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Draft:Quadruple Alliance

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Location of the four nations of the Quadruple Alliance in 1915.

The Quadruple Alliance or Central Powers refers to the alliance bloc established around the German Empire during World War I, from Bulgaria's entry into the conflict on 5 October 1915 until the withdrawal of this kingdom on 29 September 1918, the date when the defeated Bulgarians signed the Armistice of Thessaloniki. This alliance—comprising the German Empire, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Bulgaria—laboriously formed from the outbreak of World War I, quickly demonstrated its effectiveness but also its vulnerability, giving the Reich, its main driving force, a predominant weight that proved fatal in the long term, despite the theoretical equality among the four monarchies composing it. Moreover, this alliance group remained weakened by the rivalries that could exist among the various partners of the Reich, while German leaders proved unable to make clear choices in the rivalries that emerged among their allies.

Formation of the Quadruple Alliance

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Alliance formation

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propaganda postcard
The Ottomans in the conflict: propaganda postcard.

On 28 July 1914, Austria-Hungary, supported by Germany, declared war on Serbia[1]. The Reich then supported its only reliable and dependable ally, the Dual Monarchy, and attempted to localize the Austro-Serbian conflict, without success[2].

Officially neutral at the outbreak of the conflict, the Ottoman Empire was nevertheless bound to the Reich by a secret treaty; for nearly two months, the Ottoman government maneuvered, pursued a policy favorable to German interests, and prepared for war but did not formally commit[3]. The autumn of 1914 was marked by the strategic failure of the Reich and the Dual Monarchy.[alpha 1], and on 29 October 1914, an action by cruisers sold to the Ottoman Empire in August 1914[alpha 2] prompted the Ottoman Empire's entry into the war alongside the Central Powers[4].

Bulgarian intervention

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German propaganda postcard
German propaganda postcard magnifying Bulgaria’s intervention in the conflict. Inscription: Bulgarien mit uns! Bulgaria with us!.

Throughout 1915, the Bulgarian government was courted by both alliance blocs, but, faced with the distant and hypothetical promises of the Allies, the government aligned with the Reich and its allies, signing an alliance treaty with the Central Powers, the Dual Monarchy, and the Ottoman Empire; the signing of this treaty solidified the Reich’s alliances until 29 September 1918, the date when the armistice between Bulgaria and the Allies took effect[5].

Thus, King Ferdinand tied his country to the alliance bloc that guaranteed rapid annexations over its Serbian rivals[alpha 3][6].

Under this convention, the Bulgarian government agreed to subordinate its army to directives issued by the German Emperor[7].

Evolution

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Rivalries

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Soon after the initial successes of the Quadruple Alliance, its members began disputing the allocation of conquered territories and predominant economic influence over these territories.

Thus, following the conquest of Serbia, the Austro-Hungarians and Bulgarians vied for control of central Serbia[alpha 4], engaging in a patrol war against each other along the demarcation line between zones occupied by the Austro-Hungarians and those controlled by the Bulgarians; on 1 April 1916, an agreement was reached between the two parties under the auspices of the Reich: the occupation zones were defined without addressing the final status of the territories occupied by the Austro-Hungarians and Bulgarians[8].

In 1916, after the conquest of Romania through a coordinated offensive by the four members of the Quadruple Alliance[alpha 5], Bulgarian claims to Dobruja, as well as the refusal of Ferdinand of Bulgaria to accept border adjustments in favor of the Ottomans in Thrace, strained relations between Sofia and Constantinople, which the ill-considered statements of William II did not help to ease[alpha 6] · [9].

Faced with the need to maintain the cohesion of its allies while accounting for these rivalries, German diplomats suggested that their partners compile a list of political, territorial, and economic objectives they assigned to the conflict within the framework of a victorious peace: the Dual Monarchy published its war aims in the form of a note addressed to its allies on 18 October 1916, with the other two partners of the Reich doing the same shortly thereafter[9]. The war aims of the Dual Monarchy, clearly outlined by Stephan Burián von Rajecz, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, appeared clearly at odds with Bulgarian ambitions in Serbia and German aspirations for certain strategic ports and cities in the Balkans. Indeed, Serbia was, in 1915, intended to be divided between Bulgaria and the Dual Monarchy, with the nature of Austro-Hungarian control not yet determined, but the demarcation line between regions occupied by the Austro-Hungarians and regions occupied by the Bulgarians was not precisely fixed, leading to friction between the two occupying powers[10]. According to Burián, Albania was also destined to become a protectorate dependent on the Dual Monarchy, but the Germans aspired to annex Valona to provide the Reich with a war port in the Mediterranean[11].

