Regime change in autocracies

Regime change in autocracies, like the Iranian revolution of 1979, The revolution in Argentina that followed the Falklands war in 1982, The Romanian revolution in 1989, the revolution in Egypt, Libya,Tunisia, and Syria, which started in 2011, and others, has been a central topic in comparative politics, encompassing both transitions to democracy and shifts to new authoritarian rulers or systems. Scholars have advanced numerous theories to explain why and how autocratic regimes break down. These explanations can be grouped into structural-economic factors, elite dynamics and institutions, mass mobilization and opposition strategies, and international influences.

Economic and structural drivers of change

A consistent finding is that higher levels of socioeconomic development correlate with a greater likelihood of democratization. As Barbara Geddes (1999) summarizes, "Democracy is more likely in more developed countries". Empirical studies show that authoritarian regime transitions (of all kinds) are more common during economic downturns. Geddes notes that autocratic breakdowns frequently follow periods of economic crisis, as discontented elites and masses lose faith in the regime. Djuve and Knutsen (2024) find quantitatively that economic crises significantly increase the probability of transitions from within, namely, changes initiated by regime insiders (whether toward liberalization or harsher rule) because crises create either "windows of opportunity" for ambitious leaders or pressure incumbents to placate rising opposition.

Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) argue that autocracies endure when elites can credibly appease the masses' demands without surrendering power. In contrast, democratization occurs when that balance collapses. In their model, democracy can emerge as a commitment device by which threatened elites concede future policy influence to the public (via elections) to avoid immediate revolt. High inequality makes elites fear democracy (since it portends redistribution at their expense). Therefore, extreme inequality often leads to intransigence and possibly violent repression rather than voluntary transition. By contrast, moderate inequality or changes in the asset structure (e.g., the economy shifting from land, which is easily expropriated, to capital, which is more mobile) can lower elite resistance to democratization. Modernization theory similarly posits that as countries urbanize and industrialize, growing middle classes and more educated urban workers are better able to organize collective action against authoritarian rule. Indeed, the rise of cities and civil society often helps overcome the collective action problem that normally protects autocracies. Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) also argue that in agrarian societies, by contrast, populations are geographically dispersed and less capable of sustained, coordinated protest.

Some oil-rich regimes become generous welfare providers when elites sense "subversive threats" from below, using welfare as a means of mass co-optation. Eibl and Hertog (2023) give Oman as an exmaple. Oman in the 1970s utilized booming oil revenues to rapidly expand public services and raise living standards in response to a communist insurgency, thereby helping to undercut revolutionary fervor. In contrast, where elites feel secure, they may hoard rents and provide minimal welfare, as in Equatorial Guinea under Teodoro Obiang, where huge oil earnings since the 1990s have enriched a narrow elite while most citizens remained in poverty.

Elite coalitions, institutions, and regime types

According to Geddes (1999), not all dictatorships are alike: military juntas, one-party states, personalist autocracies, and hybrid regimes have different internal dynamics that affect how they fall. Barbara Geddes' seminal work highlighted that who rules and how the ruling coalition is organized shape a regime's vulnerabilities. Military regimes, for instance, "carry within them the seeds of their own disintegration". Because the officer corps values the unity and integrity of the military institution above clinging to political office, splits within military juntas often lead the army to collectively withdraw from power ("return to the barracks") rather than risk fratricidal conflict. As a result, military dictatorships are typically the most fragile type: Geddes found that post-WWII military regimes survived on average only about 9 years, compared to 15 years for personalist regimes and 35 years for single-party regimes. When faced with popular protests or elite factionalism, military rulers are relatively prone to negotiating an exit and restoring civilian rule. Indeed, most transitions from military rule (e.g., Latin America in the 1980s) were negotiated and nonviolent, yielding either democratization or, at the very least, a peaceful transfer to a new regime. In contrast, single-party regimes, where a dominant party penetrates the state and society, have more cohesive elite networks and institutional mechanisms to manage dissent. Rival factions in ruling parties can be placated by the circulation of elites or policy concessions, so leadership struggles usually do not result in regime collapse. Hence, one-party autocracies have proven remarkably durable (many communist and some postcolonial regimes lasted decades), often ending only after external shocks or gradual internally-driven reforms. Personalist regimes (centered on an individual dictator and a clique of cronies) fall somewhere in between: lacking the institutional safety valves of parties or the professional loyalty of militaries, personalist regimes tend to resist relinquishing power until forced and often end in coups or violent overthrow. As Geddes observes, personalist dictators "circle the wagons" when crises hit, preferring repression over compromise, which makes "violent overthrow much more likely" in such regimes.

