Jump to content

Timeline of the Tumu Crisis

Add links
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
A portrait of a Chinese man wearing an yellow robe and a black cap
Emperor Yingzong of Ming was captured by the Mongols during the Tumu Crisis

The Tumu Crisis was a significant battle in Chinese history that took place on 1 September 1449, between the Ming dynasty and the Oirat Mongols. In July 1449, Esen Taishi, leader of the Oirat Mongols, launched a large-scale, three-pronged invasion of China. Emperor Yingzong of Ming, under the advice by the eunuch Wang Zhen, decided to personally lead an expedition northward to confront Esen Taishi, despite protests from experienced generals. The Ming army was ill-prepared and became scattered during their advance. When they reached the Tumu post station, they were in a vulnerable position, trapped in narrow terrain with limited water and supplies.

Taking advantage of this, Esen Taishi used deceptive tactics to lure the Ming forces into an ambush. The Mongol cavalry quickly surrounded them, cutting off their retreat. Meanwhile, Wang Zhen, who held de facto command, was indecisive and ignored advice from his generals to organize a withdrawal. As a result, the Ming army was overwhelmed and suffered a complete collapse. The battle ended in a defeat for the Ming, with tens of thousands of soldiers killed and Emperor Yingzong captured alive. This defeat had a significant impact on the military and also caused political instability in the Ming dynasty for years to come. It is considered one of the worst military defeats in Ming history and marked a significant shift in power along China's northern frontier between the Ming court and the Mongol tribes.