Shortly thereafter, in early November 1916, negotiations were opened between the Reich, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire to clarify the terms of the secret convention of 6 September 1915, whose territorial clauses, according to Berlin, had received only a "mere assent" at the time, given "without any guarantee".[12]

Finally, the Reich, forced to intervene in the rivalries among its allies, quickly became the arbiter of disputes within its coalition: thus, at the end of 1915, the division of Serbia into two occupation zones, one Austro-Hungarian and one Bulgarian, did not end the rivalries between the Dual Monarchy and Bulgaria, nor did it clarify German interests[8]. This intervention allowed the Reich to assert its political, economic, and military claims in Serbia and see them satisfied through a series of agreements signed with its allies, the Bulgaria and the Dual Monarchy throughout 1916[12].

The Weight of the Reich

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Quickly, the Reich established itself as the primary power of the Quadruple Alliance and the main supplier of military equipment to its partners. Indeed, the offensives conducted by armies composed of contingents from each ally, in Serbia in 1915 and Romania in 1916, provided the Reich and its army the opportunity to supply the majority of the personnel and resources deployed, as well as to make its allies feel the significance of its contribution to the collective effort[13].

Moreover, an economic solidarity was swiftly established; however, supplying equipment to all its allies began to weigh on the German economy, engaged in a war of attrition, while the Allies had imposed a maritime blockade around the Reich, the effects of which increased as the conflict prolonged[13]. This provision of war materiel, while burdensome for the Reich and its economy, along with the constantly renewed loan requests from its allies, which its banks regularly met, also granted the successive governments in Berlin unprecedented influence over its allies, the Dual Monarchy, the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria, in the division of conquests. Thus, in Serbia, for example, the Reich and the Dual Monarchy managed to undermine Bulgaria’s political influence by controlling the economy in the regions occupied by Sofia’s army: the Bor mines, located in districts occupied by the Bulgarians, were purchased by a consortium whose capital was largely held by German and Austro-Hungarian investors[14].

Furthermore, from 1917, the Reich issued a veto on any attempts by its allies to exit the conflict: at Kreuznach, in April and then in May, William II, Hindenburg, and his deputy Erich Ludendorff categorically opposed the desire of Charles, the new Austro-Hungarian monarch, to open peace negotiations with the Allies[alpha 7][15].

Finally, the formation of army groups, often with German units as their backbone, strengthened the Reich’s control over its allies, who quickly realized their inability to contain Allied armies with their forces alone; thus, from early 1916, all Austro-Hungarian troops were placed under German operational command[16]. This integration of German units into Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Ottoman formations provided the Reich with the political means to impose its predominance over its allies[alpha 8]

A Tool for Waging a Coalition War

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Propaganda postcard: the four monarchs of the Quadruple Alliance states.

The Serbian campaign of 1915, followed by the Romanian campaign in the autumn of 1916, forced the four alliance partners to begin synchronizing their efforts. The first signs of this coordination appeared in the establishment of a unified command, nominally entrusted to Emperor William II.

Bulgaria’s intervention provided the first phase of this coalition war: indeed, the plan for the Central Powers’ campaign in Serbia was devised in Vienna by Austro-Hungarian strategists and executed by Austro-German troops from positions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Hungarian Banat, and Ottoman and Bulgarian forces from Bulgarian Macedonia[17].

Thus, the arrival of the Dioscuri, Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff, at the head of the German command on 29 August 1916, gave the German government the political means to impose on its allies the coalition war it wished to wage[18]. The two generals, aware of the exhaustion of the Quadruple Alliance’s armies, ordered the cessation of all offensive operations and the implementation of its corollary, a strict defensive stance[19].

