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Elections in Cuba are held at the municipal, provincial, and national levels.

While Cuba is sometimes described as an undemocratic and authoritarian regime by some sources,[1][2][3] others describe it as democratic, although not as using liberal democracy.[4][5][6][7][8] Cuba maintains that it is a "democratic, independent and sovereign socialist State" in its constitution.[9]

There are currently 470 seats in the unicameral national legislature, formally named the National Assembly of People's Power. Representatives are elected every five years, with most legislative districts electing more then one representative to the Assembly. The Assembly is only in session twice per year, with the 31-member Council of State exercising the legislative authority throughout the remainder of the year.[2]

Mass organizations play a notable role in the electoral process. The six principal mass organizations are the Workers' Central Union of Cuba (CTC), Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR), Federation of Cuban Women (FMC), National Association of Small Farmers (ANAP), Federation of University Students [es] (FEU), and Federation of High School Students (FEEM).[10][11]

History

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1960–1966: Revolution first, elections later

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Main article: Revolution first, elections later

After the Cuban Revolution–which successfully overthrew Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista–the anti-Batista coalition began to disintegrate almost immediately with one of the many dividing issues being elections.

The Right, dissatisfied with the rapid pace of social reforms, argued for the restoration of the electoral system used in the 1940 Constitution. The Left responded by claiming multi-party electoral democracy would only serve to revive the defunct, discredited parties of the pre-Batista era and to divide Cubans at a time when national unity was essential for the Revolution's survival in the face of US hostility. The Left argued that the new revolutionary government clearly had the overwhelming mass support and so elections were unnecessary.[12]

In addition, the fraudulence and corruption of many past Cuban elections had led elections as a whole to having a poor reputation amongst Cubans with many connecting it to corruption and the Batista regime. Likewise, when Fidel Castro held a speech at Santiago de Cuba, he was only booed when he spoke in favor of elections.[12][13][14]

While Castro initially supported elections, announcing them to occur in between fifteen to eighteen months in January 1959,[15] he eventually shifted his stance. Despite it being guaranteed–even according to estimates from the CIA and US State Department–that Castro would win such an election, he would later oppose them, adopting the phrase, believing that national unity was of utmost importance at the time.[13]

Sympathizers dubbed the system during this period as being "direct democracy".[16] William M. LeoGrande says this description rested on 3 propositions: "(1) that the essence of democracy is the pursuit of policies that serve the interests of the people; (2) that democracy requires the active support of the people through their direct participation in the implementation of public policy; and (3) that a direct, noninstitutional relationship between the people and their leaders is sufficient to ensure governmental responsiveness to popular needs and demands."[17] Others, such as historian Lillian Guerra, described the system as being a "grassroots dictatorship".

During the period, Castro held huge rallies in the Plaza de la Revolución where he spoke for hours, sometimes to millions of people.[18][19] Unsympathetic observers called these classic examples of Castro's despotism with a 1961 Life Magazine report calling Castro an "insane egomaniac" and comparing chants of "Fidel, Fidel" to "Sieg Heil" in Hitler's rallies while more sympathetic ones pointed out the immense detail in his speeches and the unprecedented amount of audience participation.[19] They were also presented as a demonstration of mass support for the government (an "instantaneous plebiscite"). However, despite the ratification of some decisions proposed by Castro at these rallies, there is no doubt that these never constituted a means by which the people could exercise substantive influence over policy decisions, and they were never intended as such.[18] He also traveled to the countryside, letting rural Cubans communicate to him in order to discuss local problems.[20][18]

However, institutional mechanisms to ensure elite accountability were virtually nonexistent, as all government officials and most party & mass organization leaders were appointed, and so virtually all politicians were only formally accountable to their superiors. Furthermore, supervision by superiors was only marginally effective due to problems of administrative organization. With no proper control mechanisms to make officials accountable to either their superiors or their constituency, a general unresponsiveness to both policy decisions from above and popular demands from below developed.[21] There was nothing at an institutional level that allowed for effective expression of conflicts or disagreements with executive decisions.[22]

