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Iranian intervention in Sudan (2023–present)

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Iran's intervention in Sudan 2023-present refers to the renewed Iran–Sudan relations following the Sudanese civil war (2023–present). In 2016, Sudan cut off all diplomatic relations with Iran due to tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, as the civil war in Sudan began, the two countries renewed their diplomatic connections. As of April 2025, Iran has significantly deepened its involvement in Sudan’s civil war, aligning with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. This intervention serves Tehran’s broader geopolitical ambitions in the Red Sea region and Africa.[citation needed]

Background

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Iran's involvement in Sudan has evolved over several decades, marked by periods of cooperation and tension. In the early 2000s, Iran provided substantial military and economic support to Sudan, including the training of Sudanese military personnel and assistance in developing the Yarmouk Military Industrial Complex in Khartoum, which has been linked to Iranian interests. This collaboration was part of Iran's broader strategy to counter Western influence and support allies in the region.[1]

However, relations soured in 2015 when Sudan joined the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, leading to the expulsion of Iranian diplomats and a cessation of military cooperation. This shift was driven by Sudan's need for economic support from Gulf countries and a desire to distance itself from Iran's regional policies.[2]

The relationship began to thaw in 2023 amid Sudan's civil war, which erupted between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). In October 2023, Sudan and Iran resumed diplomatic ties after an eight-year hiatus, with both countries exchanging ambassadors.[3] Iran's renewed engagement was motivated by strategic interests, including the desire to establish a foothold in the Red Sea region and counter the influence of rival powers such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE.[4][2][5] Since the resumption of diplomatic relations, Iran has provided military support to the SAF, including the supply of drones and other weaponry. This assistance has been instrumental in the SAF's efforts to regain control over territories held by the RSF.[6]

Military support and strategic objectives

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Since reestablishing diplomatic ties with Sudan in October 2023 after a seven-year hiatus, Iran has supplied the SAF with advanced weaponry, notably Mohajer-6 and Ababil drones. These drones have been instrumental in recent SAF offensives, including the recapture of key areas in Khartoum and Omdurman. Iran has also provided intelligence support and facilitated the training of new SAF recruits, some reportedly trained in Uganda.[7][8]

Iran's involvement in Sudan is driven by several strategic objectives

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Red Sea Naval Presence

Iran has expressed interest in establishing a naval facility in Port Sudan. Such a base would allow Iran to monitor the Suez Canal and Israel's southern flank, enhancing its naval capabilities in the region. However, Sudan's alignment with Saudi Arabia has led to the rejection of this proposal.[9][10][5]

Countering Regional Rivals

By supporting the SAF, Iran aims to counter the influence of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Sudan and the broader Horn of Africa. This support helps Tehran assert its presence in a region of strategic importance.[11][12]

Exploiting Natural Resources

Reports suggest that Iran is interested in Sudan's uranium reserves, which could potentially bolster Iran's nuclear program. Additionally, Sudan's position along key maritime routes offers Iran opportunities to disrupt shipping and challenge regional adversaries.[13]

Ideological and educational outreach

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Iran's ideological and educational outreach in Sudan is a critical element of its broader soft power strategy, aimed at deepening its influence in the country and expanding its reach across Africa. Beyond the military cooperation, which involves supplying advanced weaponry and supporting the Sudanese Armed Forces, Iran is focusing on spreading its Shiite ideology through educational initiatives.[14]

A key part of this outreach includes the establishment of educational institutions in Sudan, designed to promote Shiite teachings and strengthen Iran’s ties with local communities. These institutions not only serve as centers of learning but also as platforms for ideological engagement, promoting religious and cultural values that align with Iran's political and religious perspectives. This approach is integral to Iran's efforts to build long-term relationships with Sudanese communities and to gain influence over the country's political and social landscape.[14][15]

In February 2025, Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssif visited Tehran, where he met with Iranian officials, including President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi. During this visit, Iran announced support for the Sudanese government and expressed intentions to encourage Iranian companies to participate in Sudan's reconstruction efforts.[16]

Iran's focus on education is part of a broader strategy to expand its ideological footprint in Africa, as it views the continent as an important region for its long-term geopolitical goals. These educational programs are not only limited to theological training but also include efforts to create social networks that align with Iran’s worldview, fostering a connection between Iran and key local groups.[14]

Through these educational and ideological initiatives, Iran is strengthening its influence in Sudan, creating a network of allies that can help further its objectives in the region.[2]

Geopolitical and regional implications

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Iran’s involvement adds complexity to Sudan’s civil war, which has become a proxy battleground involving multiple foreign actors. While Iran supports the SAF, the UAE has been accused of backing the opposing Rapid Support Forces (RSF) with arms and funding. This dynamic mirrors broader regional rivalries and has intensified the conflict.[17][18][19]

There are concerns that Iran’s support could transform the SAF into a force resembling Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, potentially increasing Tehran’s influence in Sudan. Additionally, Iran’s presence in Sudan may facilitate support to allied groups like the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon, further extending its regional reach.[19][12]

