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1688 Invasion of England
Part of the Glorious Revolution and Nine Years' War
The sailing order of the Dutch fleet.
Date November – December 1688 Location North Sea, English Channel and England
Belligerents
Dutch Republic Williamites	English Government
Commanders and leaders
William III Schomberg Herbert Evertsen Van Almonde	James II Feversham Churchill (defected) Dartmouth
Strength
Army strength 16,000-21,000 men Naval strength 40 ships of the line 9 frigates 28 galliots 9 fireships >400 transport vessels	Army strength 30,000 men Naval strength 30 ships of the line 4 frigates 14 fire ships
Casualties and losses
low	low

Prelude

Further information: Glorious Revolution § Dutch intervention

To prevent an alliance between England and France in the upcoming Nine Years' War and a repeat of 1672, William III of Orange and the Dutch States General resolved to stage a pre-emptive strike on England. William was careful not to appear as a conqueror and domestic unrest in England allowed him to request an invitation from seven important English figures. The invitation from the "Immortal Seven" in early July 1688 gave William’s planned expedition the veneer of legitimacy he wanted. Louis XIV, under the impression that James II was strong enough to keep William occupied with a protracted struggle in England, attacked Philippsburg and moved into the German lands. This action removed the immidiate French threat to the Dutch Republic and cleared the path for William's mission to England.

Preperations

The seven politicians who invited William III to intervene in England were confident of the invasion's prospects for success. They assessed that "nineteen parts of twenty of the people are desirous of a change," noting widespread dissatisfaction among army officers and a strong aversion to Catholicism among the soldiers. Despite this optimism, William III deemed it essential to assemble a formidable army and navy to ensure nothing was left to chance. While the English conspirators recommended a small force supported by a large fleet, William insisted on commanding enough troops to decisively confront James II’s army if necessary.

The preparations for the expedition were managed collaboratively by William, Hans Willem Bentinck, Gaspar Fagel, Job de Wildt (Secretary of the Amsterdam Admiralty), and Lieutenant-Admiral Cornelis Evertsen. Financial backing came primarily from the States-General, which decided in late July to expand the Dutch fleet by 9,000 personnel. To fund this expansion, a state loan of 4 million guilders was issued at William’s request. Additional financial support came from Francisco Lopes Suasso, a financier of Portuguese-Jewish origin, who lent 2 million guilders. When asked about collateral, Suasso famously responded, "If you succeed, I know you will repay me; if not, I will accept the loss."

The actual invasion force comprised around 15,000 Dutch soldiers, reinforced by to up to 5,000 British and French volunteers. To safeguard the homeland against the threat of a French attack, 30,000 troops stayed behind, bolstered by an additional 19,000 elite German and Swedish forces that were hired by the Dutch. Half of the troops and the entire fleet crew were funded by the city of Amsterdam, with minimal involvement from the other Dutch admiralties except Rotterdam. The combined expenses for the army and navy exceeded 7 million guilders. The operation was conducted in secrecy, and while it was impossible to fully conceal such a vast invasion force, uncertainty persisted in England until November as to whether the fleet was aimed at France or intended for an invasion of England. In part because it was hard for James II and other experienced naval officers to imagine that the Dutch would risk such a fleet to the autumn wheater.

Oppposing forces

English navy

While James himself had more experience in leading large fleets than any of his naval commanders, he seemingly never considered leading the English fleet himself in 1688. Instead he put George Legge, Baron Dartmouth, a personal favorite of the king, in command of the fleet. Though very loyal, he lacked an impressive career to boast of and was naturally cautious and indecisive. He had only commanded a fleet once before, and that was a small squadron tasked with the evacuation of Tangier. Despite distinguishing himself as a ship’s captain during the Third Anglo-Dutch War, Dartmouth was primarily a land officer and a politician rather than a seasoned naval commander. The British naval historian J. D. Davies writes:

...throughout the campaign of 1688 he was bombarded with advice from the one man who undoubtedly had the experience and personal courage to lead the British fleet to victory, but sadly for his own prospects of survival, the ideal candidate was disqualified because he wore the crown.

