Hwasong-11S
Hwasong-11S | |
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Type | Submarine-launched ballistic missile |
Place of origin | North Korea |
Service history | |
In service | 2021-present |
Used by | Korean People's Army |
Production history | |
Designed | 2021 |
Specifications | |
Length | 6.8–8.45 m (22.3–27.7 ft) |
Diameter | 1.0–1.1 m (3 ft 3 in – 3 ft 7 in) |
Warhead | Tactical nuclear warhead |
Engine | Solid-propelled engine |
Operational range | Reported: About 600 km (370 mi) |
Launch platform | Submarine, submersible barge, underwater silo |
The Hwasong-11S[a] (Korean: 《화성포-11ㅅ》형; lit. Mars Artillery Type 11S) is a North Korean solid-fueled submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).
Description
[edit]Images of the Hwasong-11S | |
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Hwasong-11S is the underwater-launched variant of the Hwasong-11A (KN-23).[1] The missile is claimed to have a ground-based version that was first tested on 16 April 2022, later identified as Hwasong-11D.[3][4] Its reported range is about 600 km (370 mi). The estimated length and diameter are between 6.8–8.45 m (22.3–27.7 ft) and 1.0–1.1 m (3 ft 3 in – 3 ft 7 in) respectively.[5][6] Hwasong-11S is capable of carrying Hwasan-31 tactical nuclear warhead.[7] German analyst Norbert Brügge claimed the missile to be a modified version of Pukguksong-1 with two stages, a longer body and a longer warhead.[6]
Hwasong-11S utilizes a solid-fueled engine and a single-stage design with four bumps around the tail section. Four grid fins, which folded before launch, are located between the four bumps. After its maiden launch, it was determined that the bumps and grid fins were a part of the gas generator.[8] The new missile also features improved control, such as "flank" and "gliding skip" mobilities.[9]
Information from the 19 October 2021 launch suggests that the missile is fitted with a gas generator to cold launch out of the submarine's missile tube into the air, before the ignition of main engine. Compared to previous North Korean SLBMs like the Pukguksong-1 and its larger derivatives, it retains the depressed trajectory and manoeuvring flight characteristics of Hwasong-11A to try to evade missile defence systems. Since it is based on a missile with a shorter range than the Pukguksong-series, the submarine would need to get closer to its target in order to launch, leaving it more vulnerable to detection and destruction before it can be fired. Its development may be more of a political statement than an effort to create a viable weapon, as the test occurred weeks after South Korea tested their own Hyunmoo-2B's SLBM version, Hyunmoo 4-4, both of which are derived from the same Iskander design base.[8][10]
Based on information and photos from the 25 September 2022 launch, it was determined that the missile was launched from a silo under a reservoir.[11] However, it is likely the missile was fired from a submersible barge containing launch silos. It is unknown whether such a system will be pursued as a serious launch method, or if it was a demonstration of another capability to deter South Korean preemption strategies by adding another potential deployment method.[12]
History
[edit]North Korea first displayed Hwasong-11S in October 2021, during the "Self-Defence 2021" military exhibition without revealing its official name. In the exhibition, the missile was displayed beside two SLBMs: Pukguksong-1 and Pukguksong-5.[13] Due to its small size compared to the Pukguksong-series SLBM, it was unofficially called as "small SLBM".[14]
About one week after the exhibition, on 19 October 2021, Hwasong-11S was first test-fired from the 8.24 Yongung experimental ballistic missile submarine. Like the exhibition, North Korea chose to not reveal the missile's official designation. Several months later, eight Hwasong-11S missiles were displayed during the 25 April 2022 military parade without being named.[3][9][15] Further test-fires occurred on 7 May 2022 and 25 September 2022, however, North Korea only confirmed the September 2022 test.[3][4][16]
The missile's official name was revealed in the KCNA's report on the new Hwasan-31 nuclear warhead in late March 2023.[17][18]
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), as of 2025, North Korea is possessing "some" Hwasong-11S launchers, assessed as "in test" by the IISS.[19]: 268
Tests
[edit]Attempt | Date | Location | Outcome | Additional notes |
---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 19 October 2021 | Sinpo-class submarine,[10] located at Sinpo Shipyard, South Hamgyong Province[4] | Success | The missile reportedly travelled about 600 km (370 mi) and reached an altitude of 60 km (37 mi).[8][10] Japanese data showed the launch of two missiles, despite the North Korean's claim of one missile launch.[20] North Korea called Hwasong-11S as "new type submarine-launched ballistic missile" without revealing the missile's official designation in this test.[9] |
(Unconfirmed) | 7 May 2022 | Sinpo Shipyard, Sinpo, South Hamgyong Province[4] | Unknown | North Korea did not release a statement about the launch. The missile flew 600 km (370 mi) for less than 18 minutes, achieved 60 km (37 mi) apogee and used an irregular trajectory.[4][16] |
2 | 25 September 2022 | Taechon Reservoir, North Pyongan Province[4] | Success | The missile was launched from an underwater silo, under an inland reservoir and used irregular trajectory. North Korea referred to the launch as "the simulation of loading tactical nuclear warheads". Kim Jong Un oversaw the launch. North Korea also did not mention the missile's official name in this test.[11][16] |
See also
[edit]- Hwasong-11A (KN-23)
- Hwasong-11C
- Hwasong-11D
- Hyunmoo 4-4
Notes
[edit]- ^ Also known as Hwasong-11ㅅ (mixing Latin and Korean characters) and KN-33 (reported external designation).[1][2]
References
[edit]- ^ a b Tianran Xu (8 August 2023). "Brief on 27 July 2023 Parade of the DPRK" (PDF). Open Nuclear Network. Retrieved 2 January 2025.