The problem became the primary focus of domestic political action in the "struggles against bureaucratism". However, these were largely focused on streamlining political institutions to increase central control capability, not focused on increasing popular control over officials, until the introduction of the brief "Local Power" program.[21]

1966–1970: Local Power

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Issues of bureaucratization, over-centralization, and governmental unresponsiveness were especially prevalent in the region of Mayabeque, where anti-government guerrillas operated with impunity for over a year, obviously receiving assistance from the local population. After the guerrillas were captured in 1962, an experiment in municipal governance was launched.[23]

Whereas previously, the central government exercised extensive control over even minute local affairs, municipal and regional governments now had complete authority over public services and local industry. Special delegates were elected in assemblies to serve as a link between the people and local administrstion, serving an advisory role. The results of the experiment were encouraging, and in late 1965, preparations began for a similar system being used across all of Cuba.[23]

In January 1966, popular assemblies were held in workplaces and rural areas to elect 10,877 delegates to the local government.[23] Candidates were nominated directly at meetings in the workplaces and rural areas, without overt interference by the PCC (although the party did propose candidates in a few instances, but these candidates did not always win). Delegates were elected by show of hands immediately following the nominations.[24][25] Every municipality had ten elected delegates and two secretaries, as well as a president who was elected by the local nucleus of the PCC. The delegates had an advisory role as a link between citizens & administrators and had the task of organizing & mobilizing the masses.[26][23] Elected delegates served two-year terms and were required to meet with their constituents every six months in "Reports to the People's Assemblies" where they heard voters' concerns, complaints, proposals, & suggestions, answered questions, and reported on the activities of the local government.[26][27]

However, as delegates had an advisory (rather than legislative) role, Local Power quickly became an administrative unit with few real powers.[28] It was hoped that Local Power would widen the scope of mass activity, but little such widening occurred.[29] Soon, new delegate elections were postponed in 1968 and then canceled in 1970, as the country became involved in a massive effort to achieve a ten-million-ton sugar harvest (zafra).[28][30]

The aforementioned harvest would end up having a major effect on the Cuban political system. On May 19, 1970, Castro announced that the goal to produce 10 million tons of sugar in 1970 could not be achieved. Although the 1970 zafra eventually produced a record 8.5 million tons, a loss was still a loss and the loss was made even worse by the damage done to the rest of the economy. The sugar sector had been given absolute priority in resource allocation; the mobilization of experienced workers from other sectors led to declines in both productivity and product quality, the diversion of transport disrupted the flow of materials to the non-sugar economy,[31][32] along with excessive centralization and near-collapse of governmental channels and other modes of citizen input.[32] Economist Isy Joshua described the system as being "authoritarian centralization coupled with anarchic decentralization", directives issued at the center would arrive at the base without any structure to check if they were being acted upon.[33] Production declines led to greater austerity for an increasingly-discontent population.[31][32] There was a dramatic increase in worker absenteeism, estimated at 29%.[34]

It became impossible to ignore the economic failure, administrative chaos, and high level of discontent and the leadership of Cuba recognized the problems. On July 26, 1970, Castro stated:[32][35][36]

Our enemies say we have problems, and in reality our enemies are right. They say there is discontent, and in reality our enemies are right. They say there is irritation, and in reality our enemies are right.

It was recognized that there was a need for political reform and the beginning of a "new phase" in the revolution,[37][38][25] although Carollee Bengelsdorf states that "the actual results of the institutionalization process that dominated the 1970s in Cuba dramatically narrowed the manner in which all this would be realized".[39]

[edit]
Main article: Institutionalization process

In the speech on July 26, 1970, Castro recognized the failure of Local Power to meet the population's demands, and supported reviving the work of mass organizations, as well as the introduction of representatives of factory workers into said mass organizations without PCC involvement. He also mentioned the need to create a new political structure to coordinate social production, as the Council of Ministers was not enough.[40]

In a speech at the tenth anniversary of the FMC on August 23, 1970, Castro reiterated his support for increased political participation from the people:[40][41]

Administrative procedure could reach a given efficiency, but can never rise above certain levels. Sending a man down from the top to solve a problem involving 15,000 or 20,000 people is not the same thing as the problems of those 15,000 or 20,000 people-problems having to do with their community-being solved by virtue of the decisions of people of that community who are close to the source of those problems!

