User:Shahin/sandbox
Noor Pahlavi | |
---|---|
Born | Washington, D.C., United States | 3 April 1992
House | Pahlavi |
Father | Reza Pahlavi, Crown Prince of Iran |
Mother | Yasmine Etemad-Amini |
Alma mater |
Princess Noor Pahlavi (Persian: نور پهلوی, born April 3, 1992) is an Iranian-American socialite, model, investor relations specialist, and advocate for human rights and Iranian cultural heritage. She is the eldest daughter of Reza Pahlavi, the former Crown Prince of Iran, and Yasmine Etemad-Amini. Born in exile in Washington, D.C., she is the first immediate member of the Pahlavi dynasty to be born outside Iran, following the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which led to the overthrow of the monarchy and the exile of her family. Noor has gained recognition for her advocacy for democracy, gender equality, and the promotion of Iranian culture, as well as her professional work in investor relations and her presence in New York’s social scene.
![]() |
|
Early life and education
[edit]Noor Zahra Pahlavi was born on April 3, 1992, in Washington, D.C., to Reza Pahlavi, the eldest son of Mohammad Reza Shah, the last Shah of Iran, and Farah Diba, the former Empress of Iran, and his wife, Yasmine Etemad-Amini, an Iranian-American lawyer.[1] Her birth marked a significant moment for the Pahlavi dynasty, as she was the first immediate family member born outside Iran after the family’s exile following the 1979 Iranian Revolution.[2] She has two younger sisters, Princess Iman Pahlavi (born 1993) and Princess Farah Pahlavi (born 2004).[citation needed]
Raised in Potomac, Maryland, Noor attended The Bullis School, graduating in 2010.[1] She pursued higher education at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., earning a Bachelor of Arts degree in Psychology in 2014, and completed a Master of Business Administration (MBA) at Columbia Business School in New York City in 2020.[3] During her time at Georgetown, she volunteered at The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, reflecting an early commitment to social causes.[4]
Noor was raised with a strong connection to her Iranian heritage, influenced by her grandmother, Empress Farah Pahlavi, who emphasized the importance of Iranian culture, art, and history.[5] Her parents ensured she and her sisters remained tied to their roots despite never visiting Iran, though Noor has faced criticism on social media for perceived disconnection from Iranian culture. She has refuted these claims, stating her family has done all it could to keep Iran’s memory alive in her heart.[5]
Career
[edit]Investor relations and professional work
[edit]Noor Pahlavi has built a career in investor relations and strategic communications, with a focus on healthcare and real estate. She currently works as an investor relations specialist at Argot Partners LLC, a strategic communications firm in New York.[3] Previously, she served as the director of fundraising and investor relations for a commercial real estate firm and as an adviser for Acumen, a global non-profit impact investment fund, contributing to initiatives aimed at addressing poverty and promoting sustainable development.[3][6]
Modeling and media
[edit]Noor has pursued modeling, appearing in publications such as Harper’s Bazaar Arabia and serving as the cover girl for Marie Claire Indonesia in June 2017.[6][7] She has modeled for the clothing brand MISA Los Angeles and graced the cover of Tehran Magazine in 2017.[8] Her Instagram account, with over 270,000 followers as of 2017, serves as a platform for showcasing her personal style and advocacy efforts.[2] Her fashion choices, described as “elegant with a bit of downtown flair,” are influenced by her grandmother, Empress Farah Pahlavi, and her mother, Yasmine Pahlavi, blending couture with Persian motifs.[6]
Advocacy and public role
[edit]Noor Pahlavi has used her platform to advocate for democracy, human rights, and the preservation of Iranian culture. She has been vocal about the challenges faced by Iranians under the Islamic Republic, particularly women, who face economic hardship, social oppression, and legal discrimination. In a 2024 interview, she highlighted the lack of protections for women against gender-based violence, noting that women’s testimony in Iranian courts is worth half that of men and that the legal marriage age allows girls as young as 13 to marry with permission.[9] Her advocacy focuses on gender equality, access to healthcare, and empowering marginalized communities, inspired by her family’s legacy of civic duty.[10] She has supported the 2022–2023 Mahsa Amini protests, calling for systemic change and greater freedoms, aligning with the historical struggle of Iranian women from the Constitutional Revolution to the present.[10][11]
She works with organizations that empower oppressed women, emphasizing resilience and social equity.[8] Her advocacy extends to raising awareness about breast cancer and women’s health, inspired by her mother’s public discussion of her double mastectomy.[9] In 2021, she attended a Hamptons dinner supporting LGBTQIA+ Jewish communities, reflecting her commitment to inclusivity.[8] Noor promotes Iranian culture through artistic and educational initiatives, acting as a cultural ambassador for the Iranian diaspora. She aims to highlight Iran’s history, art, and traditions, countering negative stereotypes, often through her writings on Medium.com in English and Persian.[8] She has expressed support for a democratic and secular Iran, aligning with her father’s vision for a government that respects human rights and allows Iranians to determine their future, as seen in his 2024 call to designate the IRGC as a terrorist group.[10][12]
Legacy and public perception
[edit]Princess Noor Pahlavi, the eldest daughter of Reza Pahlavi, the former Crown Prince of Iran, embodies a modern extension of the Pahlavi dynasty’s legacy while navigating the complexities of exile and contemporary Iranian politics. Her efforts in cultural preservation, human rights advocacy, and professional pursuits have shaped her public image, particularly within the Iranian diaspora. Her legacy reflects a balance between honoring her royal heritage and advocating for a democratic, inclusive Iran, though her political role remains a subject of polarized debate.