English army

At the time of William's invasion in 1688, the English army had undergone a modest expansion under James II but remained relatively small compared to continental standards. Following the Monmouth Rebellion in 1685, the army had grown to approximately 19,778 soldiers, including garrison troops and field units. By the autumn of 1688, bolstered by troops 2,820 men from Ireland and the entirety of the 2,946-strong Scottish army, James's forces theoretically numbered almost 40,000 on paper. But even on paper the actual number of trained and battle ready troops was closer to 29,000–30,000, with some still undergoing training and others on garrison duty. More modern scholarship suggests that the field army James assembled on Salisbury Plain would ultimately effectively consist of just 19,000 men. And despite the apparent growth, many of the newer regiments lacked sufficient training and equipment, reducing their effectiveness in the field.

Overlooking John Churchill, James II had appointed Louis de Duras, Earl of Feversham as commander-in-chief in 1685. Feversham was a long-time associate of James since the 1660s and the nephew of the famed Turenne. However, his leadership would prove inadequate. At the decisive Battle of Sedgemoor on 6 July, Feversham’s poor judgment nearly cost James the victory and it were Churchill's efforts that saved the situation. But the credit went to Feversham and despite his incompetence, James reappointed him in 1688.

William's invasion fleet

The Dutch fleet depicted at the departure of William III from Hellevoetsluis, 29 October 1688. By Jan Claesz Rietschoof

To transport William and his army to England, the Dutch Republic outfitted a massive fleet. Forty-nine warships were prepared to protect more than 400 transport vessels from the English navy. As with the English fleet, it was impossible to send the largest ships to sea so late in the year, and the largest warships carried only 68 cannons. With possibly 40,000 men aboard, it was the largest fleet the Republic would ever assemble and while significantly larger than the Spanish Armada of 1588, it was assembled in little more than a 10th of the time.

Arthur Herbert, the ex-Royal Navy officer who carried the invitation to William with him in June 1688, was actively involved in the preparations for the 1688 invasion and for propaganda purposes the Prince appointed him as the lieutenant-admiral general of the Dutch States Navy and commander-in-chief of the fleet which would take him to England on 6 October. William hoped that this would make it easier for English naval officers to desert to him. However, Lieutenant-Admiral Cornelis Evertsen the Youngest remained in command during the preperations and after the campaign to England. Additionally the Prince decreed that until the moment of rendezvous with the English fleet, Herbert would share command with Eversten and consult with him on all significant matters. Cornelis Tromp, the famous aging Dutch officer who still nominally held the post of lieutenant-admiral general, was not consulted by the Prince.

William's army

19th century painting of William III at the Battle of Seneffe in 1674.

William took 15,269 troops with him that formed part of the Dutch States Army. The quality of these troops was superior to the forces James could muster. Many were experienced veterans and 2,000 of the 11,000 infantrymen were part of the elite Dutch Blue Guards and 3,000 of the elite Scots Brigade. Additionaly, due to the reforms of William and Georg of Waldeck during the Franco-Dutch War, Dutch infantry had acquired a reputation for being the best in Europe. Dutch infantry was better trained and more disciplined than their peers and in 1688 also enjoyed a technological advantage in weaponry. Dutch soldiers were equipped with the new flintlock muskets which meant they could achieve a higher rate of fire. Dutch artillery crews were equally well regarded, and although the reputation of the Dutch cavalry was not on par with the infantry and artillery, half of the cavalry William brought with him consisted of elite regiments. Ignatius White, James II's envoy extraordinary in the Dutch Republic, wrote: 'There is not in Christendom a better army of the number,' and; 'you may thinke what you please, they dont believe they will meet with great opposition.' It is commonly accepted that this army was supplemented by 5,000 British exiles and Huguenots who volunteered, although the Dutch historian Machiel Bosman reduces their number to 1,200.

William III personally led the army. He was a capable military commander who had gained experience with leading large armies during the Franco-Dutch War. As his deputy commander he appointed the seasoned general Frederick Schomberg. The Duke of Schomberg had served in the French army, but since he was a protestant had left France for the Dutch Republic in 1685 after the Edict of Fontainebleau. While the 72 year old had been one of Louis XIV's better commanders, his advanced age had diminished his abilities and by the end of 1689 some believed that he was no longer fit for high command. For other important posts in the army William choose some of his most trusted friends and relatives, like the Count of Solms, Hendrik van Nassau-Ouwerkerk and Willem Bentinck.