Later, on September 3 at a CTC meeting, Castro yet again supported the need for more local input, the necessity of introducing a constitution, and the right of recall. He further elaborated on September 28 that the PCC should not coincide with or substitute for the government or the mass organizations and that effective mass participation depended on invigoration of the mass organizations and decentralization:[40][41]

Imagine a bakery in some block that gives services to every neighbor in that block, and an administrative apparatus controlling that bakery from up above...How can the people fail to take an interest in how that bakery operates? How can the people fail to take an interest in whether the administrator is a good administrator or a bad one?...How can the people fail to take an interest in the problems of hygiene in that store? And how can they fail to take an interest in the problems of production, absenteeism, amount and quality of the product? Of course they can't! Can anyone imagine a more effective means for controlling this activity than the masses themselves?

In December 1970, Castro supported the Leninist concept of dual subordination where general regulation would come from the center but the administration from the local level, stating "There is nothing wrong with MINCIN [Ministry of Domestic Trade] running the wholesale distribution and laying down the guidelines for the distribution of goods, but it should be relieved of the job of running a grocery store or even a supermarket."[40]

Preparations were made for a pilot program for the new electoral system, the Organs of People's Power. It was first to be launched in the municipality of Cárdenas and then the whole Matanzas Province. A team was set up to study local governments in both capitalist and socialist states (including both the US and the USSR[42]), leading to a creation of a basic document for the pilot elections in June and July 1974.[43][42]

Based on the pilot program in Matanzas,[42] the PCC Central Committee appointed a constitutional commission of constitutional experts and mass organization representatives. It submitted a draft constitution on February 24, 1975. During a 2-month period, the draft was discussed throughout the country, in cells of the PCC, workplaces, local affiliates of ANAP, CDR, local sections of the FMC, and high school & university students' associations.[43][44] According to the CDR, there were 70,812 neighborhood meetings with a total of 2,064,755 participants. The PCC Commission responsible for the debates tabulated a total close to 170,000 assemblies with over 6,000,000 participants.[44] After popular debate, there were some changes but the essential structure remained largely the same. On December 1975, the Party Congress approved the new Constitution, and on February 1976, it passed a nationwide referendum.[43][44]

Under the new system, candidates for municipal assemblies were nominated on an individual basis at local levels by the local population at neighborhood meetings and elected by secret ballot in competitive elections. The municipal elections were required to have between two and eight candidates in total (although it generally included four to seven candidates[45]). Delegates served terms of 2.5 years and instead of electoral campaigns, candidate biographies were posted in the neighborhoods.[46]

However, the decentralization of the municipal level contrasted sharply with the centralization of the upper levels; the provincial and national assemblies. Provincial and national assemblies (as well as the executive committees of the municipal assemblies) were not elected directly, but rather indirectly through the municipal assemblies. Municipal candidacy commissions (made up of representatives from the municipal PCC, UJC, CTC, FMC, and CDR) proposed candidates (although municipal assemblies had the right to alter or add to this list of proposed candidates).[47][48] There had to be 25% more candidates in these lists than seats to fill.[49] 55% of deputies elected to the National Assembly had to also be municipal delegates, while the remaining 45% did not.[47] The provincial assemblies were elected every 2.5 years and the National Assembly every 5 years.[46] The municipal assembly was in normal session twice a year and in special session four times a year with each session lasting a day or less. It also elected an executive committee of 15 members that operates between assembly sessions and meets every other week.[50]

The right of recall is layered, people have a right to recall their municipal delegates, municipal assemblies have the right to recall members of the provincial and national assemblies, and only the National Assembly could recall members of the Council of State and Council of Ministers.[51]

With the exception of some assembly leaders, most delegates/deputies at the municipal, provincial, and national levels received no pay and continued to work in their ordinary workplaces.[52] In the municipal assembly, paid professional positions include the president, vice-president, secretary, and others with responsibility for specific areas (paid approximately what they received on their regular jobs). After the election of the executive committee, the municipal candidacy commission recommends candidates to fill these professional positions, subject to ratification from the municipal assembly.[50] The presidents of municipal assemblies were ex officio provincial delegates. All actions taken and resolutions passed by the executive committee must be approved by the municipal assembly.[53]