Bueno de Mesquita and co-authors (2005) argue that the stability of any regime rests on the size of its "winning coalition" (the core group whose support keeps the leader in power) relative to the selectorate (the pool of people with some say in choosing the leader). In autocracies, winning coalitions are typically small (e.g., top military officers, party barons, or family members). Leaders survive by delivering private goods to these insiders, lucrative posts, kickbacks, and monopolies, rather than broad public goods. This logic implies autocrats can endure even with disastrous public policies so long as the core coalition is paid off. However, if the ruler can no longer pay the coalition (due to economic crisis or sanctions) or if insider factions feel excluded, conspiracies may form to replace the leader. Indeed, coups d’état have been historically common in certain autocracies, essentially elite-led regime changes.

Kendall-Taylor and Frantz (2014) note that many autocrats are ousted by insiders (e.g., a palace coup), after which surprisingly little changes in terms of the regime's rules. For example, Argentina's military president, General Viola, was ousted in 1981 by fellow officers, yet the military regime itself persisted for another two years. Similarly, when party elites remove a communist party boss, often the authoritarian regime continues under new leadership (as happened in many Soviet-aligned states before 1989). Such insider-led ousters usually amount to rotational elitism. The regime survives by sacrificing a leader to preserve the broader coalition.

Lucan Way's research on post-Soviet states (2005) also emphasizes the role of elite capacity and state institutions in regime outcomes. He introduces the concept of "pluralism by default," noting that in Ukraine, Moldova, and other weak states, competitive politics emerged in the 1990s not due to strong democratic forces but because incumbents were too weak to monopolize power. In these cases, regimes faced the "inability of incumbents to maintain power or concentrate control by preserving elite unity, controlling elections, and/or using force against opponents". In countries where rulers failed to fully co-opt or repress all opposition, a degree of pluralism resulted almost unintentionally. Conversely, in Belarus and Russia, leaders such as Lukashenko and Putin built up strong coercive and party machines, preventing meaningful opposition and ensuring authoritarian stability. Way (2005) notes that the degree of state-building by autocrats influences regime change: strong states can suppress or manage opposition (often remaining authoritarian), whereas weak states more easily slip into political competition or even collapse.

Mass mobilization and opposition strategies

Theda Skocpol's classic study (1979) argued that revolutions are not simply the result of conscious insurgent organizing but rather emerge from structural crises in state and class relations. In her analysis of the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions, Skocpol found that an international or fiscal crisis (often induced by war or economic competition) can weaken the centralized state to the point of breakdown. This state crisis, for example, military defeat abroad or bankruptcy, undermines elite cohesion and creates a power vacuum that insurgent groups can exploit. However, whether a full-scale social revolution occurs also depends on the patterns of class dominance and alliances in society. Skocpol noted that peasant rebellions, guided by distinct class interests and often sparked by the state's collapse, were pivotal in these revolutions. For instance, in Russia 1917, World War I had pushed the Tsarist state into crisis. When regime repression faltered, peasant and worker uprisings filled the void, leading to a socialist revolution. Skocpol's structural perspective highlights that revolutions from below happen when an autocratic state's capacity crumbles (due to international pressures or internal administrative rot) and aggrieved social groups can mobilize against the old order. These conditions are rare, which is why successful social revolutions are comparatively infrequent but epochal in impact . The outcomes of such revolutions vary depending on further factors, like international context and the revolutionary coalition's nature, e.g., France ended with liberal-capitalist order, Russia with Bolshevik dictatorship, China with a mass-mobilizing party-state. The key point is that mass revolutions are most likely when autocracies face state breakdown, not just dissent: it is the combination of a faltering regime and mobilized "revolts from below" that produces sweeping regime change.