Naval campaign

William III Embarking his Army for England at Brielle and Hellevoetsluis.

Until September, William and his confidants had deliberately concealed whether the growing Dutch military force was intended for France or England, waiting to see how Louis XIV would react. The French king, confident in James II’s position, saw little cause for concern regarding England. He had threatened to declare war on the Republic as soon as its fleet set sail and, in the worst case, he assumed that William III would become entangled in a prolonged conflict there. The French fleet was in the Mediterranean because Louis was seriously considering an invasion of the Papal States and therefore unable to come to James’s aid. When Louis, in September, ordered the occupation of Papal Avignon, deployed a garrison to Cologne and the Palatinate, and laid siege to Philippsburg, William III deemed it the right moment to disclose the planned expedition to the Dutch States General.

Setbacks for William

From early October onwards, the preparations for the invasion of England by the Dutch fleet, under Prince William, became more public. The majority of the newly outfitted warships joined the fleet, with several admirals in command of various divisions, including Lieutenant-Admiral Willem Bastiaensz Schepers, Rear Admiral Gilles Schey, Vice-Admiral Van de Putte, and others overseeing the ships from Amsterdam, Noord-Holland, and Zeeland. However, the fleet faced challenges due to severe storms, which caused significant damage to several ships. Prince William, concerned that further damage could jeopardize the entire mission, ordered the fleet to retreat to Goedereede for repairs. Despite the setbacks, the fleet eventually regrouped and by 26 October, now fully repaired and ready, awaited favorable winds for the journey.

On October 29, the invasion fleet set sail, but the expedition encountered early setbacks. A storm struck during the night of October 30-31, scattering the fleet. Although no ships were lost, 800 cavalry horses died. After consultation, William III decided not to delay the mission, opting to proceed without waiting for new horses to be acquired. In the worst-case scenario, the cavalrymen would be mounted on smaller dragoon horses.

Although the delays might have given the English navy an opportunity to attack the Dutch fleet, and Dartmouth was under pressure from James II to do so, no such attempt was made. At the councils of war on 5 and 7 November, Dartmouth, cautious and lacking self-confidence, deferred to his subordinates. The majority of his subordinates were at least potentially disaffected with James, which may have influenced their advice. However, the naval historian J. D. Davies also notes that rejecting an expedition across the North Sea reflected what he calls "professional common sense," based on their experience during the Third Anglo-Dutch War. The stormy weather posed serious risks and threatened to drive the English fleet onto the Dutch coast, making any operation extremely hazardous.

'The Protestant Wind'

On 11 November, the fleet set sail for the second time. The decision of where to land was only made at the last moment. Herbert consistently advocated for a landing in the south-west, where the most favorable harbors were located, but William III and his advisers, had a low opinion of him and decided to make for the northeast of England. They opted to steer the fleet toward the north-east because of the influence wielded in that region by four key signatories of the invitation to William: Danby in Yorkshire, Lord Devonshire in Derbyshire, and Nottingham and Lumley in Durham. While William wanted to avoid the southeast of England were James II forces were centered he didn't want to land to far from London. During the night of the 12th to the 13th, William changed his mind and set course for the southeast. Several reasons have been suggested for this decision. He may have judged the winds too strong to allow for a safe landing in the north, or perhaps he wanted to avoid the reinforcements James was sending in that direction. In any case, the weather continued to play a decisive role. Earlier storms had kept the Dutch fleet confined to harbour, the situation was now reversed. The same east wind that carried William westward held the English fleet in the mouth of the Thames, unable to sail.

On 14 November, the fleet sailed unopposed through the Strait of Calais. The shores on both sides were lined with spectators, eager to witness the unprecedented spectacle. As evening fell, the fleet reached the Isle of Wight, which it passed during the night. William initially intended to land at Torbay or Dartmouth on the following day, 14 November, which coincided with both his 38th birthday and his wedding anniversary. He believed these events would boost the morale of his troops. However, some of his English advisors argued that the landing should take place on 15 November, the anniversary of the discovery of the Gunpowder Plot, and William agreed.