Municipal assemblies discussed, monitored, and controlled the social, judicial, economic, and political affairs of their municipality, as well as selected administrators for local enterprises and entities. It also participates in formulating the municipal plan and budget. Delegates also participated in municipal assembly commissions that overseen specific areas, such as health, education, commerce, etc., making on-site inspections and writing reports. The municipal assembly had no legislative power, such power lied exclusively in the National Assembly.[48]

However, as per the aforementioned concept of "dual subordination", municipalities only had control over areas that affected their municipality alone. If an aspect applied to the entire nation, it was under the control of the National Assembly. For example, the goods in a store, the amount of goods to be sold, the price of the goods, etc. are all determined by a national system of supply and pricing regulated by the national Ministry of Internal Commerce. The daily functioning of the store itself, however, fell under the control of the municipal assembly.[54] Bengelsdorf criticized this as having "limited the scope of actual power at the popular level".[54] However, Peter Roman disagreed, saying it's erroneous to minimize the municipal assembly's power, citing influence of municipal assemblies in provincial & national plans and their power to veto projects in these plans.[55]

"Accountability assemblies" were held every six months where municipal delegates had to report on their and the municipal assembly's activities in the past six months, how they had handled comments from the previous accountability assembly, and present crime reports. Afterwards, those attending could offer new suggestions and complaints. Delegates usually were able to resolve or explain the majority of the concerns, but this became increasingly difficult during the Special Period.[56] According to a 1983 study on the accountability assemblies, while there generally appeared to be a correlation between problems raised most frequently at these assemblies and areas seen by citizens as needing the most improvement. However, the study adds that "[a] certain self-restraint appeared when bringing problems to the local government", stating various complaints are often withdrawn as the central government said they were impossible to meet with the available resources, usually citing the impact of the United States embargo. In Nuevitas, where the study was held, less than 10% of complaints raised were about the transportation system, despite 40% considering it the least improved sector.[57] Bengelsdorf states the issues talked about at the accountability assemblies were not minor or unimportant, but that "at the same time, they were all issues that, taken individually or collectively, would not determine the basic direction the Cuban nation would take."[58] She also notes that while attendance at the accountability assemblies was initially quite high, it would soon decline, something she says "indicated a growing populaer perception concerning the efficacy of the institution."[59]

Provincial assemblies operated similarly to municipal assemblies. They controlled and directed state economic enterprises and social & service entities under provincial control and formulated provincial plans & budgets, as well as assisting in monitoring those under national control. Provincial assemblies held regular sessions twice a year and extraordinary sessions several times a year. They also elected an executive committee that operated between the assembly's sessions from candidates proposed by a provincial candidacy commission. The provincial assemblies are much less likely to take their own initiatives (with the exception of Havana) and more likely to work with municipalities, providing assistance when requested and acting as a link between municipal governments and the national government. At the provincial level, suggestions and complaints are handled by a functionary who makes a biannual inspection of all the province's municipalities and issues a quarterly report on them, containing data on complaints and suggestions by municipality, by category, and how many have been resolved.[60]

Only the National Assembly has legislative powers. However, the National Assembly does not set up long-range national policy goals, as that was the party's role. While individual deputies could have proposed laws, most deputies do not have the time or staff to do this, as they are not professional politicians and keep their ordinary jobs. Legislation primarily comes from government ministries or non-government mass organizations. The Communist Party reviewed all legislation prior to it being presented to the National Assembly. After review by the party, ministry officials work with the appropriate assembly commission to produce a final draft of the bill.[61] Despite foreign policy being a matter that applies to the nation as a whole, debate over foreign policy matters was rare to nonexstent.[61][58]

Debates in the National Assembly are characterized by a pursuit of consensus, leading to near-unanimous approval of most bills. When there is strong disagreement upon an issue, it is usually withdrawn for further study. However, there is also a pressure to conform in voting with dissent being more common in commission meetings.[62]