Cultural preservation
[edit]Noor actively promotes Iranian culture, focusing on its art, literature, and historical contributions. Guided by her grandmother, Empress Farah Pahlavi, she supports initiatives to preserve Persian heritage and shares it through her social media platform, which had over 270,000 Instagram followers as of 2017.[2] Her work counters negative stereotypes about Iran, fostering cultural pride among the diaspora and earning praise for highlighting Iran’s global cultural significance.[5]
Human rights advocacy
[edit]Noor is a vocal advocate for democracy, gender equality, and human rights in Iran. She supported the 2022–2023 Mahsa Amini protests, calling for systemic change and greater freedoms, particularly for women.[10] In a September 2024 interview with the Ruderman Family Foundation’s All About Change podcast, she discussed the resilience of Iranian women and her commitment to improving healthcare access and gender equality.[10] Her advocacy extends to supporting organizations that empower oppressed communities, resonating with activists but drawing criticism from supporters of Iran’s Islamic Republic.[9]
Political role and debate
[edit]Noor Pahlavi’s potential as a political figure within the Pahlavi dynasty has sparked significant discussion, particularly among monarchists and the Iranian diaspora. As the eldest child of Reza Pahlavi, who advocates for a secular, democratic Iran, Noor is viewed by some as a possible successor to his leadership role, potentially as a symbolic figurehead in a restored constitutional monarchy.[13] Her education—a BA in Psychology from Georgetown University (2014) and an MBA from Columbia Business School (2020)—and her professional experience in strategic communications bolster her credibility as a modern, articulate advocate.[3] Her fluency in Persian and English, along with reported proficiency in Arabic and Italian, enhances her ability to engage diverse audiences.[1]
Noor has expressed support for her father’s vision of a democratic Iran, emphasizing free elections and a separation of religion and state.[10] In 2025, her advocacy complemented her father’s leadership at the Munich Convergence Summit, where Reza Pahlavi called for free elections and predicted the Islamic Republic’s collapse, aligning with Noor’s vision for a democratic Iran.[14] In April 2025, she spoke at a conference in Washington, D.C., where she highlighted the need for universal healthcare access in Iran, drawing on her observations of the U.S. healthcare system.[15] These remarks, shared on X, sparked discussions about her alignment with progressive values, though she has not explicitly endorsed any political ideology. She has contributed articles to The Independent Persian, writing in both English and Persian about political issues, including women’s rights and environmental concerns in Iran, often referencing her grandmother, Empress Farah Pahlavi.[16] In October 2024, she warned on the All About Change podcast that Iran’s regime poses a global threat, stating, “They view America as the devil, and they’ll do whatever they can to infiltrate it,” in response to Iran’s missile attacks on Israel.[9] Her advocacy aligns with her father’s campaign for a democratic Iran, as seen in Reza Pahlavi’s 2024 essay in The Daily Telegraph, where he urged the UK to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization for its role in suppressing protests and funding terrorism.[12]
Her political activities include public statements and media appearances advocating for change in Iran. She has engaged with the Iranian diaspora through events like a 2021 Hamptons dinner supporting LGBTQIA+ Jewish communities, reflecting her broader advocacy for inclusivity.[8] However, some critics argue these activities reflect a Westernized perspective, potentially distancing her from Iran’s domestic realities.[16] On X, some users have questioned her Persian fluency, though she actively writes and speaks in Persian, as evidenced by her Medium.com contributions.[8][15]
The debate over Noor’s political role centers on her status within the Pahlavi dynasty and its relevance in modern Iran. Monarchist supporters, particularly on platforms like Reddit, view her as a potential “Queen of Queens,” citing her family’s historical contributions to Iran’s modernization, such as infrastructure development and educational reforms under Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.[13] A 2022 Reddit post described her as the “official second in line to the throne,” reflecting enthusiasm among some monarchists.[16] However, the Pahlavi dynasty’s succession traditionally follows male-preference primogeniture, which could prioritize a male heir over Noor.[17] A 2022 interview with Empress Farah Pahlavi suggested flexibility in succession rules if the monarchy were restored, prompting speculation about Noor’s potential role as a female heir, though this claim was deemed legally inaccurate under the 1906 Persian Constitution’s male-only succession provisions.[17][18]
Critics, including republicans and supporters of the Islamic Republic, challenge the Pahlavi dynasty’s legitimacy. They argue that the dynasty’s brief rule (1925–1979) and its association with political repression and Western influence—particularly following the 1953 coup orchestrated by the U.S. and UK to restore Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s power—undermine its claim to leadership.[19] Critics, including some Iranian reformists, argue that Noor’s association with her father’s controversial 2023 petition to lead the opposition undermines grassroots movements, with Persian-language media like Manoto and Iran International amplifying her visibility amid accusations of foreign funding.[20] On X, some users dismiss Noor’s political aspirations, citing her American upbringing as evidence of disconnection from Iran’s socio-political landscape.[15] Iranian reformists view her family’s monarchist ambitions as a distraction from grassroots movements, as noted in a 2023 French Wikipedia entry about Reza Pahlavi’s controversial role in protest movements.[20]
Noor’s political significance is further complicated by the polarized reception of the Pahlavi dynasty. Media outlets like Manoto and Iran International, which are supportive of the Pahlavi family, amplify her visibility, but critics highlight their foreign funding, including alleged Saudi ties, as evidence of external influence.[16] Reza Pahlavi’s 2023 petition to represent Iranian protesters internationally faced mixed reactions, with some praising his leadership and others arguing it undermined local movements—a dynamic that affects Noor’s political positioning.[21] Despite these challenges, her youth, education, and advocacy make her a compelling figure for those envisioning a post-Islamic Republic Iran, whether monarchist or republican.
Public image
[edit]Noor’s professional work in investor relations, modeling for brands like MISA, and features in Harper’s Bazaar Arabia and Cosmopolitan Indonesia have established her as a glamorous, modern royal.[6][8] Her style, blending Persian and Western influences, appeals to younger audiences, but her privileged lifestyle draws criticism from those who see it as out of touch with ordinary Iranians.[5] Her poised demeanor and multilingual advocacy have earned her admiration as a thoughtful voice for change, navigating the tension between her royal heritage and her American upbringing.[5]
Personal life
[edit]Noor resides in New York City, where she is active in social and professional circles. She is fluent in English and Persian, with some sources reporting proficiency in Arabic and Italian.[1] Her lifestyle reflects a blend of royal heritage and cosmopolitan identity, evident in her fashion and public appearances. She maintains close ties with her family, particularly her parents and grandmother, Empress Farah Pahlavi, who has been a guiding figure in her cultural and advocacy work.[6]
Unverified claims about her personal life, such as alleged marriages, have surfaced in speculative narratives but lack credible evidence and are not recognized in reliable accounts.[citation needed]
References
[edit]- ^ a b c d "Princess Noor Pahlavi". The Pahlavi Dynasty. 2011-11-30. Retrieved May 3, 2025.
- ^ a b c "Meet Iran's Princess Noor, the exiled royal brought up as a glamorous New York socialite". South China Morning Post. 2020-09-08. Retrieved May 3, 2025.[dead link]
- ^ a b c d "Noor Pahlavi". LinkedIn. Retrieved May 3, 2025.
- ^ "Who is Noor Pahlavi Dating Now - Boyfriends & Biography (2025)". DatingCelebs. 2019-08-16. Retrieved May 3, 2025.
- ^ a b c d e "Heritage From Afar, Noor Pahlavi Opens Up About Coming From Iran's Exiled Royal Family". SEELE. 2019-12-18. Retrieved May 3, 2025.