During the night of 14 to 15 November, strong easterly winds or a navigational error caused the fleet to overshoot the intended landing sites. By morning, Torbay and Dartmouth lay far behind. Returning was impossible due to the wind, and other nearby ports were either unsuitable or held by commanders whose loyalty William doubted. This caused considerable alarm among some of the English officers, who feared the expedition was at risk. There was concern that the English fleet, thus far held back by adverse winds, might now catch up. However, a shift in the wind soon brought unexpected relief, allowing William to proceed.

By mid-morning on 15 November, the wind shifted to the south, allowing the Dutch fleet to enter Torbay within four hours. The landing began immediately. Sixty boats were deployed for disembarkation, with the first ashore being six regiments under General Hugh Mackay, including English and Scottish units that had entered Dutch service after 1685. The landing was entirely unopposed, and William himself disembarked shortly after his troops.

The Dutch fleet at Torbay.

Meanwhile, the English fleet under Lord Dartmouth, which had set sail in pursuit on 14 November, had reached the South Sand Head during the night and made all preparations for battle. However, strong and erratic winds frustrated the chase. A council of war held aboard Dartmouth’s flagship concluded that any attempt to intercept the Dutch fleet was now futile. The Dutch transports were already emptying, and the English fleet was still short several capital ships, fireships, and small craft that had failed to rejoin the main force since leaving the Gunfleet Sands anchorage off the Essex coast. Dartmouth reported to the Admiralty and King James that, although his officers were willing to risk battle, they unanimously advised against attacking unless it could prevent the landing itself. He also expressed concern that engaging a superior fleet without adequate reinforcements could lead to the destruction of the English navy’s best ships and a potentially catastrophic defeat. As a result, Dartmouth resolved to remain near the Isle of Wight and await further instructions from London, while sending scouts westward to monitor the Dutch position.

Admiral Dartmouth believed that if he caught the Dutch fleet after they had landed their troops and supplies in sheltered harbours like Stokes Bay or Southampton Water, they would be more vulnerable than if intercepted at sea. However, he also recognized that a defeat in such a politically sensitive moment could have severe consequences. This uncertainty led him to delay action and seek the King’s guidance, while still keeping open the possibility of attacking if new intelligence made it feasible. Dartmouth planned to hold position until his scattered ships regrouped and scouts reported back.

On 16 November, Admiral Dartmouth tried to approach the Dutch fleet, but a storm the next morning forced him to give up. Some of his ships, including the flagship, were damaged, so he brought the fleet into the Downs to take shelter. There, he took up a defensive position. He explained the setbacks to James and said he was waiting for reinforcements. To strengthen his position, he meanwhile ordered local ships to be turned into fireships using his own crews, which would be faster than relying on the navy yards. Although he didn’t openly admit that his fleet was weaker, he clearly hoped for better conditions, especially an easterly wind, before taking action.

Land campaign

Dutch and English strategy

William III by Jan Wyck, commemorating the landing at Brixham, Torbay, 5 November 1688

William’s army landed in England late in the year, when the weather was far from ideal for military operations. There was little to no forage for horses, roads were virtually impassable due to mud, and soldiers had to camp in leaky tents in near-freezing temperatures. Under normal circumstances, seventeenth-century armies would have gone into winter quarters, and neither the Dutch nor the English forces could function at full capacity. While the more experienced Dutch troops were likely better prepared for such conditions, the advantage this gave them was limited. However, the Dutch benefited in another way: the difficult marching conditions forced James to spread his army more thinly across the country, especially since he could not predict where the landing would take place.

