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Hwasong-11B

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Hwasong-11B
Artist rendition of the missile, with two color variants: Black-white (left) and tan-white (right)
TypeShort-range ballistic missile
Place of originNorth Korea
Service history
Used byNorth Korea (Korean People's Army Strategic Force)
Russia
WarsRussian invasion of Ukraine
Production history
Designed2019
Specifications
Length7.2 m (24 ft)
Diameter1.1 m (3 ft 7 in)
Warhead400–500 kg (880–1,100 lb)
EngineSolid fuel rocket
Operational
range
410 km (250 mi)
Maximum speed up to 2.1 km/s (Mach 6.2)
Guidance
system
Inertial navigation system (INS), possible satellite navigation
Accuracy35–200 m (115–656 ft)
Launch
platform
tracked or 8×8 wheeled TEL

The Hwasong-11B[a] (Korean: 《화성포-11나》형; lit. Mars Artillery Type 11B), also known as KN-24 under the United States’s naming convention,[6] is a North Korean single-stage, solid-fueled tactical ballistic missile.

Description

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The Hwasong-11B is a missile that bears an external resemblance to the American MGM-140 ATACMS and likely fills a similar role of supporting battlefield operations. Its aft-mounted aerodynamic fins are fixed rather than foldable like those on the ATACMS, requiring deployment from rectangular launch canisters. It flies in a "variable ballistic trajectory," flattening out at a lower altitude, below around 50 km (31 mi), than traditional SRBMs like the Scud, where the atmosphere is dense enough, so the missile's fins can maintain aerodynamic control over its entire flight and dive toward the target.[6][7][8]

The use of INS updated with satellite-guidance data could make it accurate to within 35–200 m (115–656 ft) CEP, depending whether the missile uses satellite guidance or INS alone. Although the missile is outwardly similar to the ATACMS, it has demonstrated greater range, suggesting its physical dimensions are larger. It appears to share a common booster with the Hwasong-11A (KN-23) and is estimated to carry a 400–500 kg (880–1,100 lb) payload with a unitary or submunition warhead. The Hwasong-11B is also capable of carrying Hwasan-31 tactical nuclear warhead. It is likely to replace older liquid-fueled North Korean SRBMs, like the Hwasong-5 and Hwasong-6, as its non-parabolic trajectory makes it more survivable against missile defense systems, and its increased accuracy reduces the number of missiles that would be needed to destroy a single target.[6][7][8][9][10]

Despite their similarities to the ATACMS system, the Hwasong-11B is significantly larger, and likely uses the same motor as the Pukguksong-1 with similar jet vanes, and overall resembling a single stage version of it. The launch container is a tracked chassis that has a width of about 1.26 m (4 ft 2 in) and a wheel diameter of 0.78 m (2 ft 7 in), similar to the Pukguksong-2 tracked TEL. A number of images shown of the system appears to be manipulated, significantly increasing the size of the launcher. The Hwasong-11B can also be launched using a four-axle chassis along with the tracked TEL.[11][12]

With the missile fulfilling a similar role to the Hwasong-11A, there should have been no need to develop another missile later with an overlapping performance. In an analysis of news reports from the Korean Central News Agency, despite the differences the Hwasong-11A possesses from the 9K720 Iskander, the Hwasong-11A is likely to be constructed with foreign assistance or foreign parts.[13]

While all the news reports on the Hwasong-11A mainly focused on the deployment, 'demonstration of power' and newness of it, reports on the Hwasong-11B instead focused on the 'research' and 'development' in its first launch. Later launches of Hwasong-11B made mention of 'Juche weapons of Korean style', which is not mentioned at all for the Hwasong-11A, hinting that whereas the Hwasong-11B underwent a research and development phase, the Hwasong-11A was already deployed prior to being tested, and likely having foreign involvement in some form.[13]

History

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Hwasong-11B made its public debut on 10 August 2019 with a flight test. Another test-fire occurred on 16 August 2019. A third flight test was also carried out on 21 March 2020.[14] Between the March 2020 test and January 2022 test, North Korea featured Hwasong-11B (then known by its US designation) in military parades on 10 October 2020 and 14 January 2021,[15][16] as well as the “Self-Defence 2021” military exhibition in October 2021, where North Korea revealed official name of the missile.[17]

North Korea also unveiled a tan-coloured version of Hwasong-11B during the “Self-Defence 2021” military exhibition.[12][17]

Hwasong-11B also appeared in military parades on 25 April 2022,[18] 8 February 2023,[19] as well as on 27 July 2023, when North Korea unveiled truck-type TEL of Hwasong-11B.[11] A further test-fire took place on 30 August 2023.[19][20]

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), as of 2025, North Korea is possessing more than nine Hwasong-11B launchers. These launchers are assessed as "in test" by the IISS.[21]: 268 

Usage during Russian invasion of Ukraine

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On 15 February 2024, a Hwasong-11B was claimed to be shot down in Ukraine, near Kyiv.[22][unreliable source?]