In addition to debates on proposed laws, deputies also debate and vote on reports and the assembly's commissions' commentaries & critiques regarding proposed laws and reports. They also discussed and approved reports from provinces, government ministries, prosecutors, and the judiciary. It also votes, usually without debate, on the national economic plan & budget and the Council of State & Council of Ministers' reports. The lack of debate on the national economic plan & budget is usually a result of their complexity and deputies only being given synopses, usually on the day of the vote. The lack of debate on the Council of State and Council of Ministers' reports is usually due to an almost-total lack of information. For example, the texts of decrees listed for approval are not available to them.[63]

The National Assembly elects the officers of the National Assembly, the Council of State, the Council of Ministers, and the leadership of both aforementioned councils (including the President of Cuba). Unlike similar municipal and provincial elections, there was no choice among candidates as they were preselected by party leadership.[61] National Assembly sessions lasted 2 to 3 days and were held twice a year, extra sessions being convened when necessary. Between sessions, the Council of State represents the legislature.[63]

1992–present: Electoral reforms

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Procedure

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Municipal elections

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Cuba is divided into 168 municipalities, each with their own municipal assemblies with municipal elections held every two and a half years. Each municipal delegate represents an electoral district of about 1,000 to 1,500 voters (fewer in rural areas, more in urban areas).[64]

Nomination process

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Candidates for municipal assemblies are nominated on an individual basis at local levels by the local population at nomination assemblies. Nomination assemblies are held one month before the municipal elections in subdivisions of the electoral districts called areas; there are usually one to eight areas in one electoral district. If there is only one area in an electoral district, then at least two candidates must be nominated. If there is more than one, each area can nominate at least one. The municipal elections must have between two and eight candidates in total.[65][66]

A member of the local electoral commission opens the meeting and calls for nominations for a meeting president and secretary to preside over the nomination assembly, elected by show of hands. The elected president reads the relevant law regarding nomination eligibility and then calls upon voters to propose candidates.[65]

At the nomination assemblies, only eligible voters can nominate candidates and only eligible voters can be nominated. People cannot propose themselves as candidates, and no party or organization may propose or publicly support candidates. In these assemblies, a vote by show of hands is taken, and the person with the most votes is the candidate from the area.[65][66]

Election

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Following the nomination assemblies, the district electoral commissions write and print biographies of the candidates.[67][68] About two weeks before the election, they post them on store windows and on CDR bulletin boards. These biographies generally include the name, age, marital status, education, occupation, and "integration in the revolution" (meaning membership in the PCC, UJC, the military, or mass organizations) with the rest of the document elaborating on these points as well as containing a personal history of the candidate, accompanied by the candidate's photo.[67]

The CDRs also put the aforementioned biographies in front of polling places on Election Day.[67] Voting is conducted by secret ballot and a candidate must win a majority of votes to win. If no candidate achieves a majority, a second round of elections is held. Delegates are elected for terms of two and a half years.[64][69]

Once the municipal assembly is elected, the municipal candidacy commission provides the assembly with two candidates (both having to be municipal delegates) for assembly president and vice president. The assembly, in a vote by secret ballot, can decide to accept both (one as president and the other vice president), accept one while rejecting the other, or rejecting both. A candidate needs a majority of votes to be elected.[70]

National elections

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Cuba's parliament is the unicameral National Assembly of People's Power with 470 deputies with national elections held every 5 years. Deputies represent multi-member constituencies (2 to 5 deputies per district) with one deputy representing approximately 20,000 voters.[71]

Nomination process

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Unlike in elections for the municipal assemblies, elections for the National Assembly are not competitive as the number of candidates is equal to the number of positions to be filled. Candidates are nominated by municipal assemblies and mass organizations & submitted to the National Candidacy Commission. Mass organizations can propose up to three times the number of candidates needed for each municipality. The National Candidacy Commission then narrows down the submissions to one candidate per seat, taking into account gender, skin color, age, education, and occupation.[72][73]

Up to half of the candidates are municipal assembly delegates (known as de base candidates), with the rest being proposed directly by mass organizations (known as directo candidates or directos). De base candidates must be nominated and elected from the municipality in which they reside, while directos do not have such a requirement.[72][74]