English planners were in considerable confusion about William’s intentions. Reports from the Dutch Republic suggested that his army might land anywhere from the Scottish border to Land’s End. Although this effectively ruled out the entire west coast, major posts such as Chester and Carlisle still had to be garrisoned. In the north, the fortresses of Berwick, Hull, and York required protection, while on the Thames and around London, Landguard Fort, Sheerness, Tilbury, Gravesend, and the Medway towns had to be manned—both to secure the capital and to prevent a repeat of the Dutch Raid on the Medway in 1667. Control of the south coast rested on key ports like Dover, the Isle of Wight, Portsmouth, and Plymouth. In addition to maintaining all these positions, James was deeply concerned about potential unrest in London. To pre-empt any uprising, he stationed a substantial force within the city. A mobile field army was to be assembled within a 25-mile (40-kilometre) radius of the capital, ready to march in whichever direction William’s army might land.

Once it became clear that William intended to land in the south-west, James decided to concentrate his field army on Salisbury Plain. A forced march to surprise and overwhelm William's exhausted troops was impossible due to the weather conditions. However, Salisbury's central location blocked William's path to London, offered the Royal army strategic flexibility, while the wide, open plain allowed James to make full use of his superiority in cavalry.

After landing near Brixham, William's troops marched toward Exeter, the nearest major town. Following a difficult journey through rough and isolated terrain, they reached the city on 19 November. The reception was mixed: the local population lined the roads, clapping and cheering, but there was no sign of a widespread uprising against James II. The nobility and urban elite remained cautious, and the city's magistrates had fled. The lukewarm response of the local elite caused concern among the Dutch and deeply unsettled William. His English contacts had painted a very different picture of the situation. In Exeter, William rested his troops, prepared for the long and difficult march to London and hoped to see the first defections take place. He bought up all the available horses in the area to replace those lost earlier and established a supply line to support the advance. The Dutch remained in Exeter for 12 days.

James's retreat

Salisbury

Faversham

London

Torbay

Wincanton

Exeter

Portsmouth

Hungerford

Reading

Plymouth

class=notpageimage|

Key locations in November 1688

Meanwhile, James and Feversham made his final preparations to confront William at Salisbury. Morale in James's army was low. On 22 November, the first defector, Captain Charles Burrington, had reached William’s camp. The following day, several junior officers also rode into Exeter to switch sides. The real blow, however, came the same day with the defection of Lord Cornbury, commander of the Royal Dragoons and son of the staunch royalist Earl of Clarendon. Cornbury, along with Thomas Langston, had been sent to attack Dutch outposts near Honiton. Instead, they attempted to defect, bringing three cavalry regiments with them. When the troops realised what was happening, most managed to escape and returned to James's army.

The conspiracy within the army was too weak to overcome the loyalty of the vast majority of officers and soldiers. Only a few hundred troops joined the defecting officers, and many of them had been misled. Yet although the number of actual defections may have been disappointingly small from William's perspective, their impact on James's morale and the spirit of his army was far greater than the numbers suggested. Mentally unprepared for the Dutch invasion, unsure of his own strategy, and beset by rumours of further desertions, James finally reached his army on 29 November. Many of his troops were still straggling down the road from London, slowed by ice and mud. In poor physical condition, a significant portion of his army failed to reach Salisbury, and his field force probably numbered no more than 19,000 men.

Feversham had no idea where William’s forces were, whether the Dutch were still in Exeter or already advancing eastward, or even which route they might take. He was unable to obtain this crucial intelligence, as he refused to send out more scouting parties for fear they might defect. The English camp was in disarray, with mutual suspicion spreading among officers and men, further undermining the army's cohesion. James might still have rallied morale by appealing to national resentment against the Dutch and the humiliation of invasion, but he was mentally and physically exhausted. He suffered nosebleeds and appeared deeply depressed. On 3 December, a council of war persuaded him to retreat toward London. The retreat proved disastrous. By falling back on London, James effectively ceded control of the rest of England to William, while his own army was left with little room to manoeuvre and risked being trapped between the Dutch army and fleet. Once James chose not to attack, he handed the strategic initiative to William. From that point, the campaign was no longer a serious military contest. James had no path to victory. The retreat was, in effect, an admission of defeat.

This marked the beginning of major defections. On the night of 3 December, Churchill, the Duke of Grafton, and Lord Berkeley deserted to William. Their example was quickly followed by other senior nobles, and with their departure the command structure of James's army collapsed entirely. Meanwhile, the elite in the Dutch-occupied counties began shifting their loyalties toward William. In Dorset, leading gentlemen organised both the militia and the collection of taxes in his name. Elsewhere in the country, Williamite supporters secured control over Lancashire, Cheshire, York, and Nottingham.

