Federalist No. 71
 Alexander Hamilton, author of Federalist No. 71 | |
| Author | Alexander Hamilton |
|---|---|
| Original title | The Duration in Office of the Executive |
| Language | English |
| Publisher | The New York Packet |
Publication date | March 18, 1788 |
| Publication place | United States |
| Media type | Newspaper |
| Preceded by | Federalist No. 70 |
| Followed by | Federalist No. 72 |
Federalist No. 71 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the seventy-first of The Federalist Papers. It was published on March 18, 1788, under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all The Federalist papers were published. Its title is "The Duration in Office of the Executive", and it is the fifth in a series of 11 essays discussing the structure and powers of the executive branch.
It was published in the New York Packet in an effort to convince the people of New York to ratify the new Constitution. The papers were meant to urge New York and other states to ratify the proposed Constitution, which was a success at the end. This essay stated that the government should serve the public good. The legislature would control the judicial and executive, so they can all come to agreements with any conflicts that may be argued. It was about deciding the duration of the presidential term in office and the advantages and disadvantages it had for the president. Having a certain duration develops personal firmness in the employment in his or her constitutional powers. It also sets up a stable system of administration adopted under his sponsorship.
Alexander Hamilton's view
[edit]Hamilton defended the provision of the constitution for a presidential term of four years. Against the argument that this was too long a term and would increase the risk of the president amassing too much power, Hamilton defended the four-year term due to the energy the president should attain. To him, having an energetic executive meant someone who holds true power and intelligence which was apparent when building a strong union. He argued that a term of four years would give the president the ability to counteract temporary passions or influences of faction that may from time to time convulse the American people and their representatives in Congress. According to Hamilton, it is the duty of the executive "to protect the interests of the people and the greater good of the nation, even when the people may, as a result of being deceived or manipulated, demand the adoption of flawed policy" (Gradesaver). He goes on to argue that a four-year term and the ability to run for reelection will make the president determined to pursue policies he believes will have the greatest impact. He thought that a term which is four years will give the president the ability to influence the American people and the representatives in Congress. According to Hamilton, it is the executive's responsibility to guard the nation's greater good even when the people mandate the acceptance of flawed policy. Four years will also enable the president to follow policies he feels are best after Congress approves. It is also enough time to commit to that position and not lose sight of why they are there in the first place.[1]
Hamilton also makes the case for duration, meaning a presidential term long enough to promote stability in the government.[2] While Hamilton elaborates on the importance of duration in Federalist No. 73, he argues briefly in Federalist No. 71 that the prospect of more time in office will motivate a president to act in concert with the views of the public.[3][4] Hamilton claims that "safety in the republican sense" depends on "duration" because a unitary executive structure promoting energy in the executive is only safe if the possibility of re-election gives the executive a strong incentive to make policy in conformity with public opinion.[5][6]
Other proposals
[edit]When the paper was being made, there were other proposals put on the table for consideration. There were proposals two-year terms or eight-year terms. Hamilton argued a two-year term was too short for the president to make a difference or even make a major move since the first year of presidency is supervised to determine presidential fitness; the first year is taken in settling in and understanding the dynamics of how to run the country. So two years would essentially rush the president and make him have rash decisions. The president may not take the position seriously or feel like they could even make an impact on the country. On the other hand, eight-year term is too long especially if that president was to get reelected. The president might end up doing what is best for himself rather than what the nation needs.
Missing text
[edit]The missing text in Federalist No. 71 is the "vital role that the legislature and the direct participation of the public has to play in achieving energetic public service that can provide safety in the regulatory process" (Federalist No. 71: Does Duration in Office Provide Vigilant Autonomy in the Regulatory Process?). Hamilton argued that duration in office provides some independence for the executive branch between the legislative branch. In the span of four years, or the duration of a particular regulatory term, expertise can be developed, processes can be established, and some autonomy of action can be taken place. This autonomy, Hamilton argued, provides a check against the passions or unwise opinions and points of view of the public. A steady, durable executive can be in tune with the public, compassionate, yet "withstand the temporary delusion" that may arise. Overall, the missing text avoids debates over executive versus legislative prominence in the government and refocuses the debate from evidence of dominance to administrative role in fostering a public services. This federalist paper also debates the sufficiency of executive duration in office and the stability of administration to foster these public service through regulation.
References
[edit]- ^ "The Debate Over the President and the Executive Branch". Center for the Study of the American Constitution. Retrieved February 7, 2023.
- ^ Bailey, Jeremy D. (November 2008). "The New Unitary Executive and Democratic Theory: The Problem of Alexander Hamilton". American Political Science Review. 102 (4): 453–465. doi:10.1017/S0003055408080337. JSTOR 27644538. S2CID 144083358.
Although energy in the executive can be made compatible with republican principles, energy is not the only necessary character of executive power. Rather the administration of the laws also requires stability. The problem, as Hamilton perceived in his treatment of duration, is that republican principles might at times be too compatible with energy. With each praise an blame of a single president taking the form of an election, new presidents would find reasons to regard themselves as repudiators of previous principles of administation. Thus, the removal power, used in conjunction with the power to appoint, would become an instrument of permanent electoral revolution. With popular majorities and new presidents conspiring against administration, leading citizens would be less likely to serve as department head. This is to say that Hamilton showed the need for not one, but two executives―one chained to electoral accoutability and one freed from it. The one would use elections to make republican theory work with the requirements of energy. The other would be staffed by qualified men who would be attracted by the permanence of the office as well as its insulation from public opinion.
- ^ Cite error: The named reference
Hamiltonwas invoked but never defined (see the help page). - ^ Cite error: The named reference
Calabresiwas invoked but never defined (see the help page). - ^ Bailey (2008), p. 459: "[H]amilton's second and what he described as an especially weighty argument about safety in the republican sense deserves more attention. In The Federalist Nos. 70-72, Hamilton showed how unity would provide the accountability required by republican principles: as opposed to plurality, which is a "clog" on an executive's "good intentions" and "a cloak to his faults"...[H]amilton showed that eligibility for reelection could work with unity to use accountability to appeal to the ambition or interest of the sitting president, because "it is a general principle of human nature, that a man will be interested in whatever he possesses, in proportion to the firmness or precariousness of the tenure by which he holds it" (FP 71:457)
- ^ Berry, Christopher R.; Gersen, Jacob E. (2008). "The Unbundled Executive". The University of Chicago Law Review. 75 (4): 1385–1434. JSTOR 27653959. SSRN 1113543.
External links
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