Once a final list of candidates is produced with an equal amount of candidates as seats, the list is divided into municipal lists and presented to each municipal assembly. The municipal assembly may reject a candidate on its municipality's list and the candidacy commission will give an alternative candidate.[75][76]

Election

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Similar to the municipal elections, biographies about candidates are posted and a candidate must receive a majority of valid votes to win the seat.[76][77] Voters can choose to vote for the whole slate of candidates (known as voto unido), selectively vote for some but not all candidates, or vote for none of them.[77][78] Deputies to the National Assembly are elected for five-year terms.[79][80]

Following their election, the deputies elect the Council of State, a 31-member body which exercises legislative power between the sessions of the National Assembly.[81][82]

Political parties

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Criticism and concerns

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MAJOR PROBLEM CURRENT ARTICLE HAS: BIAS

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"Non-democratic" means "non-liberal democratic." Cuba very much has a democratic system, albeit different from the western world. Help finding sources that do not paint Cuba as a one-party dictatorship is welcome

Things to mention:

  • Party has no formal role in choosing candidates

References

[edit]

https://www.britannica.com/place/Cuba/Political-process

https://cuba-solidarity.org.uk/resources/democracyfactsheet2015.pdf

https://svensk-kubanska.se/val-i-kuba/

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/08854300.2021.2050346#d1e73