Hellmeier and Bernhard (2023) provide a comprehensive dataset of mass mobilization "from below" for the period 1900–2021, distinguishing pro-democracy versus pro-autocracy movements. They confirm that large-scale nonviolent pro-democratic mobilizations significantly increase the likelihood of a transition to democracy. People's power can dislodge entrenched elites, as seen in the wave of democratic transitions in the late 20th century (e.g., the "Third Wave" in Southern Europe, Latin America, and Eastern Europe). Conversely, Hellmeier and Bernhard also caution that mass mobilization is a double-edged sword: there are instances of pro-autocratic mobilization, populist or reactionary movements, that demand more authoritarianism or the restoration of a former autocrat. Their data show that such mobilization in favor of authoritarian ideals or leaders can undermine democracies and help hardliners to power. In other words, crowds in the street do not always chant for freedom. Sometimes, they call for a "strongman" or the suppression of minority rights, and those cases often presage democratic backsliding. The authors' broader point is that one must examine who the mobilization supports, democracy or autocracy, to gauge its effect on regime change.

Armstrong, Reuter, and Robertson (2020) highlight that unified oppositions present a far bigger threat to dictators than fragmented ones. Using data on protests in Putin-era Russia, Armstrong et al. find that cooperation between different opposition factions is most likely when issues arise that transcend their divides and resonate widely with their supporters. However, the regime's co-optation strategies are effective when the state has granted systemic opposition parties certain privileges or stakes (such as parliamentary seats and funding), those parties are less inclined to join forces with non-systemic dissidents in protest. In Russia, for example, nominal opposition parties often stayed away from anti-Putin street protests to avoid losing their sanctioned status. The study illustrates the "precarious position" of semi-loyal opposition in autocracies - they are pressured to show fealty to the regime yet must retain credibility with their base.

Hager and Krakowski (2022) provide evidence from Communist Poland, and find that communities more exposed to secret police agents saw more protest organizations, even as they witnessed less underground sabotage. Using archives and interviews, they show that pervasive spying created widespread anger and a sense of injustice among citizens. Rather than cowering silently, many Poles responded by openly demonstrating as a way to "reveal their true loyalties" and defy the regime. In effect, the intrusive repression eroded the regime's legitimacy and prompted people toward collective action (while dissuading smaller covert acts like sabotage). Once on the streets, protesters also moderated their tactics, refraining from violence or sabotage, to signal that their motives were political, not criminal. Hager and Krakowski (2022) note that autocrats walk a fine line: too little force and protests may swell; too much indiscriminate force, and they risk delegitimizing themselves or provoking international backlash. They also mention the examples from Iran in 1978 to Egypt in 2011, where heavy-handed crackdowns initially seemed to quell unrest, only to trigger larger demonstrations later, as casualties galvanized public anger.

Kendall-Taylor and Frantz (2014) note a striking pattern: when dictators fall due to mass revolts, the regime is far more likely to undergo fundamental change. In contrast, if insiders or the military ousts a dictator without popular pressure, the regime often remains essentially the same. They point out that in about 85% of cases where a leader was toppled by a popular uprising, the authoritarian regime itself collapsed with the dictator. This often paves the way for democratization or at least a new political order. By contrast, when a coup removes a dictator, roughly half the time, the broader regime continues under new leadership. The difference is that mass protests can delegitimize not only the ruler but the ruling system, especially if the army or portions of it side with the people or remain neutral. Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) and Kendall - Taylor (2014) give the example of the ouster of Egypt's Hosni Mubarak in 2011 followed millions of protesters gathering in Tahrir Square. The military ultimately refused to shoot protesters and maneuvered Mubarak out, opening space (albeit brief) for democratization. In Tunisia in 2011, likewise, the security forces' restraint and the sheer scale of demonstrations forced President Ben Ali to flee, and crucially, former regime elites then negotiated a democratic transition. In such cases, notes Kendall-Taylor (2014), the old regime's pillars are sufficiently weakened or delegitimized, allowing a new system to take root. By contrast, when a dictator is replaced by a general (as in many coups), the underlying power structure endures.

