

Regional Impact

The concentration of Punjabi personnel in administrative, military, and political spheres has fueled deep-seated mistrust in KP, Sindh, and Balochistan. These provinces have cited unequal resource distribution, bureaucratic exclusion, and political sidelining as consequences of Punjabi hegemony 

Civil Administration and Bureaucratic Dominance

After independence, Pakistan adopted Urdu as its sole national language, despite it being the mother tongue of only a small minority—primarily migrants from India. This language policy marginalized native languages like Pashto, Sindhi, Balochi, and Saraiki, especially in terms of official use and educational resources.

Punjab, with its better infrastructure and wider access to Urdu-medium and English-medium education, gained disproportionate representation in Pakistan's civil services. The Central Superior Services (CSS) exam, which serves as the main entry point to elite government jobs, has long favored candidates from Punjab due to superior schooling and coaching facilities.

Data from the Federal Public Service Commission consistently show that more than 50% of successful CSS candidates hail from Punjab, while underrepresented regions like Balochistan and former FATA districts often fill far fewer positions despite having reserved quotas.

A 2019 report by the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT) also highlighted how federal institutions are heavily staffed by Punjabi-origin officers, exacerbating ethnic grievances in smaller provinces.

Economic Centralization and Resource Allocation

Economic policies in Pakistan have historically favored Punjab, especially its central and northern districts, resulting in regional inequalities. Punjab receives a disproportionate share of national resources, including irrigation, infrastructure, industrial projects, and federal development funds, while other provinces and subregions like the Saraiki belt, Balochistan, and interior Sindh remain neglected.

The Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) has repeatedly come under criticism for allocating more than 60% of federal development funding to Punjab. A 2017 Planning Commission report noted that a majority of national projects were centered in Lahore and its surrounding districts.

The Saraiki region, particularly districts like Dera Ghazi Khan and Rajanpur, contributes significantly to Pakistan’s cotton, wheat, and gas production but receives minimal industrial investment. Natural gas extracted from these areas is often used to power industries in Lahore and Faisalabad, while the originating districts face electricity and gas shortages.

One of the most controversial examples is the alleged manipulation of the 1972 census. Political commentators and regional activists claim that the actual figures from Sindh and KP were revised to maintain Punjab’s majority status in the National Assembly under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s government.

CPEC and Infrastructural Priorities

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), initially envisioned as a trans-provincial infrastructure corridor, became a major point of contention after changes in project alignment appeared to overwhelmingly benefit Punjab. These changes diverted development toward Lahore, Multan, and Faisalabad, marginalizing Balochistan, southern KP, and interior Sindh.

In 2016, multiple Senate committees expressed concern over the fact that more than 50% of CPEC-related projects were Punjab-centric. The original western route—meant to pass through less developed areas like D.I. Khan, Zhob, and Gwadar—was deprioritized in favor of the eastern alignment via Lahore and Faisalabad.

Key criticisms include:

Overconcentration of power plants, SEZs (special economic zones), and road infrastructure in Punjab.

Absence of proportionate investment in Balochistan and KP, despite their strategic geographic position.

Lack of transparency and consultation with non-Punjab provinces during project realignment.

Lawmakers from KP, Sindh, and Balochistan warned that this biased allocation of strategic infrastructure could widen inter-provincial disparities, rather than promote integration and development.

Cultural Influence and Marginalization of Regional Identities

Pakistan’s national culture, narrative, and education often advance a Punjabi/Urdu-centric vision, marginalizing regional histories, languages, and identities.

Textbook Bias and Historical Erasure

- Pakistani textbooks heavily emphasize Mughal rulers and Pakistan’s Punjabi-linked founders (Iqbal, Jinnah), while largely omitting celebrated Pashtun figures like Khushal Khan Khattak, Bacha Khan, and Sher Shah Suri—even though these played key roles in regional and South Asian history. - Historian KK Aziz famously critiqued history textbooks for presenting selective, distorted narratives—a phenomenon he called The Murder of History.

Educational and Linguistic Exclusion

- Urdu and English dominate government education, with Pashto only now being added sporadically in KP schools—despite being the mother tongue of ~18% of Pakistan’s population. - As of April 2024, even where Pashto is “mandatory,” many schools lack teachers or textbooks—delaying effective rollout. A Dawn article from July 2021 noted official exclusion of Pashto from primary syllabus—which triggered protests by ANP-affiliated teacher groups. - Education analysts highlight that teaching in mother tongues dramatically improves learning and cultural connection—yet Pakistan lacks meaningful implementation.

Media Control and Language Policy

- National television and film production is headquartered in Lahore and Karachi; no quotas enforce Pashto, Sindhi, Balochi, or Saraiki content, sustaining a Punjabi/Urdu media monopoly. - Between 2006–2009, PEMRA informally discouraged non-Urdu programming in prime time, effectively silencing regional-language TV growth.

Regional Resistance and Identity Revival

• Organizations like the Pashto Academy (University of Peshawar, est. 1955) promote Pashtun culture and literature, undertaking translation and historic preservation efforts—though their influence remains provincial.
• Public protests led by the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) highlight systemic marginalization and call for recognition of Pashtun heritage, rights, and official language status.

Demands for Saraiki Province

The Saraiki nationalist movement seeks the creation of a separate province — often referred to as "Saraikistan" — out of southern Punjab, including Bahawalpur, Dera Ghazi Khan, Multan, and other districts. This campaign has gained traction through local parties like the Saraiki Democratic Assembly and mainstream groups such as the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), who have occasionally endorsed provincial restructuring in their manifestos.

Cultural and Linguistic Suppression

Saraiki activists accuse Punjabi-centric cultural policies of attempting to subsume Saraiki identity under a broader Punjabi umbrella, often labeling the language as a "dialect of Punjabi."

- Textbook Policies: Public and private school curricula in southern Punjab frequently refer to Saraiki as a “dialect of Punjabi,” which undermines its status as a distinct literary language with its own poetic and folk traditions. - Administrative Practice: Government notices, local signage, and official communication in Bahawalpur and Dera Ghazi Khan are often issued in Urdu and Punjabi, while Saraiki is omitted — reinforcing perceptions of marginalization. - Media Representation: Local-language media, including radio, TV, and print in Saraiki, receive minimal institutional support compared to Punjabi. Broadcast quotas for regional languages do not formally include Saraiki, leaving it without protection. - Economic & Cultural Narratives: Saraiki writers and poets frequently express that their language and culture are “erased” from Punjab’s official narrative, with Punjabi elites portraying it as inadequate to hold provincial status.

While the constitutional and legal framework allows for the creation of new provinces, it also requires political will and legislative consensus — both of which are stymied by the dominant influence of Punjab-based parties in the National Assembly.

Counterarguments

Defenders of the current structure argue that Punjab’s size and contributions to the economy justify its representation. They cite census data and electoral math to defend majority control. They also claim that civil and military appointments are merit-based, and regional underrepresentation reflects educational disparities, not discrimination.

However, critics argue that these disparities are themselves a result of historic underinvestment, creating a cycle where Punjab continues to dominate due to advantages reinforced over decades.

See Also

• Punjabi nationalism
• Ethnic groups in Pakistan
• Centre–province relations in Pakistan
• Pashtun Tahafuz Movement
• Balochistan conflict
• Saraiki nationalism