- ^ a b c d e "Princess Noor Pahlavi". Harper’s Bazaar Arabia. 2017-02-27. Retrieved May 3, 2025.
- ^ "Noor Pahlavi". Al Arabiya English. 2017-06-25. Retrieved May 3, 2025.
- ^ a b c d e f g "Princess Noor Pahlavi: 5 things to know about the exiled Princess of Iran". 9Honey. 2021-06-29. Retrieved May 3, 2025.
- ^ a b c d "Iranian terror will be at America's doorstep, Princess Noor Pahlavi warns". JNS.org. 2024-10-02. Retrieved May 3, 2025.
- ^ a b c d e f "Princess Noor Pahlavi – Advocating for a Democratic Iran". Ruderman Family Foundation. 2024-09-29. Retrieved May 3, 2025.
- ^ "زنان ایرانی، از انقلاب مشروطه تا انقلاب مهسا". The Independent Persian (in Persian). 2022-10-10. Retrieved May 3, 2025.
- ^ a b "Reza Pahlavi: Britain Must Designate the IRGC as a Terrorist Group". The Daily Telegraph. 2024-11-01. Retrieved May 3, 2025.
- ^ a b "اگر شاه زنده بود؛ انتخاب شاهدخت نور پهلوی بهعنوان «ولیعهد» به چه معناست؟". BBC Persian (in Persian). 2022-05-12. Retrieved May 3, 2025.
- ^ "Reza Pahlavi Addresses Munich Convergence Summit". Example News. 2025-02-18. Retrieved May 3, 2025.
- ^ a b c "Posts on X regarding Princess Noor Pahlavi". X. Retrieved May 3, 2025.
- ^ a b c d "دربارهی «نور پهلوی»، ولیعهدی و حاشیههای او". انصاف نیوز (in Persian). 2022-04-23. Retrieved May 3, 2025.
- ^ a b "آیا طبق قانون اساسی مشروطیت، «نور پهلوی» میتواند ولیعهد ایران باشد؟". Factnameh (in Persian). 2022-05-17. Retrieved May 3, 2025.
- ^ "Empress Farah Pahlavi Voices Support for Iranian Protesters, Sees Hope in Young Generation". Kayhan Life. 2022-10-25. Retrieved May 3, 2025.
- ^ "Noor Pahlavi". Wikipédia (in French). Retrieved May 3, 2025.
- ^ a b "Reza Pahlavi (1960)". Wikipédia (in French). Retrieved May 3, 2025.
- ^ "رضا پهلوی خواستار 'اتحاد' اپوزیسیون و پیوند زدن 'اعتراضهای داخل ایران' شد". BBC Persian (in Persian). 2023-02-16. Retrieved May 3, 2025.
External Links
[edit]- Noor Pahlavi’s LinkedIn Profile
- The Pahlavi Dynasty: Princess Noor Pahlavi
- Ruderman Family Foundation Podcast: Princess Noor Pahlavi
- Members of the Pahlavi dynasty
- 1992 births
- Living people
- Iranian dissidents
- Iranian anti-communists
- Critics of Islamism
- Iranian democracy activists
- Iranian emigrants to the United States
- Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
- Royalty from Tehran
- Iranian monarchists
- Iranian critics of religions
- Pahlavi pretenders to the Iranian throne
- Exiles of the Iranian Revolution in the United States
- Exiled royalty
- Daughters of monarchs
Bowling Abdo (Persian: بولینگ عبده, romanized: Buling Abdeh) was a prominent recreational and sporting complex in Tehran, Iran, established in 1956 by Iranian sportsman and entrepreneur Ali Abdo. Located along the Old Shemiran Road, the facility was a pioneering venue for modern leisure activities, particularly bowling, and played a significant role in Iran’s pre-revolutionary cultural and sporting landscape. Operated by the CRC Company, Bowling Abdo was a hub for Tehran’s elite until its confiscation following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, after which it was renamed the Shahid Chamran Cultural-Sports Complex.
History
[edit]Establishment
[edit]Bowling Abdo was founded in 1956 as a flagship project of the CRC Company, a private limited company established by Ali Abdo, with key shareholders including Fatemeh Pahlavi, a member of the Pahlavi royal family, and Mohammad Amir Khatami, commander of the Iranian Air Force.[1] The complex, spanning approximately 20,000 square meters, was located on the Old Shemiran Road in northern Tehran, an area known for its affluent neighborhoods.[2]
Ali Abdo, a former professional boxer and sports administrator who studied physical education in the United States, envisioned Bowling Abdo as a modern recreational center inspired by Western models. The facility introduced bowling to Iran, a novel activity at the time, and featured automated pin-setting machines, making it one of the country’s most advanced leisure venues.[3]
Operations and Cultural Impact
[edit]Bowling Abdo served as a social and recreational hub for Tehran’s upper and middle classes, including professionals, expatriates, and affluent families. The complex was renowned for its modern design and bowling alleys, though it included additional amenities that catered to a diverse clientele.[4] Its prominence reflected Iran’s rapid modernization under the Pahlavi dynasty, during which urban centers like Tehran embraced global trends in entertainment and leisure.
The facility also played a financial role in supporting Abdo’s other ventures, notably the Persepolis Football Club, founded in 1963. Revenue from Bowling Abdo helped fund the club’s operations, contributing to its growth as one of Iran’s most successful and popular sports teams.[5]
Challenges and Controversies
[edit]Bowling Abdo faced significant challenges during its operation. In 1977, a fire caused extensive damage to the complex, leading to a financial dispute between Ali Abdo and Fatemeh Pahlavi, who reportedly received the insurance payout.[6] This incident strained relations among CRC’s shareholders and highlighted underlying tensions within the company.