Hellmeier and Bernhard's (2023) data show that while pro-democracy mobilizations generally improve the odds of transition, they do not guarantee success. Cases like the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests in China or the 2020 uprising in Belarus show that if the ruling elite and security forces remain cohesive and willing to use unlimited repression, they can survive major protest waves. Hellmeier and Bernhard (2023) emphasize that timing and trigger events also matter. Sometimes, a seemingly small incident (like the self-immolation of a fruit seller in Tunisia) can ignite a prairie fire of protests because of underlying grievances and networks ready to mobilize. Once protests grow, maintaining nonviolent discipline and broadening the coalition (e.g., incorporating workers' strikes, student rallies, and middle-class participation) are key to sustaining momentum. The influence of social media and transnational diffusion in recent movements is also notable. The Arab Spring demonstrated how protests in one country can inspire those in another, as activists share slogans and tactics. Hellmeier and Bernhard refer to this as the transnational dimension of mobilization, where successes or failures in one place affect morale and strategy elsewhere.

International context and diffusion

As Levitsky and Way (2010) mention, interntional forces, ranging from great-power pressure to demonstration effects that cross borders, can significantly influence regime stability or change. One major international factor is the leverage and linkage to Western democracies, as highlighted by Levitsky and Way (2010). In their study of "competitive authoritarian" regimes after the Cold War, Levitsky, and Way found that countries with high linkage to the West (characterized by extensive diplomatic, economic, and media ties) were more likely to democratize because Western governments and transnational networks applied pressure for reforms and empowered domestic opposition. For example, many Eastern European hybrid regimes democratized in the 1990s under the pull of EU and NATO membership (high linkage), whereas regimes in regions with lower Western linkage (like much of the former Soviet Union or Africa) often remained authoritarian or even became more repressive. Levitsky and Way argue that where linkage is low, the fate of competitive authoritarian regimes depends more on incumbent organizational power: if the ruling party or state apparatus is strong, the regime can endure (e.g. Malaysia, Russia); if weak, it may face repeated unstable transitions or even collapse into chaos without democratization (e.g. Zambia or Madagascar experienced turnover but not consolidated democracy). This reinforces the earlier point about state capacity. Still, with an international twist, the post-Cold War world saw a shift in international norms against outright dictatorship, meaning that many autocracies maintained a façade of elections. Whether those elections led to genuine regime change or were mere window-dressing often depended on international scrutiny and support for the opposition.

Foreign intervention is another pathway. Some regime changes occur through external military force, as in Iraq in 2003, when a U.S.-led invasion deposed Saddam Hussein's autocracy (ushering in a troubled attempt at democracy-building), or in more minor cases like Panama 1989. While military interventions are relatively rare and controversial, the Arab Spring saw a version of this in Libya: NATO airstrikes in 2011 decisively tilted the balance in favor of rebels, leading to Gaddafi's overthrow. External actors can also influence outcomes by imposing sanctions that cripple an autocrat's patronage networks or by offering exile guarantees to dictators, persuading them to leave (e.g., the negotiated exit of Yemen's president in 2012 involved significant involvement from the Gulf Cooperation Council). Way (2005) notes that democratization in some post-communist states was aided by Western democracy assistance and the attraction of European integration. In contrast, in places like Belarus, the absence of such carrots and the countervailing influence of Russia helped the autocrat persist.

Finally, regional diffusion and demonstration effects play a role. Huntington's "third wave" of democratization (1974–1991) and the Arab Spring (2011) are classic examples of contagion: seeing a neighboring country's people overthrow a dictator can inspire similar movements at home. Authoritarian elites are keenly aware of this threat; hence, they often coordinate regionally to blunt its diffusion (as Gulf monarchies did by coordinating responses to the Arab Spring protests). International media and social networks accelerated the diffusion: satellite TV and the internet beamed images of jubilant crowds in Tunis and Cairo across the Arab world, undermining the aura of invincibility surrounding other autocrats. Hellmeier and Bernhard's data, encompassing both pro- and anti-democratic mobilizations globally, suggest that each successful popular uprising shifts perceptions of what is possible. However, diffusion can cut both ways: successful crackdowns or the descent of one country's uprising into chaos (e.g., Libya's post-revolution turmoil or Syria's civil war) can discourage protesters elsewhere or justify more brutal repression by neighboring regimes.

See also

• Iranian Revolution
• Revolution
• Autocracy
• Dictatorship
• Revolutions in autocracies after military defeats
• The final days of autocratic regimes: mechanics and dynamics