A day later, on 16 February 2024, Ukrainian data showed 24 missiles, including Hwasong-11B type, being used by Russia, allegedly with low accuracy.[23]

According to Ukraine, at the start of 2025, North Korea had supplied at least 148 ballistic missiles of two types, including Hwasong-11B.[24]

List of tests

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Confirmed tests

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Attempt Date Location Number of missiles tested Outcome Additional notes Reference(s)
1 10 August 2019 Hamhung 2 Success Two missiles reached an apogee of 48 km (30 mi) and a range of 400 km (250 mi), at a speed of 2.1 km/s (7,600 km/h; 4,700 mph). Kim Jong Un oversaw the test-fire. [6][25]
2 16 August 2019 Tongchon 2 Success These missiles flew to an apogee of 30 km (19 mi) and a range of 230 km (140 mi), demonstrating a depressed trajectory. Kim Jong Un supervised the test-fire. [14][26]
3 21 March 2020 Sonchon 2 Success These missiles flew to an apogee of 50 km (31 mi) and a range of 410 km (250 mi), performing "pull-up maneuvers" in flight, and one supposedly striking a small 100 meter-long island. Kim Jong Un supervised the test-fire. [6][7][27]
4 17 January 2022 Sunan Airport 2 Success The missiles flew 380 km (240 mi) and achieved an apogee of 42 km (26 mi), with a maximum speed of Mach 5 (1.7 km/s). The test-fire was conducted to check operational readiness and validate the build quality of mass produced Hwasong-11B missiles. [14][28]
5 2–5 November 2022 Unknown 2 Un­known Information based on the images released by Korean Central News Agency on 7 November 2022. [29][30]
6 30 August 2023 Sunan Airport 2 Success These missiles achieved 50 km (31 mi) apogee. One missile flew 400 km (250 mi), the other flew 350 km (220 mi). The missiles exploded at an altitude of about 400 m (1,300 ft) above target. [14][20]

Unconfirmed tests

[edit]

According to member states of the United Nations Security Council, some of the eight ballistic missiles fired on 5 June 2022 could be the Hwasong-11B.[31]

See also

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  • KTSSM – South Korean tactical ballistic missile
  • ATACMS – American tactical ballistic missile
  • Hwasong-11D – North Korean short-range ballistic missile

Notes

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  1. ^ Also known without using United States’s designation as Hwasong-11Na, Hwasongpho-11Na, Songun ATACMS, Hwasong-11나 and Hwasongpho-11나 (mixing Latin and Korean characters).[1][2][3][4] South Korea also refers to Hwasong-11B as 19-4 SRBM under its naming convention.[5]