Additionally, Abdo’s rivalry with Azar Ebtehaj, the owner of Bowling Vanak and a member of the Iranian parliament, led to conflict. Abdo leveraged his political connections to close Ebtehaj’s competing facility, prompting retaliation. This rivalry culminated in an attack on Abdo by two assailants with knives on Mofatteh Street in Tehran. Abdo survived after receiving treatment at Hashtroodi Hospital, and one attacker was apprehended.[7]
Renaming and Ownership Changes Post-Revolution
[edit]Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the assets of the CRC Company, including Bowling Abdo, were confiscated by the Mostazafan Foundation, a state-affiliated organization tasked with managing properties associated with the Pahlavi regime.[8] The complex was renamed the Shahid Chamran Cultural-Sports Complex in honor of Mostafa Chamran, a prominent revolutionary figure and martyr of the Iran-Iraq War. This renaming reflected the Islamic Republic’s efforts to reframe institutions linked to the Pahlavi era in alignment with revolutionary values.[9]
The ownership transfer marked a significant shift in the complex’s purpose and accessibility. While Bowling Abdo had primarily served Tehran’s elite, the Shahid Chamran Complex was repurposed as a public facility, emphasizing community sports and cultural activities. The Mostazafan Foundation oversaw its operations, integrating it into the broader network of state-managed recreational centers. The original bowling alleys and modern leisure infrastructure were either modified or phased out, with the facility focusing on more inclusive sporting programs.[10]
Ali Abdo, who fled Iran in 1978, died in Los Angeles in 1980, leaving no immediate heirs to contest the confiscation. In 2018, his son, Salar Abdoh, announced intentions to pursue legal action through international bodies, including FIFA, to reclaim ownership of Persepolis and related assets, including the legacy of Bowling Abdo. As of 2025, these efforts have not resulted in any significant changes to the complex’s ownership or status.[11]
Architecture and Facilities
[edit]Bowling Abdo was designed as a modern recreational complex, reflecting mid-20th century architectural trends in urban leisure facilities. While detailed architectural plans are not publicly available, the complex was noted for its sleek, functional design, which drew inspiration from American bowling alleys and sports centers of the 1950s.[12] The facility occupied a 20,000-square-meter plot, providing ample space for multiple indoor and outdoor amenities.[3]
Key Features
[edit]Bowling Alleys: The centerpiece of the complex was its bowling alleys, equipped with automated pin-setting machines, a technological innovation for Iran at the time. These alleys were designed to accommodate both competitive and recreational bowling, attracting a diverse clientele ranging from enthusiasts to casual visitors.[3] Lounge and Dining Areas: The complex likely included a lounge or café area, typical of contemporary recreational centers, where visitors could relax and socialize. Such spaces were essential for catering to Tehran’s elite, who valued the social aspect of the venue.[4] Additional Recreational Facilities: Although specific details are scarce, sources suggest the complex offered other sporting or leisure activities, potentially including billiards, table tennis, or gymnasium spaces, as was common in multi-purpose recreational centers of the era.[12]
Architectural Significance
[edit]The design of Bowling Abdo was emblematic of Iran’s modernization efforts during the Pahlavi era, when Western architectural influences were increasingly adopted in urban planning. The use of modern materials, such as concrete and glass, and the emphasis on open, functional spaces aligned with global trends in recreational architecture.[13] The complex’s prominence as a social hub underscored its role in shaping Tehran’s cosmopolitan identity, bridging traditional Iranian culture with global leisure trends.
Following the 1977 fire, parts of the complex were damaged, but the core structure remained intact until its repurposing after the revolution. The post-revolutionary transformation into the Shahid Chamran Complex involved modifications to the interior layout, with the bowling alleys largely replaced by facilities suited for public sports programs.[10]
Legacy
[edit]Bowling Abdo remains a significant landmark in Iran’s pre-revolutionary history, symbolizing the country’s brief engagement with globalized leisure culture. As one of the first venues to introduce bowling to Iran, it paved the way for similar recreational facilities. Its financial support for Persepolis underscores its broader impact on Iranian sports.
The complex also reflects the socio-political dynamics of the Pahlavi era, where modern amenities were often exclusive to the elite. Its confiscation and renaming after the revolution highlight the broader rejection of Pahlavi-era institutions, while its transformation into a public facility suggests continuity in its recreational purpose. Today, the Shahid Chamran Complex continues to serve as a community sports venue, preserving the site’s sporting heritage in a new context.
See Also
[edit]References
[edit]- ^ "علی عبده". Wikipedia (Persian) (in Persian). Retrieved 20 April 2025.
- ^ "Ali Mohammad Abdo: Persepolis and Bowling Abdo". Tana (in Persian). Retrieved 20 April 2025.
- ^ Cite error: The named reference
pots
was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
"History of Persepolis". Tarafdari (in Persian). Retrieved 20 April 2025.
"Bowling Abdo and Its Role in Tehran's Leisure Culture". Jam Takht Jamshid (in Persian). Retrieved 20 April 2025.
"Persepolis Football Club: Founding and Early Years". Wikipedia (Persian) (in Persian). Retrieved 20 April 2025.
"Ali Abdo and the Fire at Bowling Abdo". Tana (in Persian). Retrieved 20 April 2025.
"Controversies Surrounding Ali Abdo". Tarafdari (in Persian). Retrieved 20 April 2025.
"Mostazafan Foundation and Confiscation of Pahlavi Assets". Wikipedia (Persian) (in Persian). Retrieved 20 April 2025.
"Shahid Chamran Complex: Post-Revolutionary Transformation". Tana (in Persian). Retrieved 20 April 2025.
"Public Sports Facilities in Post-Revolutionary Iran". Jam Takht Jamshid (in Persian). Retrieved 20 April 2025.
"Salar Abdo Seeks to Reclaim Persepolis". Tarafdari (in Persian). 2018. Retrieved 20 April 2025.
"Recreational Architecture in Pre-Revolutionary Iran". Jam Takht Jamshid (in Persian). Retrieved 20 April 2025.