- ^ Lee Geun-pyeong; Lee Yu-jeong (13 April 2025). "[단독]美, 北 CRBM에 코드명 'KN-35' 붙였다…KN-25 이후 30번대 넘버링 첫 확인" [(Exclusive) US gives North Korea CRBM codename 'KN-35'... First confirmation of 30-series numbering since KN-25]. The JoongAng (in Korean). Retrieved 27 May 2025.
- ^ a b c "S/2022/668" (PDF). United Nations Security Council. 7 September 2022. pp. 24, 26, 29–30, 143. Retrieved 27 January 2025.
- ^ a b c d e f "The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database". Nuclear Threat Initiative. Retrieved 3 January 2025.
- ^ "S/2022/132" (PDF). United Nations Security Council. 1 March 2022. p. 30. Retrieved 2 January 2025.
- ^ a b "PS-1 mod". b14643.eu. Retrieved 2 January 2025.
- ^ Yang Uk (29 June 2023). "북한의 최신 핵무기 개발 현황: 핵그림자를 드리우는 북한의 인지전 시도" [North Korea's latest nuclear weapons developments: North Korea's cognitive warfare attempts to cast a nuclear shadow]. Asan Institute for Policy Studies (in Korean). Retrieved 25 May 2025.
- ^ a b c Tianran Xu (20 October 2021). "Brief on the 19 October 2021 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Test of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (PDF). Open Nuclear Network. Retrieved 2 January 2025.
- ^ a b c "Academy of Defence Science Succeeds in Test-Launch of New Type SLBM". Korean Central News Agency. 20 October 2021. Retrieved 3 January 2025.
- ^ a b c Vann H. Van Diepen (22 October 2021). "North Korea's "New Type Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile": More Political Than Military Significance". 38 North. Retrieved 2 January 2025.
- ^ a b "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Military Drills of KPA Units for Operation of Tactical Nukes". Korean Central News Agency. 10 October 2022. Retrieved 2 January 2025. For images, see 1, 2, 3 and 4.
- ^ Vann H. Van Diepen (14 October 2022). ""A Strong Military Warning": Four Key Implications of North Korea's October 10 Missile Statement: More Political Than Military Significance". 38 North. Retrieved 2 January 2025.
- ^ Tianran Xu (18 October 2021). "Brief on the Defence Development Exhibition of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (PDF). Open Nuclear Network. Retrieved 2 January 2025.
- ^ "North Korea's Small SLBM". Arms Control Wonk. 27 October 2021. Retrieved 27 January 2025.
- ^ "Overview of the DPRK's 25 April 2022 Military Parade" (PDF). Open Nuclear Network. 2 May 2022. p. 13. Retrieved 2 January 2025.
- ^ a b c "S/2023/171" (PDF). United Nations Security Council. 4 March 2023. p. 19. Retrieved 28 January 2025.
- ^ Colin Zwirko (3 April 2023). "North Korea reveals internal names for several missile systems: Analysis". NK Pro. Retrieved 21 June 2025.
- ^ "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Work for Mounting Nuclear Warheads on Ballistic Missiles". Korean Central News Agency. 28 March 2023. Retrieved 21 June 2025.
- ^ International Institute for Strategic Studies (12 February 2025). The Military Balance 2025 (1st ed.). Routledge. ISBN 978-1041049678.
- ^ "Japan maintains North Korea fired 2 ballistic missiles, not 1". Kyodo News+. 20 October 2021. Retrieved 24 October 2021.