Draft:The Blue Homeland Doctrine

• Comment:
  
  I re-wrote the lead, but the rest of the article needs to be polished. It currently is extremely essay-like and there are some mild to moderate WP:NPOV issues.
  
  MWFwiki (talk) 01:42, 15 June 2025 (UTC)

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The Blue Homeland doctrine (Turkish: Mavi Vatan, lit. "Blue Homeland") is a Turkish maritime-geopolitical doctrine and strategy which advocates for expanded Turkish exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claims across the Black Sea, Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean. First promoted in 2006, it was politicized after the July 2016 failed coup attempt as part of Turkey’s pursuit of strategic autonomy. The doctrine rejects the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS; which Turkey has not ratified) and advocates for control over roughly 462,000 km² (178,380 mi²) of maritime territory.

Since 2019, Blue Homeland has been effected via a maritime boundary memorandum of understanding with Libya and the annual Mavi Vatan naval exercises, drawing criticism from Greece, Cyprus, the European Union and NATO for challenging established maritime norms and intensifying regional security and energy disputes. Also in 2019, a senior official of the Turkish Naval Forces stated that Turkey was "ready to protect every swath of our 462,000 square kilometer blue homeland with great determination," while the German Institute for International and Security Affairs described the doctrine as a "neo-Ottoman" and "neo-imperial" agenda.

Introduction

In the aftermath of the failed coup attempt of July 2016, Turkish geopolitics and foreign policy underwent a significant shift. Within this context, the "Blue Homeland doctrine," or Mavi Vatan, emerged as a political project that reflects Turkey’s new strategic autonomy. The ideas behind the doctrine were first articulated by Admiral Cem Gürdeniz in 2006 and later developed by Admiral Cihat Yaycı in the 2010s. Initially, the name “Blue Homeland” stemmed from a criticism of the EEZ map of Seville, which granted Cyprus its maritime claims to its EEZ according to UNCLOS. In response, Admiral Cem Gürdeniz called for Turkey to defend a much larger EEZ, which he referred to as the Blue Homeland, launching a doctrine of new territorial claims, through a new map. This Blue Homeland is a maritime territory spanning approximately 462,000 square kilometres across the Black Sea, the Aegean, and the Mediterranean.

Historical Background

The historical foundations of the Blue Homeland Doctrine can be traced back to the early 20th century, specifically to the aftermath of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the early years of the Turkish Republic. After World War I, Turkey was left with almost no navy or maritime industry. A central goal for the new republic under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was to build naval power and restore Turkey after the 1919 defeat to the Allied powers of Britain, France, and Greece. While this strategy wasn't explicitly termed Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland), Turkey’s maritime rights and interests have been reflected in policy documents since the time of Atatürk. The strategy was not fully embraced because of a land-centric focus within the army, limited hard power capabilities, and a top priority of maintaining internal order.

Fast forward to 2006, the specific doctrine of Blue Homeland was articulated by Admiral Cem Gürdeniz as a critique of the EU for adopting a map that granted Cyprus an EEZ in what he perceived as the Turkish maritime domain without legal justification. This doctrine was gradually embraced by military and nationalist circles in the 2010s and was adopted and politicized by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan around 2019. Today, the Blue Homeland doctrine essentially extends elements of the new geopolitical doctrine that emerged after the 2016 coup attempt.

Core Principles

At its core, the Blue Homeland doctrine rejects the territorial claims made by Greece and Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as the Seville map used by the EU to delimit EEZs. Thus, the doctrine also serves as a critique of maritime delimitation principles used by frameworks such as UNCLOS, to which Turkey, unlike most coastal states, is not a signatory. The Turkish argument is that the UNCLOS framework is incompatible with Mediterranean geography, favouring island-rich states, such as Greece, over continental states, such as Turkey. Instead, Turkey argues that maritime delimitation should be decided through bilateral negotiations and be based on principles of equity, coastal length, and geographical configuration. In addition, Turkey considers any treaties that overlook the rights to the waters surrounding the Republic of Northern Cyprus as legally unfounded.

Through the Blue Homeland Doctrine, Turkey defines its broader maritime domain as approximately 462,000 square kilometres across the Black Sea, the Aegean, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Within this area, Turkey specifically claims a 189,000 square kilometre Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean, which overlaps the claims of several other states according to UNCLOS.

The doctrinal claims hold several motivations and aspirations. Firstly, its long-term goal is to reposition Turkey as a dominant maritime actor of the 21st century, as well as to mark itself as an overall rising power. Second, the doctrine is also driven by access to Eastern Mediterranean gas discoveries, and thereby economic interests and energy security. Thirdly, Turkey perceives control of maritime routes as vital, also to avoid what it perceives as a hostile encirclement. In summary, the primary aim of the Blue Homeland doctrine is to defend what Turkey perceives as its rightful territory. However, the doctrine also serves as a tool for strategic, economic, and geopolitical interests.