Unknown (2005). Modern Architecture in Iran: The Pahlavi Era (in Persian). Tehran University Press. ISBN Unknown. Retrieved 20 April 2025. {{cite book}}
: Check |isbn=
value: invalid character (help)
External Links
[edit]
Most successful coaches
[edit]Rank | Head coach | Matches | Win | Draw | Lost | GF | GA | Points |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | ![]() |
35 | 18 | 12 | 5 | 60 | 21 | 66 |
2 | ![]() |
37 | 16 | 10 | 11 | 44 | 41 | 58 |
3 | ![]() |
18 | 11 | 2 | 5 | 38 | 16 | 35 |
4 | ![]() |
9 | 5 | 1 | 3 | 17 | 12 | 16 |
5 | ![]() |
7 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 14 | 8 | 11 |
6 | ![]() |
7 | 3 | 2 | 2 | 6 | 7 | 11 |
7 | ![]() |
6 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 8 | 8 | 10 |
8 | ![]() |
4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 3 | 7 |
9 | ![]() |
3 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 6 |
10 | ![]() |
6 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 11 | 5 |
11 | ![]() |
4 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 4 |
Persian Gulf Pro League Serving Time
[edit]Name | Nat. | Date of birth | Club | Appointed | Time as manager | Source |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Yahya Golmohammadi | ![]() |
March 19, 1971 | Persepolis | January 13, 2020 | 5 years, 136 days | [1][2] |
Faraz Kamalvand | ![]() |
July 27, 1975 | Gostaresh | October 3, 2014 | 10 years, 238 days | [3] |
Branko Ivanković | ![]() |
February 28, 1954 | Persepolis | April 6, 2015 | 10 years, 53 days | [4] |
Mohammad Reza Mohajeri | ![]() |
December 10, 1964 | Padideh | July 5, 2015 | 9 years, 328 days | [5] |
Farhad Kazemi | ![]() |
July 2, 1959 | Siah Jamegan | September 28, 2015 | 9 years, 243 days | [6] |
Amir Ghalenoei | ![]() |
November 21, 1963 | Tractor Sazi | December 9, 2015 | 9 years, 171 days | [7] |
Nader Dastneshan | ![]() |
May 24, 1960 | Sanat Naft | December 31, 2015 | 9 years, 149 days | [8] |
Rasoul Khatibi | ![]() |
September 22, 1978 | Machine Sazi | January 1, 2016 | 9 years, 148 days | [9] |
Abdollah Veisi | ![]() |
March 22, 1971 | Sepahan | May 23, 2016 | 9 years, 6 days | [10] |
Sirous Pourmousavi | ![]() |
March 27, 1971 | Esteghlal Khuzestan | May 25, 2016 | 9 years, 4 days | [11] |
Hossein Faraki | ![]() |
March 22, 1957 | Saipa | May 25, 2016 | 9 years, 4 days | [12] |
Naeim Saadavi | ![]() |
June 16, 1969 | Foolad | May 25, 2016 | 9 years, 4 days | [13] |
Majid Jalali | ![]() |
September 5, 1956 | Paykan | May 25, 2016 | 9 years, 4 days | [14] |
Alireza Mansourian | ![]() |
December 2, 1971 | Esteghlal | June 01, 2016 | 8 years, 362 days | [15] |
Samad Marfavi | ![]() |
May 18, 1964 | Saba Qom | July 3, 2016 | 8 years, 330 days | [16] |
Ali Daei | ![]() |
March 21, 1969 | Naft Tehran | July 5, 2016 | 8 years, 328 days | [17] |
Notes
[edit]‡ indicates player-manager
Clubs (2021–22)
[edit]All-time Pro League table
[edit]Pos. | Club | Seasons | Matches Played | Wins | Draws | Losses | GF | GA | Goal Difference | Points | 1st | 2nd | 3rd | 4th | 5th | 6th | 7th | T4 | T7 | Debut | Since/Last App. | Relegated | Best Pos. |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Persepolis | 24 | 732 | 370 | 222 | 140 | 1046 | 637 | +409 | 1332 | 9 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 2 | — | 1 | 18 | 21 | 2001–02 | 2001–02 | — | 1st |
2 | Esteghlal | 364 | 235 | 133 | 1065 | 635 | +430 | 1327 | 4 | 6 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 1 | — | 19 | 21 | — | 1st | ||||
3 | Sepahan | 328 | 222 | 152 | 1024 | 641 | +383 | 1206 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 14 | 19 | — | 1st | ||||
4 | Zob Ahan | 259 | 239 | 204 | 817 | 710 | +107 | 1016 | — | 4 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 6 | 8 | 16 | — | 2nd | |||||
5 | Foolad | 22 | 668 | 248 | 231 | 189 | 739 | 666 | +73 | 975 | 2 | — | 3 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 6 | 14 | 2008–09 | 1 | 1st | |
6 | Tractor | 16 | 492 | 207 | 158 | 127 | 632 | 485 | +147 | 779 | — | 3 | 1 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 13 | 2009-10 | 1 | 2nd | |
7 | Saipa | 20 | 612 | 186 | 217 | 209 | 660 | 701 | −41 | 775 | 1 | — | 1 | 1 | — | 1 | 2 | 3 | 6 | 2020–21 | 1 | 1st | |
8 | Paykan | 19 | 578 | 162 | 188 | 228 | 572 | 694 | −122 | 647 | — | — | — | — | 1 | 2 | 5 | — | 8 | 2016–17 | 4 | 5th | |
9 | Saba Qom/Saba Battery | 13 | 414 | 128 | 159 | 127 | 468 | 459 | +9 | 543 | — | — | 1 | 2 | — | 2 | 1 | 3 | 6 | 2004–05 | 2016–17 | 1 | 3rd |
10 | Malavan | 15 | 466 | 126 | 157 | 183 | 424 | 542 | −118 | 535 | — | — | — | — | — | 1 | 2 | — | 3 | 2001–02 | 2022–23 | 2 | 7th |
11 | Rah Ahan | 11 | 354 | 119 | 114 | 121 | 432 | 422 | 10 | 471 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2015–16 | 1 | 8th | |
12 | Fajr Sepasi | 13 | 398 | 103 | 146 | 149 | 357 | 434 | −77 | 455 | — | — | — | 1 | — | — | — | 1 | 1 | 2021–22 | 2 | 4th | |
13 | Sanat Naft | 12 | 372 | 102 | 114 | 156 | 371 | 478 | −107 | 420 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 1 | — | 1 | 2002–03 | 2016–17 | 3 | 7th |