Campaign of 1449

[edit]
  • July: Esen launched a large-scale invasion of China, with the Mongols advancing in three directions.[1] The main objective of this campaign was to capture the fortified cities of Datong and Datong, which would grant the Mongols unrestricted access to the northern regions of China.[2]
  • 20 July: News of the invasion reached Beijing, prompting Emperor Yingzong to order four generals and 45,000 soldiers from the Beijing garrison to advance to Datong and Xuanfu for border protection.[3]
  • 30 July:
    • Esen attacked Datong region; the Mongols also attacked several points from the Liaodong Peninsula to Gansu.[4]
    • The emperor, after being persuaded by the eunuch Wang Zhen, decided to lead the campaign in person to counterattack and punish the Mongols, but the matter was opposed by officials led by Minister of War Kuang Ye.[4]
  • 2 August: A group of officials, led by the Minister of Personnel, submitted a memorial to protest the emperor's decision to personally lead the army into battle, but the emperor's resolve remained unchanged.[5]
  • 3 August:
    • The emperor appointed his younger brother, Zhu Qiyu, as regent and formed a staff of high-ranking officials to accompany him on the campaign.[6]
    • A commander at Xuanfu reported that his cavalry remount post was surrounded and had its water supply cut off by the marauding Mongols.[5]
    • The Ming army suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Mongols at Yanghe Pass northeast of Datong, leading to the deaths of two senior field commanders. This defeat occurred after a eunuch representing Wang Zhen, who had forced military commanders to take orders from him, led disgruntled and undisciplined troops into battle; he himself escaped only by hiding in tall grass until the action concluded.[7]
A map with arrows indicate the direction of military advances, with different colors potentially representing opposing forces. Cities and geographical features are labeled.
Map showing the Tumu campaign
  • 4 August: The emperor-led army departed Beijing toward the Shanxi border, camping for its first night in Tangjialing.[8]
  • 5 August: The Ming army camped for its second night in Longhutai, south of Nankou. However, an alarm during the night led to widespread disorder and confusion among the troops.[9]
  • 7 August: The emperor and his army passed through Juyong Pass and beyond the inner line of the Great Wall, but were constantly beset by rain and storms. Despite requests from officials for a several-day halt, Wang Zhen's refusal fostered widespread displeasure and led to a decline in army discipline.[10]
  • 8 August: News arrived of an outstanding display of loyalty from the front, which was rewarded through public announcements to bolster officer morale. The army camped at Yulin post station.[9]
  • 9 August: The army camped for the night west of Huailai County.[9]
  • 10 August: The army camped for the night at Leijiazhan.[9]
  • 11 August: The army climbed through the steep Qiming Mountain passes. As usual, the emperor entrusted all power to Wang Zhen, who subsequently became increasingly arrogant and abused his power. There were warnings about the dangers ahead, but Wang Zhen ignored them and ordered the march to continue.[11]
  • 12 August: The emperor and his army reached Xuanfu, where it was still raining. Growing concern over enemy movements prompted officials to urge Wang Zhen to remain in Xuanfu, but he rejected their advice. Some officials and generals even harbored intentions of assassinating Wang Zhen and bringing the emperor back to the capital, though no one had the courage to carry out the plan. As the Ming army advanced, Esen retreated back behind the Wall and waited for an opportunity to ambush.[12]
  • 13 August: The army camped for the night at Wanquanyu.[13]
  • 14 August: The army camped west of Huai'an County.[13]
  • 15 August: The army camped west of Tiancheng (present-day Tianzhen County, Shanxi).[13]
  • 16 August: The army arrived at the battlefield in Yanghe Pass, where they saw the bodies of soldiers from the previous battle, causing the morale of the soldiers to plummet.[12]
  • 17 August: The army reached Chiluo post station, located approximately sixty li from Datong.[14]
  • 18 August: The army reached Datong.[15]
  • 19 August: Wang Zhen was initially reluctant to abandon his plan to march into the steppe. However, after a warning from a trusted eunuch commander—who had escaped the Battle of Yanghe Pass on 3 August by hiding in tall grass—that proceeding would be dangerous and merely lead into Esen's trap, Wang Zhen decided to declare the campaign victorious and return to the capital.[15]
  • 20 August: The army began its return to Beijing. Initially, Wang Zhen intended to take the Zijing Pass route, the shortest path for a swift return to the capital. This route also passed through Yuzhou (present-day Yu County, Hebei), Wang Zhen's hometown. After one day's travel, Wang Zhen changed his mind, fearing that the army would damage the crops in his native village. He decided to alter the marching direction, choosing the old route back from Xuanfu, which prolonged the journey and caused unease among the soldiers.[15]
  • 21 August: The army camped at Dishuiya, located sixty li south west of Yanghe.[14]
  • 22 August: The army camped at Hongzhou Fangcheng.[14]
  • 23 August: The army camped at Baideng.[14]
  • 24 August: The army camped west of Huai'an County, returning to a site they had camped ten days earlier.[14]
  • 25 August: The army camped at Wanquanyu.[14]
  • 26 August: The army camped north of Yanghe River at Shalingbao.[14]
  • 27 August: The army stopped at the midpoint of the return route at Xuanfu after a week of foul weather and disorderly marches.[16]
  • 28 August: The army camped southeast of Xuanfu.[16]
  • 29 August: The army camped at Leijiazhan, the site they had camped on 10 August.[16]
  • 30 August:
    • The rear guard of the Ming army, led by Wu Kezhong and Wu Kejin, who were of Mongol descent, was attacked and wiped out by the Mongols at Liangshan near Xuanfu.[17]
    • A new rear guard of 40,000[18] (or 30,000 or 50,000[16]) cavalry, led by Zhu Yong and Xue Shou, was formed and sent toward Xuanfu. However, this army fell into an ambush in the Yao'er Gorge, about thirty li from where the imperial entourage had stopped, resulting in the complete annihilation of the entire force.[19]
  • 31 August: The army reached the Tumu post station. As Esen's army had quickly closed in, leading officials suggested moving to the walled county town of Huailai, only 10.5 km farther on. Wang Zhen, however, refused due to his desire to keep the huge imperial baggage with him. The army then set up camp in Tumu, but the incessant rain that had plagued the entire campaign had now ceased, and this place had no water. Esen sent his flanking force to occupy the riverbank south of the Ming camp and block their access to it. The soldiers and horses, without water and food, began to suffer, and the Mongols had completely encircled them.[20]
  • 1 September:
    • After two days without water, the Ming army suffered severely, and their plan to break through to Huailai had failed. The Mongols then offered negotiations. Although the emperor drafted a peace proposal to send to Esen's camp, Wang Zhen ignored it and, without authorization, ordered the army to march toward the river. Chaos ensued, and the Mongols seized the opportunity to launch a full-scale assault. The Ming forces were annihilated, with nearly all high-ranking officials killed. According to some accounts, Wang Zhen was later murdered by his own officer.[21]
    • As the emperor’s cavalry guards failed to break through the Mongol encirclement, he dismounted and sat on the ground that a storm of arrows killed most of his attendants. He remained unharmed and quietly waited for the outcome of the battle. Mongol soldiers swarmed around him, attempting to seize his rich armor, but he refused to yield it. Just as one warrior raised his sword to kill the emperor, a Mongol officer intervened. Recognizing the captive’s noble bearing, the officer escorted him away.[22]
  • 2 September: The emperor was taken to Leijiazhan, a post station between Tumu and Xuanfu.[22]
  • 3 Septemper: The emperor was received by Esen in his camp near Xuanfu.[22]

Aftermath

[edit]