https://cuba-solidarity.org.uk/news/article/3542/how-does-democracy-in-cuba-work

  1. ^ Domínguez, Jorge I.; Galvis, Ángela Fonseca; Superti, Chiara (July 2017). "Authoritarian Regimes and Their Permitted Oppositions: Election Day Outcomes in Cuba". Latin American Politics and Society. 59 (2): 27–52. doi:10.1111/laps.12017. ISSN 1531-426X.
  2. ^ a b Domínguez, Jorge I. (2021-06-01). "The Democratic Claims of Communist Regime Leaders: Cuba's Council of State in a Comparative Context". Communist and Post-Communist Studies. 54 (1–2): 45–65. doi:10.1525/j.postcomstud.2021.54.1-2.45. ISSN 0967-067X.
  3. ^ Levitsky, Steven; Way, Lucan A. (2010-08-16). Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-139-49148-8.
  4. ^ Díaz, Emilio Antonio Duharte (2018-12-01). "The Cuban Political System: Current Status and Possible Reforms for an Integral and Democratic Participative Transformation". International Journal of Cuban Studies. 10: 175–208. doi:10.13169/intejcubastud.10.2.0175. ISSN 1756-347X.
  5. ^ LeoGrande, William M. (March 1979). "The theory and practice of socialist democracy in Cuba: Mechanisms of elite accountability". Studies in Comparative Communism. 12 (1): 39–62. doi:10.1016/S0039-3592(79)90205-9.
  6. ^ Roman, Peter (1993). "Representative Government in Socialist Cuba". Latin American Perspectives. 20 (1): 7–27. ISSN 0094-582X.
  7. ^ August, Arnold (1999). Democracy in Cuba and the 1997-98 elections. La Habana, Cuba: Editorial José Martí. ISBN 978-0-9685084-0-4.
  8. ^ August, Arnold (2013). Cuba and its neighbours: democracy in motion. London New York: Zed Books. ISBN 978-1-55266-404-9.
  9. ^ "Cuba 2019 Constitution - Constitute". www.constituteproject.org. Retrieved 2025-04-10.
  10. ^ Roman, Peter (2007-04-15). "Electing Cuba's National Assembly Deputies: Proposals, Selections, Nominations, and Campaigns". European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies | Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe (82): 70. doi:10.18352/erlacs.9640. ISSN 1879-4750.
  11. ^ August 2013, p. 168.
  12. ^ a b LeoGrande 1979, p. 39–40.
  13. ^ a b Bengelsdorf, Carollee (1994). The problem of democracy in Cuba: between vision and reality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 73–74. ISBN 978-0-19-505826-0.
  14. ^ August 2013, p. 103.
  15. ^ Ferrer, Ada (2021). Cuba: an American history (First Scribner hardcover ed.). New York: Scribner. pp. 325–326. ISBN 978-1-5011-5455-3.
  16. ^ Bengelsdorf 1994, p. 79–89.
  17. ^ LeoGrande 1979, p. 40.
  18. ^ a b c LeoGrande 1979, p. 43–44.
  19. ^ a b Bengelsdorf 1994, p. 79–81.
  20. ^ Bengelsdorf 1994, p. 81–83.
  21. ^ a b LeoGrande 1979, p. 45.
  22. ^ Bengelsdorf 1994, p. 84.
  23. ^ a b c d LeoGrande 1979, p. 46.
  24. ^ Roman 2003, p. 65.
  25. ^ a b August 2013, p. 110.
  26. ^ a b Roman 2003, p. 65–66.
  27. ^ LeoGrande 1979, p. 47.
  28. ^ a b Roman 2003, p. 66.
  29. ^ LeoGrande 1979, p. 48.
  30. ^ LeoGrande 1979, p. 48–49.
  31. ^ a b LeoGrande 1979, p. 49.
  32. ^ a b c d Roman 2003, p. 66-67.
  33. ^ Bengelsdorf 1994, p. 95.
  34. ^ Bengelsdorf 1994, p. 97.
  35. ^ Bengelsdorf 1994, p. 99.
  36. ^ LeoGrande 1979, p. 49–50.
  37. ^ Roman 2003, p. 67–69.
  38. ^ LeoGrande 1979, p. 50.
  39. ^ Bengelsdorf 1994, p. 102.
  40. ^ a b c d Roman 2003, p. 68–69.
  41. ^ a b Bengelsdorf 1994, p. 106–107.
  42. ^ a b c August 2013, p. 113.
  43. ^ a b c Roman 2003, p. 69–70.
  44. ^ a b c August 2013, p. 113–114.
  45. ^ Bengelsdorf 1994, p. 108.
  46. ^ a b Roman 1993, p. 8.
  47. ^ a b Bengelsdorf 1994, p. 107–108.
  48. ^ a b Roman 1993, p. 12.
  49. ^ Roman 1993, p. 77.
  50. ^ a b Roman 1993, p. 12–13.
  51. ^ Bengelsdorf 1994, p. 110.
  52. ^ Roman 1993, p. 9.
  53. ^ Roman 1993, p. 17.
  54. ^ a b Bengelsdorf 1994, p. 112.
  55. ^ Roman 1993, p. 15.
  56. ^ Roman 1993, p. 11.
  57. ^ Jörgensen, Bard (1983-01-01). "The Interrelationship between Base and Superstructure in Cuba". Iberoamericana – Nordic Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies. 13 (1): 36–37. doi:10.16993/ibero.401. ISSN 2002-4509.
  58. ^ a b Bengelsdorf 1994, p. 117–118.
  59. ^ Bengelsdorf 1994, p. 114.
  60. ^ Roman 1993, p. 17–18.
  61. ^ a b c Roman 1993, p. 19.
  62. ^ Roman 1993, p. 21.
  63. ^ a b Roman 1993, p. 20.
  64. ^ a b Roman 2003, p. 3.
  65. ^ a b c Roman, Peter (2003). People's Power: Cuba's Experience with Representative Government. Critical currents in Latin American perspective. p. 103-105. ISBN 978-0-7425-2565-8.
  66. ^ a b August 2013, p. 157-158.
  67. ^ a b c Roman 2003, p. 112-113.
  68. ^ August 2013, p. 162.
  69. ^ August 2013, p. 146.
  70. ^ Roman 2003, p. 123.
  71. ^ Roman 2003, p. 82-83.
  72. ^ a b August 2013, p. 167-169.
  73. ^ Roman 2003, p. 130-132.
  74. ^ Roman 2003, p. 131.
  75. ^ Roman 2003, p. 131-132.
  76. ^ a b August 2013, p. 170.
  77. ^ a b Roman 2003, p. 130.
  78. ^ August 2013, p. 174-175.
  79. ^ August 2013, p. 148, 154, 191.
  80. ^ Roman 2003, p. 3, 82, 130.
  81. ^ August 2013, p. 191.
  82. ^ Roman 2003, p. 5.
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