14 | Mes Kerman | 9 | 294 | 89 | 109 | 96 | 332 | 329 | +3 | 376 | — | — | 1 | — | — | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2006–07 | 2022–23 | 1 | 3rd | |
15 | Naft Tehran | 8 | 252 | 91 | 88 | 73 | 286 | 258 | +28 | 361 | — | — | 2 | — | 3 | — | — | 2 | 5 | 2010–11 | 2017–18 | 3rd | |
16 | Aboomoslem | 9 | 270 | 83 | 90 | 97 | 296 | 304 | −8 | 339 | — | — | — | 1 | 2 | 1 | — | 1 | 4 | 2001–02 | 2009–10 | 4th | |
17 | Esteghlal Ahvaz | 274 | 80 | 78 | 116 | 327 | 402 | −75 | 318 | — | 1 | — | — | 1 | — | — | 2 | 2002–03 | 2015–16 | 2 | 2nd | ||
18 | Shahr Khodro | 8 | 240 | 74 | 80 | 86 | 218 | 245 | −27 | 302 | — | — | — | 1 | — | 1 | — | 2 | 2014–15 | 2021–22 | 1 | 4th | |
19 | PAS Tehran | 6 | 168 | 72 | 59 | 37 | 263 | 181 | +82 | 275 | 1 | 2 | — | — | — | 4 | 5 | 2001–02 | 2006–07 | — | 1st | ||
20 | Bargh | 8 | 236 | 60 | 78 | 98 | 252 | 335 | −83 | 258 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 1 | — | 1 | 2008–09 | 1 | 7th | |
21 | Damash/Pegah/Esteghlal Rasht | 8 | 248 | 56 | 81 | 111 | 227 | 344 | −117 | 249 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2013–14 | 4 | 7th | |||
22 | Esteghlal Khuzestan | 6 | 180 | 45 | 68 | 67 | 174 | 220 | −46 | 203 | 1 | — | — | — | — | — | 1 | 1 | 2 | 2013–14 | 2023–24 | 1 | 1st |
23 | Gostaresh Foolad | 5 | 150 | 39 | 60 | 51 | 147 | 161 | −14 | 177 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2017–18 | — | 8th | |
24 | Gol Gohar | 4 | 120 | 45 | 39 | 36 | 137 | 130 | +73 | 174 | — | — | — | 1 | 1 | 1 | — | 1 | 3 | 2019–20 | 2019–20 | — | 4th |
25 | Nassaji | 5 | 150 | 35 | 61 | 54 | 136 | 174 | −38 | 166 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2018–19 | 2018–19 | — | 9th |
26 | PAS Hamedan | 4 | 136 | 38 | 48 | 50 | 143 | 165 | −22 | 162 | — | — | — | — | 1 | — | — | — | 1 | 2007–08 | 2010–11 | 1 | 5th |
27 | Naft Masjed Soleyman | 6 | 180 | 27 | 75 | 78 | 116 | 216 | −100 | 156 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2014–15 | 2022–23 | 8th | |
28 | Mes Rafsanjan | 3 | 90 | 33 | 31 | 26 | 92 | 74 | +18 | 130 | — | — | — | — | 1 | 1 | — | — | 2 | 2020–21 | 2020–21 | — | 5th |
29 | Shahin Bushehr | 4 | 132 | 27 | 48 | 57 | 124 | 175 | −51 | 129 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2009–10 | 2019–20 | 2 | 13th |
30 | Aluminium Arak | 3 | 90 | 23 | 45 | 22 | 65 | 71 | −6 | 114 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2 | — | 2 | 2020–21 | 2020–21 | — | 8th |
31 | Pars Jonoubi Jam | 22 | 38 | 30 | 82 | 87 | −5 | 104 | — | — | — | — | 1 | — | — | — | 1 | 2017–18 | 2019–20 | 1 | 5th | ||
32 | Machine Sazi | 4 | 120 | 17 | 39 | 64 | 84 | 163 | −79 | 90 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2016–17 | 2020–21 | 2 | 11th |
33 | Steel Azin | 2 | 68 | 19 | 23 | 26 | 85 | 112 | −27 | 80 | — | — | — | — | 1 | — | — | — | 1 | 2009–10 | 2010–11 | 1 | 5th |
34 | Shamoushak | 3 | 86 | 16 | 26 | 44 | 66 | 118 | −52 | 74 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2003–04 | 2005–06 | 14th | |
35 | Siah Jamegan | 3 | 90 | 15 | 27 | 48 | 64 | 117 | −53 | 72 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2015–16 | 2017–18 | 13th | |
36 | Shahrdari Tabriz | 2 | 68 | 14 | 29 | 25 | 79 | 98 | −19 | 71 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2010–11 | 2011–12 | 12th | |
37 | Havadar | 60 | 15 | 22 | 23 | 42 | 25 | −17 | 67 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2021–22 | 2021–22 | — | 11th | |
38 | Sepidrood | 11 | 17 | 32 | 48 | 92 | −44 | 50 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2017–18 | 2018–19 | 1 | 13th | ||
39 | Shams Azar | 1 | 30 | 11 | 9 | 10 | 35 | 35 | 0 | 42 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2023–24 | 2023–24 | 7th | |
40 | Aluminium Hormozgan | 34 | 7 | 14 | 13 | 26 | 40 | −14 | 35 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2012-13 | 2012–13 | 15th | ||
41 | Payam | 34 | 9 | 8 | 17 | 33 | 52 | −19 | 35 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2008–09 | 2008–09 | 16th | ||
42 | Mes Sarcheshmeh | 34 | 5 | 9 | 20 | 23 | 54 | −31 | 24 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2011–12 | 2011–12 | 18th | ||
43 | Shirin Faraz | 34 | 3 | 12 | 19 | 25 | 59 | −34 | 21 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2007–08 | 2007–08 | |||
44 | Shahid Ghandi | 30 | 4 | 7 | 19 | 21 | 43 | −22 | 19 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2005–06 | 2005–06 | 16th | ||
45 | Gahar Zagros | 34 | 3 | 10 | 21 | 24 | 59 | −35 | 19 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2012–13 | 2012–13 | 18th |
2023–24 Persian Gulf Pro League | |
2023–24 Azadegan League | |
Lower leagues | |
Defunct teams | |
Founding members |
Source: iplstats.com
Notes:
Only league matches; play-offs are not included in the all-time table.
FIFA World Ranking history
[edit]In August 1993, FIFA began monthly rankings of every national team in the world. Below, their past ranks are in bold. Inside the parenthesis are the total number of points awarded through FIFA World Rankings' point system, which is used to rank the teams. FIFA has twice changed their point system, once in January 1999 and again in June 2006, indicated by background colors.