References

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  1. ^ "North Korean nuclear forces (2021)" (PDF). Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Retrieved 28 December 2024.
  2. ^ Lee Je-hun (29 March 2023). "N. Korea reveals tactical nuclear warhead for first time". The Hankyoreh. Retrieved 28 December 2024.
  3. ^ Ankit Panda (11 August 2019). "Unpacking North Korea's new weapon: the "Songun ATACMS"". NK Pro. Retrieved 28 December 2024.
  4. ^ "DPRK Military Parade Viewbook 2022" (PDF). Open Nuclear Network. 21 April 2022. p. 12. Retrieved 29 December 2024.
  5. ^ "韓国軍国防白書2020の北朝鮮ミサイル比較図から大きさ推定値" [Size estimate from comparative diagram of North Korean missiles in South Korean Defense White Paper 2020]. Yahoo News Japan (in Japanese). 3 February 2021. Retrieved 20 June 2025.
  6. ^ a b c d e "KN-24". Missile Threat - CSIS. 15 April 2020. Retrieved 26 January 2025.
  7. ^ a b c Michael Elleman (25 March 2020). "Preliminary Assessment of the KN-24 Missile Launches". 38 North. Retrieved 9 February 2025.
  8. ^ a b Michael Elleman (9 October 2019). "North Korea's New Short-Range Missiles: A Technical Evaluation". 38 North. Retrieved 9 February 2025.
  9. ^ "North Korean Short Range Systems" (PDF). EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium. Retrieved 26 January 2025.
  10. ^ Yang Uk (29 June 2023). "북한의 최신 핵무기 개발 현황: 핵그림자를 드리우는 북한의 인지전 시도" [North Korea's latest nuclear weapons developments: North Korea's cognitive warfare attempts to cast a nuclear shadow]. Asan Institute for Policy Studies (in Korean). Retrieved 26 July 2025.
  11. ^ a b Xu Tianran (8 August 2023). "Brief on 27 July 2023 Parade of the DPRK". Open Nuclear Network. Retrieved 26 January 2025.
  12. ^ a b "Pukguksong GLBM-1". www.b14643.eu. Retrieved 25 October 2021.
  13. ^ a b "A Tale of Two Missiles: Analysis of KCNA Reports on North Korea's KN-23 and KN-24 Short-Range Ballistic Missiles". datayo.org. Archived from the original on 15 January 2021. Retrieved 12 October 2021.
  14. ^ a b c d "The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database". Nuclear Threat Initiative. Retrieved 12 January 2025.
  15. ^ "Viewbook of DPRK 10 October 2020 Parade" (PDF). Open Nuclear Network. 13 October 2020. Retrieved 26 January 2025.
  16. ^ Masao Dahlgren (15 January 2021). "North Korea Displays New Missiles in Nighttime Parade". Missile Threat - CSIS. Retrieved 26 January 2025.
  17. ^ a b Colin Zwirko (18 January 2022). "North Korea says it successfully launched 'tactical guided missiles' on Monday". NK News. Retrieved 5 June 2025.
  18. ^ Xu, Tianran (2 May 2022). "25 April 2022 DPRK Parade" (PDF). Open Nuclear Network. Retrieved 26 January 2025.
  19. ^ a b "S/2024/215" (PDF). United Nations Security Council. 7 March 2024. Retrieved 14 February 2025.
  20. ^ a b "KPA General Staff Releases Report". Korean Central News Agency. 31 August 2023. Retrieved 26 July 2025. For image, see here.
  21. ^ International Institute for Strategic Studies (12 February 2025). The Military Balance 2025 (1st ed.). Routledge. ISBN 978-1041049678.
  22. ^ Yevhen Buderatskyi; Yevhen Kizilov (16 February 2024). "North Korean KN-24 missile leaves huge crater in Bucha district". Ukrainska Pravda. Retrieved 7 February 2025.
  23. ^ Balforth, Tom (16 February 2024). "Ukrainian data casts doubt on precision of N.Korea missiles fired by Russia". Reuters. Archived from the original on 16 February 2024. Retrieved 17 February 2024.
  24. ^ Balforth, Tom (24 April 2025). "Missile that killed 12 in Russian strike on Kyiv was North Korean, Zelenskiy says". Reuters. Retrieved 25 April 2025. By the start of 2025, Pyongyang had supplied Russia with 148 KN-23 [Hwasong-11A] and KN-24 [Hwasong-11B] ballistic missiles, Ukraine's military spy agency says.
  25. ^ "Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Test-Fire of New Weapon". Korean Central News Agency. 11 August 2019. Retrieved 26 January 2025. For images, see 1 and 2.
  26. ^ "Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Guides Test-fire of New Weapon Again". Korean Central News Agency. 17 August 2019. Retrieved 26 January 2025. For images, see 1 and 2.
  27. ^ "Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un Observes Demonstration Fire of Tactical Guided Weapon". Korean Central News Agency. 22 March 2020. Retrieved 26 January 2025. For images, see 1 and 2.
  28. ^ "Test-fire of Tactical Guided Missiles Held". Korean Central News Agency. 18 January 2022. Retrieved 26 January 2025.
  29. ^ "S/2023/171" (PDF). United Nations Security Council. 7 March 2023. p. 185. Retrieved 25 July 2025.
  30. ^ "Images of two Hwasong-11B missile launches in early November 2022". Korean Central News Agency. Retrieved 12 January 2025 – via KCNA Watch.
  31. ^ "S/2022/668" (PDF). United Nations Security Council. 7 September 2022. pp. 22, 161. Retrieved 25 May 2025.
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