William's march and James's flight

At Exeter, William's position was threatened from the rear by the fortress of Plymouth, which remained in royal hands and was garrisoned by 1,000 troops under the Earl of Bath. However, Bath made no serious move against William, and by 26 November the fortress had been effectively isolated by Dutch cavalry patrols in the surrounding countryside. On 1 December, news reached William that Bath had declared for him, removing the threat and allowing William to begin his march on London.

William recognised that James’s retreat had handed him control of the situation. He refused to negotiate and firmly declined a personal meeting with James. Such a meeting would have suited the Tories, who sought a compromise between the two men in order to protect their own political interests. William was determined to shape events on his own terms. He understood that James's authority had collapsed after his return from Salisbury and that he himself now held the initiative in English politics. It was not until 18 December that William agreed to meet James's commissioners. His demands were not particularly severe. He accepted the summoning of a free Parliament but insisted on the immediate dismissal of all Catholic officials. He also demanded that the English government finance his army. These terms, while humiliating, did not necessarily strip James of his crown or render him powerless. Only the continued presence of William's army could enforce any limits on royal authority, and that presence could not last indefinitely.

William was not entirely free in his actions. He could not publicly state that his primary motive for intervention was to secure English support in his ongoing war against France. This objective had been deliberately omitted from his Declaration to avoid alienating English public opinion. However, after Louis XIV declared war on the Dutch Republic on 26 November, English assistance became more urgent than ever. James admitted that the conditions offered to him were more favourable than he had expected. Nonetheless, he was unwilling to remain king under circumstances and feared that he might meet the same fate as his father in 1649. After the Queen and the Prince of Wales fled to France on the night of 9 December, James followed them into exile the next day.

The flight of the King transformed the political landscape. Until that moment William III had acted with caution and had refrained from openly challenging James's position. However, James’s departure presented William with the opportunity to claim the English crown for himself. He was confident that a freely elected Parliament would offer him the throne. William was fully aware that his intervention had been decisive and that he was now an essential figure in any settlement concerning the succession. According to Clarendon, who met the Prince on 22 December, William appeared cheerful and made no attempt to hide his satisfaction at the King's departure. However, James was captured and brought back to London on the 26th , where despite everything he was still cheered by the crowd. Meanwhile, William advanced steadily towards London. Six hundred Irish troops under Patrick Sarsfield attempted to defend the bridge over the Thames near Reading, but a frontal assault by Bentinck and 280 Dutch cavalry successfully dislodged them. Besides the Wincanton Skirmish it would be the only armed clash of the campaign.

Occupation of London

By 24 December, William's army had reached Henley-on-Thames, and three days later, on 27 December, they arrived at Windsor. On the same day, the Count of Solms, leading three battalions of Dutch infantry supported by cavalry, was sent to secure London for William. Around 10 p.m., his forces entered the city. They easily took control of the posts at St James's Palace and then marched in battle formation with lit matches towards Whitehall. King James was going to bed around 11 p.m. when he learned that Dutch troops were already in St James's Park. The Dutch general demanded entry for his troops into Whitehall, but James refused. After a tense exchange, James realised he had little choice and ordered his Coldstream Guards to leave the palace. William Craven, commander of the Coldstream Guards, was offered a peaceful retirement by Solms but refused fiercely, declaring he would rather be cut to pieces than surrender his posts to the Prince's Dutch guards. Despite Craven's resistance, James insisted and urged him to surrender. Eventually, the English guards withdrew, allowing Dutch troops to occupy the palace.

The next day, 28 December, while James departed for Rochester against his will, William entered London. The arrival was carefully choreographed. William wore white, and his Dutch Guards lined a two-mile route through streets packed with cheering crowds, many of them dressed in orange. But William, who disliked crowds to begin with, was not pleased. He did not want to be seen as a conquering hero. Instead, he aimed to persuade the English that they had taken this step themselves. At the first opportunity, he turned off the main road and made his way to St James's Palace, leaving the disappointed crowd behind.

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