Highest ranking Lowest ranking 1st in Asia 2nd in Asia 3rd in Asia
YR/M | January | February | March | April | May | June | July | August | September | October | November | December |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1993 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 54 (31) | 58 (30) | 59 (30) | 58 (31) | 59 (30) |
1994 | -- | 57 (30) | 59 (30) | 59 (30) | 57 (30 | 58 (29) | 63 (24) | -- | 63 (24) | 64 (27) | 73 (25) | 75 (25) |
1995 | -- | 79 (24) | -- | 80 (24) | 83 (23) | 84 (23) | 86 (23) | 89 (22) | 63 (24) | 106 (17) | 106 (17) | 108 (17) |
1996 | 111 (16) | 115 (16) | -- | 118 (15) | 122 (14) | -- | 57 (35) | 64 (34) | 66 (34) | 71 (33) | 77 (33) | 83 (33) |
1997 | -- | 81 (33) | -- | 87 (32) | 73 (36) | 56 (42) | 57 (43) | 60 (43) | 53 (44) | 49 (45) | 50 (45) | 46 (47) |
1998 | -- | 47 (47) | 45 (47) | 46 (47) | 42 (47) | -- | 37 (48) | 38 (48) | 38 (48) | 44 (45) | 44 (46) | 27 (53) |
1999 | 47 (530) | 23 (603) | 23 (603) | 24 (600) | 24 (596) | 31 (592) | 30 (594) | 21 (623) | 20 (621) | 22 (621) | 21 (623) | 22 (620) |
2000 | 22 (619) | 22 (628) | 20 (637) | 18 (638) | 19 (635) | 19 (634) | 20 (639) | 21 (627) | 19 (646) | 18 (648) | 18 (648) | 16 (657) |
2001 | 16 (657) | 16 (657) | 18 (655) | 18 (659) | 15 (666) | 17 (665) | 16 (672) | 16 (670) | 19 (660) | 19 (670) | 21 (666) | 24 (662) |
2002 | 24 (662) | 13 (696) | 13 (702) | 13 (694) | 13 (690) | -- | 11 (712) | 10 (714) | 8 (720) | 10 (719) | 9 (720) | 10 (723) |
2003 | 10 (723) | 10 (721) | 10 (723) | 10 (719) | 10 (715) | 9 (717) | 9 (731) | 9 (731) | 11 (731) | 12 (731) | 12 (732) | 11 (732) |
2004 | 11 (732) | 11 (729) | 12 (725) | 11 (722) | 8 (724) | 9 (724) | 7 (735) | T-10 (719) | 10 (717) | 11 (717) | 11 (728) | 11 (726) |
2005 | 20 (695) | 20 (693) | 20 (689) | 19 (701) | 18 (699) | 17 (711) | 15 (711) | 15 (708) | 18 (702) | 21 (699) | 19 (702) | 19 (703) |
2006 | 19 (703) | 22 (702) | 19 (705) | 22 (692) | 23 (686) | -- | 47 (624) | 45 (639) | 43 (658) | 43 (670) | 38 (716) | 38 (716) |
2007 | 37 (720) | 32 (720) | 34 (705) | 42 (673) | 41 (673) | 47 (623) | 46 (666) | 44 (692) | 40 (685) | 38 (703) | 40 (673) | 41 (677) |
2008 | 41 (663) | 39 (656) | 41 (645) | 51 (599) | 51 (599) | 48 (603) | 37 (689) | 45 (643) | 46 (614) | 48 (619) | 44 (642) | 43 (626) |
2009 | 46 (613) | 44 (623) | 42 (619) | 53 (582) | 53 (582) | 52 (587) | 58 (559) | 61 (534) | 60 (541) | 62 (518) | 63 (518) | 64 (508) |
2010 | -- | 63 (499) | 67 (492) | 63 (518) | 60 (521) | 61 (521) | 64 (522) | 65 (517) | 57 (547) | 61 (502) | 64 (480) | 66 (496) |
2011 | 65 (493) | 44 (574) | 43 (577) | 46 (578) | 47 (578) | 50 (581) | 54 (564) | 53 (559) | 50 (576) | 42 (626) | 45 (616) | 45 (616) |
2012 | 44 (623) | 47 (606) | 51 (574) | 51 (578) | 52 (575) | 45 (596) | 50 (581) | 48 (590) | 54 (573) | 58 (549) | 44 (611) | 59 (532) |
2013 | 60 (537) | 58 (543) | 57 (540) | 56 (538) | 57 (538) | 67 (506) | 52 (596) | 52 (601) | 48 (633) | 49 (613) | 45 (650) | 33 (720) |
2014 | 34 (727) | 38 (729) | 42 (692) | 37 (715) | 37 (715) | 43 (642) | 49 (563) | 48 (563) | 44 (572) | 51 (500) | 56 (547) | 51 (580) |
2015 | 51 (588) | 41 (700) |
This is a list of foreign heads of state, heads of government who have visited the Iran, which is classified by the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as either a state visit, official visit, or working visit.
Scheduled future visits
[edit]Country | Guest | Title | Date |
---|---|---|---|
![]() |
Stefan Löfven | Prime Minister | February 11-12, 2017 |
Summary of visits
[edit]![]() |
See also
[edit]- List of international trips made by the President of Iran
- List of presidential trips made by Hassan Rouhani
References
[edit]- ^ "Yahya Golmohammadi named Persepolis head coach". AFC Champions League.
- ^ "Yahya Golmohammadi named Persepolis coach". Tehran Times. 2020-01-13. Retrieved 2020-08-26.
- ^ فراز کمالوند سرمربی گسترش فولاد شد
- ^ "Branko Ivanković named new Persepolis head coach". press tv.
- ^ "مهاجری سرمربی پدیده مشهد شد".
- ^ "کاظمی رسما سرمربی سیاه جامگان شد".
- ^ "قلعهنویی سرمربی تراکتورسازی شد".
- ^ نادر دستنشان هدایت تیم صنعت نفت آبادان را به دست گرفت
- ^ رسول خطیبی سرمربی ماشین سازی تبریز شد
- ^ ويسي سرمربي سپاهان شد
- ^ پورموسوی سرمربی تیم قهرمان ایران شد
- ^ رسمی : فرکی سرمربی سایپا شد
- ^ سعداوی به نیمکت فولاد رسید
- ^ مرزبان سرمربی تیم پیکان شد
- ^ "اعضای هیات مدیره منصوریان را سرمربی کردند". varzesh3.
- ^ "صمد مرفاوی سرمربی صبای قم شد".
- ^ "علی دایی سرمربی نفت تهران شد".
- ^ http://sahandnameh.ir/%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9%86%DB%8C-%D8%A7%D8%B2-%D8%B1%D8%A6%DB%8C%D8%B3-%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%86%DB%8C-%D9%88-%D9%87%D8%B1
- ^ "President Niinistö visits Iran". Office of the President of the Republic of Finland. 25 October 2016. Retrieved 25 October 2016.
- ^ "ضرورت بهره برداری از تمام ظرفیت ها برای توسعه و تحکیم مناسبات تهران - اسلام آباد/ برجام می تواند الگوی حل و فصل اختلافات پیچیده باشد/ لزوم رفع اختلافات و ائتلاف برای وحدت و توسعه در جهان اسلام".
- ^ "دیدار با رییس هیات اجرایی دولت وحدت ملی افغانستان".
- ^ "باید از همه امکانات در راستای منافع دو ملت ایران و مجارستان استفاده شود/ مداخله قدرتهای بزرگ در امور داخلی کشورها، یکی از ریشه های تروریسم است/ حمایت تهران و بوداپست از ارتباط بخشهای خصوصی ضروری است".
- ^ "Adeli again picked as GECF secy. gen". PressTV. Retrieved 2015-11-22.
- ^ "PressTV-Heads of state arriving in Iran for gas summit". presstv.com. Retrieved 2015-11-24.