When news of Emperor Yingzong's capture reached Beijing, chaos ensued as the city was only left with approximately 100,000 soldiers.[23] Some officials suggested relocating the capital to the south in order to avoid the advancing Mongol army, but Vice Minister of War Yu Qian strongly advocated for defending the capital.[24] In this urgent situation, Empress Dowager Sun made the decision to enthrone Emperor Yingzong's younger brother, Zhu Qiyu, as the new emperor, while also honoring Emperor Yingzong as the "emperor emeritus".[18]

On 27 October 1449, the Mongols launched an attack on Beijing. Under the leadership of Yu Qian, the Ming army put up a fierce resistance. After five days of fighting, the Mongols realized they did not have the strength to capture the city and retreated to their homeland.[25] Despite attempts at negotiation, it was not until 1450 that Esen finally released Emperor Yingzong. However, upon his return, Yingzong was immediately placed under house arrest by his brother within the Forbidden City for seven years. In 1457, taking advantage of his brother's failing health, Emperor Yingzong swiftly regained the throne through a palace coup.[26]

Esen faced criticism for failing to capitalize on his triumph at Tumu, and his subsequent friendly relations with the Ming angered Mongol hardliners. In 1453, his proclamation as khan ignited factional strife. Within two years, he was assassinated (1455), ending his short-lived supremacy.[27]

References

[edit]

Citations

[edit]
  1. ^ Twitchett & Grimm (1988), p. 322.
  2. ^ de Heer (1986), p. 20.
  3. ^ Goodrich & Fang (1976), p. 290.
  4. ^ a b Mote 1974, p. 254; de Heer 1986, p. 16.
  5. ^ a b Mote (1974), p. 255.
  6. ^ Mote 1974, p. 255; Twitchett & Grimm 1988, pp. 322–323.
  7. ^ Mote 1974, p. 255; Twitchett & Grimm 1988, p. 322.
  8. ^ Mote 1974, p. 255; Twitchett & Grimm 1988, p. 323.
  9. ^ a b c d Mote (1974), p. 256.
  10. ^ Mote 1974, p. 256; Twitchett & Grimm 1988, pp. 323–324.
  11. ^ Mote (1974), pp. 256–258.
  12. ^ a b Mote 1974, p. 258; Twitchett & Grimm 1988, p. 324.
  13. ^ a b c Mote (1974), p. 258.
  14. ^ a b c d e f g Mote (1974), p. 259.
  15. ^ a b c Mote 1974, p. 259; Twitchett & Grimm 1988, p. 324.
  16. ^ a b c d Mote (1974), p. 260.
  17. ^ Mote 1974, p. 260; Twitchett & Grimm 1988, p. 324.
  18. ^ a b Goodrich & Fang (1976), p. 291.
  19. ^ Mote 1974, pp. 260–261; Twitchett & Grimm 1988, p. 324; Goodrich & Fang 1976, p. 291.
  20. ^ Mote 1974, pp. 261–262; Twitchett & Grimm 1988, p. 324.
  21. ^ Mote 1974, pp. 262–263; Twitchett & Grimm 1988, pp. 324–325.
  22. ^ a b c Mote (1974), p. 263.
  23. ^ de Heer 1986, p. 18; Twitchett & Grimm 1988, p. 325.
  24. ^ de Heer 1986, pp. 17, 19; Twitchett & Grimm 1988, p. 326.
  25. ^ Twitchett & Grimm (1988), p. 328.
  26. ^ Goodrich & Fang (1976), pp. 291–292.
  27. ^ Twitchett & Grimm (1988), p. 331.

Works cited

[edit]
  • de Heer, Ph. (1986). The Care-taker Emperor : Aspects of the Imperial Institution in Fifteenth-century China as Reflected in the Political History of the Reign of Chu Chʾi-yü. Leiden: Brill. ISBN 9004078983.
  • Goodrich, L. Carington; Fang, Chaoying (1976). Dictionary of Ming Biography, 1368-1644. Vol. 1, A–L. New York: Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-03801-1.
  • Mote, Frederick W (1974). "The T'u-Mu Incident of 1449". In Dreyer, Edward L; Kierman, Frank Algerton; Fairbank, John King (eds.). Chinese Ways in Warfare. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. pp. 243–272. ISBN 978-0674125759.
  • Twitchett, Denis C; Grimm, Tilemann (1988). "The Cheng-t'ung, Ching-t'ai, and T'ien-shun reigns, 1436—1464". In Mote, Frederick W.; Twitchett, Denis C (eds.). The Cambridge History of China Volume 7: The Ming Dynasty, 1368–1644, Part 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 305–342. ISBN 0521243327.
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Timeline_of_the_Tumu_Crisis&oldid=1296780617"