In alignment with its military vision, the doctrine is militarized through the introduction of a strategic typology of other regional actors. These are namely allies, structural adversaries, and occasional opponents. This typology considers Libya and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) as key allies due to Libya's geostrategic position and the TRNC for its function as a southern fortress that anchors Turkey's presence in the eastern Mediterranean. Greece and the Republic of Cyprus are categorized as structural adversaries, as their maritime claims are viewed as obstructive to Turkish sovereignty. Lastly, other coastal states such as Egypt, Israel, and Italy are categorized as occasional opponents. In this case, Turkey seeks collaboration through arguments of mutual benefit and more equitable delimitation models.

Implementation and Regional Impact

The implementation of the Blue Homeland doctrine is particularly evident in two events that took place in 2019.

Memorandum of Understanding with Libya

The first clear adoption of the doctrine is often dated to 2019, when Turkey signed a maritime boundary agreement with Libya's Government of National Accord (GNA), marking a significant initial step in implementing the new Turkish maritime strategy. The agreement established an Exclusive Economic Zone in the Eastern Mediterranean, based on equitable distribution principles considering coastal length and geographical proximity. It established a maritime boundary of 18.06 nautical miles between Turkey and Libya, effectively denying full EEZ or continental shelf rights to Cyprus and several major Greek islands, including Crete and Rhodes. Instead, these islands were given a 6-nautical-mile territorial sea, ignoring both their size and location. Meanwhile, Turkey gave full EEZ rights to small, uninhabited Turkish islands in the agreement. In addition to maritime delimitation, the agreement also included provisions for military cooperation. This included Turkish assistance with trainers, advisers, and equipment. However, Turkey denies a link between the maritime delimitation and the military aspect of the pact.

Mavi Vatan exercises

The Mavi Vatan exercises have been conducted annually since 2019, with a two-year hiatus in 2023 and 2024, and cover the Black Sea, the Aegean, and the Eastern Mediterranean. These exercises are viewed as the most visible and large-scale demonstration of Turkey's maritime ambitions under the Blue Homeland doctrine. The initial exercise of 2019, which included more than 100 naval vessels, is seen as a reaction to multiple regional events. This exercise was also the largest maritime exercise conducted in the history of the Turkish Republic. These comprise the unsuccessful Cyprus negotiations, the regular naval and air drills by the Eastern Mediterranean Energy/Defence Alliance, and Turkey's exclusion from the East Mediterranean Gas Forum's launch earlier that year.

The objective of these military exercises, together with overall assertiveness, is to demonstrate Turkish military capabilities and presence in contested waters. The exercises also serve to reinforce what Turkey views as the exclusionary regional arrangement and to validate its interpretation of maritime jurisdiction under international law. The operational function is to test the interoperability of Turkey's naval, air, and land forces through joint scenarios. Another central function is that these exercises signal deterrence to other regional actors such as Greece and Cyprus. From a domestic perspective, the exercises function as a boost to national pride and are often framed in Turkish media as affirmations of Turkish sovereignty and independence at sea.

Responses and reactions

The Blue Homeland Doctrine and the subsequent increase in assertiveness have increased tensions between Turkey and several countries, especially the EU countries of Greece, Cyprus, and France. Both Greece and Cyprus reject the Turkish interpretation of maritime boundaries and instead rely on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to legitimize their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) claims. Greece has framed Turkey's maritime posture as a direct threat to its sovereignty and regional stability. It views the doctrine as part of a broader Turkish strategy of revisionism, rooted in a rejection of international legal norms. The 2019 Turkey-Libya maritime delimitation agreement further heightened tensions, as it was seen by Greece and several EU members as a challenge to their maritime rights under UNCLOS. In response, Greece signed a similar agreement with Egypt, which led to a naval standoff in disputed waters.

Scholars also point out that the implementation of the doctrine has contributed to a broader security dilemma in the region. The combination of the perception of strategic marginalisation and encirclement, and the regional energy competition, has led to increased Turkish naval presence and military exercises in and around contested waters. This has prompted countermeasures from Greece and other states, such as the expansion of military cooperation between Greece, Egypt, and Israel. The dispute has also been further complicated due to the discovery of hydrocarbon reserves in the contested area. These resources are perceived as strategically vital by both Greece and Turkey. Following these developments, tensions in the eastern Mediterranean have increased and the security landscape has become militarised.

In addition, initiatives for regional cooperation, such as the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, have, to a large extent, excluded Turkey. This has further strengthened its perception of isolation and, in consequence, limited opportunities for inclusive dialogue.

Turkey's increased assertiveness following the implementation of the Blue Homeland doctrine has further complicated the relationship between Turkey and NATO allies, including the United States. Turkey's increasingly assertive maritime posture and its anti-Western, nationalist orientation have led to a greater distance between Ankara and its Western partners. Consistent with NATO's general hesitance to intervene in the Greece–Turkey conflict, the alliance has avoided directly criticizing the Blue Homeland doctrine, focusing instead on balancing the interests of both member countries. The increased assertiveness has led the United States to focus more on cooperation with Greece, arguing that Greece provides more stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.