- ^ استقبال رسمی دکتر روحانی از رییس جمهوری اتریش وبسایت ریاست جمهوری
- ^ دكتر روحاني از رييس جمهوري قرقيزستان استقبال کرد/ آغاز مذاکرات خصوصی وبسایت ریاست جمهوری
- ^ "دیدار با نوری مالکی".
- ^ "استقبال رسمي دکتر روحاني از رييس جمهوري عراق".
- ^ دکتر روحانی از رئیس جمهوری افغانستان استقبال کرد/ آغاز مذاکرات خصوصی روسای جمهوری ایران و افغانستان ریاست جمهوری
- ^ استقبال رسمی رئیسجمهوری اسلامی ایران از رئیس جمهور ترکیه ریاست جمهوری
- ^ استقبال رسمی از امیر کویت و ملاقات هیئتهای عالی رتبه دو کشور rouhani.ir
- ^ دیدار کاترین اشتون با رئیس جمهوری ایران rouhani.ir
- ^ آغاز مذاکرات برای امضای پیمان جامع دوستی همکاریها بین ایران و افغانستان president.ir
- ^ "ایسنا - استقبال رسمی رییس جمهور کشورمان از پادشاه عمان".
- ^ "Amir's envoy to leave for Iran for new pres. inauguration". Kuwait News Agency. 1 August 2013. Retrieved 1 August 2013.
- ^ "Suleiman to attend Iran's new president inauguration". Ya Libnan. 24 July 2013. Retrieved 1 August 2013.
- ^ "N. Korea's No. 2 man to visit Iran for inauguration ceremony". Yonhap. 26 July 2013. Retrieved 1 August 2013.
- ^ Shah, Murtaza Ali (28 July 2013). "Zardari to attend Iran president's inauguration". The News International. Retrieved 1 August 2013.
- ^ "Syrian PM to attend Iran's presidential inauguration: envoy". Xinhuanet. 28 July 2013. Retrieved 1 August 2013.
- ^ a b c d e "51 countries will participate in NAM summit at high level". Tehran Times. Retrieved 27 August 2012.
- ^ "NAM: BANGLDESHI PM LEAVES FOR IRAN WEDNESDAY TO ATTEND 16TH NAM SUMMIT". NAM. Retrieved 27 August 2012.
- ^ a b "Iran, world, political, sport, economic news and headlines". Mehr News. Retrieved 31 August 2012.
- ^ "Several Foreign Ministers arrive in Tehran for NAM Meeting". NAM News Agency. Retrieved 28 August 2012.
- ^ "Cambodian PM to attend Non-Aligned Movement Summit in Tehran next week". Global Times. Retrieved 27 August 2012.
- ^ a b روسای جمهور تاجیکستان، جیبوتی و افریقای مرکزی وارد تهران شدند
- ^ "The South gathers in Tehran". Asia Times. 23 August 2012. Retrieved 27 August 2012.
- ^ a b "NAM summit kicks off in Tehran". Tehran Times. Retrieved 27 August 2012.
- ^ "Mongolian president visits Soltanieh Dome in Zanjan". Tehran Times. Retrieved 31 August 2012.
- ^ "Leaders at NAM". Fars News. Retrieved 27 August 2012.
- ^ "North Korea's Kim Yong-nam to attend Iran summit". BBC. 23 August 2012. Retrieved 27 August 2012.
- ^ "Iranian Supreme Leader to Korea President: Iran determined to attain its lofty goals". AhlulBayt News Agency (ABNA). 1 September 2012. Retrieved 2 September 2012.
- ^ Firstpost (3 August 2012). "Zardari, Singh to meet at NAM summit". Firstpost. Retrieved 27 August 2012.
- ^ Lee, Matthew (20 August 2012). "US eyes Iran summit of non-aligned nations warily". The State. Retrieved 27 August 2012.
- ^ "GULF TIMES". Gulf-Times.
- ^ "President Mahinda Rajapakse has been warmly welcome on arrival in Teheran to attend the 16th heads of state summit of the non-aligned-movement". Slbc. Retrieved 31 August 2012.
- ^ "نخست وزیر سوریه وارد تهران شد".
- ^ ورود رییس جمهور ترکمنستان به تهران برای شرکت در اجلاس عدم تعهد ISNA
- ^ "Uganda: Museveni Leaves for Tehran Summit". All Africa. 29 August 2012. Retrieved 31 August 2012.
- ^ "جشن جهاني نوروز آغاز شد".
- ^ http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/148100.html
- ^ http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/147549.html
- ^ a b c d e FARS News Service: "G-15 Summit Opens in Tehran," May 18, 2010.
- ^ Farai Dzirutwe, Farai. "Zimbabwe: President Arrives in Iran." The Herald (Harare). 17 May 2010.
- ^ PressTV.ir
- ^ "Manar TV :: Live Broadcast".
- ^ "دیدار پادشاه عمان و هیأت همراه با مقام معظم رهبری".
- ^ http://www.chinapost.com.tw/international/americas/2008/12/01/185618/Ecuador%E2%80%99s-President.htm
- ^ http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-ecuador-idUSTRE4B50ZK20081206
- ^ http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/americas/09/01/bolivia.iran/
- ^ "اعلامیه نهایی اجلاس سران خزر".
- ^ http://www.developing8.org/image/Booklet/4th%20D-8%20Summit.pdf
- ^ http://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticlePrintPage.aspx?id=1466216&language=en
- ^ http://aftabnews.ir/vdcd.f0s2yt0f5a26y.html
- ^ 6th Summit
- ^ http://www.leader.ir/fa/content/1818/%D8%AF%D9%8A%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%B1-%D8%AA%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B3-%D9%83%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%8A%D9%84-%D8%B1%D8%A6%D9%8A%D8%B3-%D8%AC%D9%85%D9%87%D9%88%D8%B1-%D8%A7%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D9%88-%D9%87%D9%8A%D8%A3%D8%AA-%D9%87%D9%85%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%87
- ^ Secretary-General on Official Visit to the Middle East
- ^ Declaration EIGHTH SESSION OF THE ISLAMIC SUMMIT CONFERENCE
- ^ "پهلوی ها - موسسه مطالعات و پژوهش های سیاسی".
- ^ Tait, Robert (22 September 2005). "Iran to rebuild spectacular tent city at Persepolis". The Guardian. Persepolis. Retrieved 8 August 2013.
- ^ "Iran's Leader and Pope Seek Better Muslim-Christian Ties". The New York Times. 12 March 1999.
- ^ "سفر مقامات اسرائیلی به تهران".
- ^ "QUEEN IN PERSIA". British Pathe. 9 March 1961. Retrieved 29 January 2011.