Humanitarian consequences

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The influx of Iranian weaponry has contributed to the escalation of violence, exacerbating Sudan’s humanitarian crisis. The conflict has resulted in over 150,000 deaths and displaced more than 12 million people. The United Nations has condemned external support to both warring parties, stating that it "enables the slaughter" and worsens the humanitarian situation.[20][21] In April 2025, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) launched a deadly attack on the Zamzam displacement camp in Darfur, killing at least 500 people, including 12 aid workers. Such assaults have left many without access to essential services, including healthcare and food distribution.[22][23]

Risk and implivations

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While Iran’s support has bolstered the SAF’s recent military gains, the long-term implications remain uncertain.[11] Tehran’s ambitions for a strategic foothold in Sudan face challenges, including local resistance to foreign military bases and the complex interplay of regional powers. The deepening foreign involvement risks prolonging the conflict and further destabilizing the region, with Sudan potentially becoming a battleground for proxy conflicts between Iran and its regional adversaries, leading to prolonged instability.[11] The continued military support to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) could also further isolate Sudan internationally, especially if such support violates arms embargoes or exacerbates the ongoing humanitarian crisis.[24][25] Additionally, the influx of foreign arms and support may escalate the civil war, resulting in more casualties and further displacement of civilians.[24] These factors complicate the prospects for peace and stability in Sudan and raise concerns about the broader regional implications of Iran's intervention.[11]

See also

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References

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  1. ^ "Sudan: The Country Hijacked by Islamists and Targeted for Burial by Iran". strategiecs.com. Retrieved 2025-04-27.
  2. ^ a b c "How Iran is Reshaping the Sudanese Civil War | Bruin Political Review". bruinpoliticalreview.org. Retrieved 2025-04-27.
  3. ^ "Sudan and Iran exchange ambassadors after diplomatic rift | Al Bawaba". www.albawaba.com. Retrieved 2025-04-27.
  4. ^ "Iran fuels Sudanese civil war with arms, seeks Red Sea base - Bloomberg". www.iranintl.com. 2024-12-18. Retrieved 2025-04-27.
  5. ^ a b "Curbing Outside Intervention in the Sudan War | The Washington Institute". www.washingtoninstitute.org. Retrieved 2025-04-27.
  6. ^ "Sudan civil war: are Iranian drones helping the army gain ground?". 2024.
  7. ^ "Civil War in Sudan | Global Conflict Tracker". www.cfr.org. Retrieved 2025-04-27.
  8. ^ ADF (2024-10-15). "Iran Seeks Influence in Sudan Through an Influx of Weapons - Africa Defense Forum". Retrieved 2025-04-27.
  9. ^ "Iran and Foreign Red Sea ambitions in Sudan - Robert Lansing Institute". lansinginstitute.org. 2024-10-14. Retrieved 2025-04-27.
  10. ^ "Iran's Red Sea Strategy Amid the RSF–SAF Fratricidal War in Sudan". jamestown.org. Retrieved 2025-04-27.
  11. ^ a b c d Lob, Eric. "Iran's intervention in Sudan's civil war advances its geopolitical goals − but not without risks". FIU News. Retrieved 2025-04-27.
  12. ^ a b "Iranian Influence in Sudan: Balancing Drone Diplomacy and Conflict Pressures". 2024.
  13. ^ Dov, Yehuda (2025-04-06). "Iran Sends Attack Drones To Sudan, Seeks To Exploit Sudan's Uranium For Nuclear Program - VINnews". Retrieved 2025-04-27.
  14. ^ a b c "Iran's Expanding Influence in Sudan: Technical Training and Strategic Implications". The Arab posts. 2024-06-14. Retrieved 2025-04-27.
  15. ^ Staff, The Media Line (2024-11-02). "Iran Exploits the Sudanese Crisis To Enhance Its Regional Influence". The Media Line. Retrieved 2025-04-27.
  16. ^ "Sudan Is Iran's Opening for a Foothold in the Red Sea". Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. 2025-03-03. Retrieved 2025-04-27.
  17. ^ "Sudan's Army Close to Retaking Its Own Capital From Rebels". 2025.
  18. ^ "Allies providing Sudan's warring parties with weapons are 'enabling the slaughter,' UN official says". AP News. 2024-11-13. Retrieved 2025-04-27.
  19. ^ a b "Iran in Sudan: Fears of a Sudanese Popular Mobilization Forces | The Washington Institute". www.washingtoninstitute.org. Retrieved 2025-04-27.
  20. ^ "Sudan conflict: what's behind the war?". 2025.
  21. ^ Tharoor, Ishaan (2025-03-24). "Column | Sudan's bloody civil war may be reaching a turning point". The Washington Post. ISSN 0190-8286. Retrieved 2025-04-27.
  22. ^ "Mass displacement, horrific eyewitness accounts follow Sudan camp attack". 2025.
  23. ^ Zakaria, Nicholas Bariyo and Mohamed. "Attacks on Darfur Relief Camps Threaten Bloody New Chapter in War". WSJ. Retrieved 2025-04-27.
  24. ^ a b "Weapons fuel humanitarian crisis in Sudan". www.ploughshares.ca. Retrieved 2025-04-27.
  25. ^ "Civil War in Sudan | Global Conflict Tracker". www.cfr.org. Retrieved 2025-04-27.
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