As of 6 September 1916, an agreement between the Reich and the Dual Monarchy, soon extended to the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria, placed the Emperor [20] at the head of the Central Powers’ armies[21]; this agreement, signed on behalf of William II by Paul von Hindenburg[22], translated in practice to the control of Austro-Hungarian armies by Hindenburg and Ludendorff[21]: directives intended for the Austro-Hungarian Armeeoberkommando [fr] were issued to Dual Monarchy military officials by Paul von Hindenburg on behalf of the German Oberste Heeresleitung[16]; however, Conrad von Hötzendorf, initially opposed to the terms of the 6 September agreement, managed to avoid German interference in operations conducted in Italy and Albania[7].

The 16 September 1916 agreement among the Quadruple Alliance members reiterated the terms of the 6 September 1916 German–Austro-Hungarian agreement: the overall planning of the conflict was entrusted to the German Emperor, advised by the Oberste Heeresleitung and the Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Ottoman general staffs[23]; however, each partner remained in control of logistical resources to carry out the collectively decided operations[23]. In practice, this directive gave the Dioscuri a role in coordinating the armies engaged in the conflict but excluded political and economic matters from their authority[24].

The subordination of the Reich’s allies was also materialized through the standardization of weapons, uniforms, and procedures within the Quadruple Alliance’s armies: as early as late 1915, the Austro-Hungarian army adopted the Feldgrau uniform, made with fabric imported from Germany[21]; this clothing measure was extended to Bulgaria, while the Ottoman troops also adopted a uniform imposed by the Reich.

Moreover, to strengthen ties between the various armies, officer exchanges and joint training were organized, initially between Germans and Austro-Hungarians, while the curricula of German and Austro-Hungarian war colleges were standardized, sometimes delivered simultaneously to officers of both empires[16]. Finally, the new German doctrine of Sturmbataillonen was meticulously taught to Dual Monarchy officers, enabling the establishment of the first such battalions in the Austro-Hungarian army in February 1917[16].

Disintegration of the Quadruple Alliance

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Waning Solidarity

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As the war prolonged, the Reich’s allies gradually sought to emancipate themselves from German influence.

Thus, the death of Francis Joseph and the accession of his successor Charles marked a paradigm shift in relations between the Reich and the Dual Monarchy. Indeed, the Habsburg quickly sought to distance himself from the policy pursued in the Reich: this distancing was materialized by the transfer of the Austro-Hungarian Armeeoberkommando, the high command, from Teschen, near Pless, the seat of the OHL, to Baden, near Vienna; this move was intended, according to its architects, to loosen the Reich’s grip on the Dual Monarchy[25].

Moreover, from 1916, Dual Monarchy leaders sought to exit the conflict at all costs, aware of the risks of disintegration if the war continued[26].

Finally, the peace treaties of early 1918 led to the fall of the Bulgarian government of Vasil Radoslavov and its replacement by Aleksandar Malinov, less loyal to the 1915 alliance. Feeling cheated by the division of the 1915 and 1916 conquests, Bulgarian leaders fueled discontent with the conflict, funding press campaigns unfavorable to the Reich and the Dual Monarchy[27].

Bulgarian Defection

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Under the command of Louis Franchet d'Espèrey, Franco-Serbian troops launched a breakthrough offensive against Bulgarian units weakened by privations, plagued by desertions, pacifist propaganda[27], and exhausted by three years of positional warfare in Macedonia[28]. This breakthrough quickly shattered the Macedonian front and dismantled the Bulgarian position through the Maneuver of Uskub [it] by Franco-Serbian troops[29].

Faced with this alarming situation, the German high command ordered the deployment of occupation troops from Ukraine to the Balkans and the organization of a front south of Niš[29]. Moreover, on 28 September 1918, Erich Ludendorff ordered the commander of the few German divisions positioned in the Balkans to redeploy around Sofia to ensure Bulgaria’s continued commitment alongside its Quadruple Alliance partners; this attempt to counter Bulgaria’s unilateral initiative failed immediately due to the speed of the armistice negotiations between Allied plenipotentiaries and Bulgarian representatives[alpha 9][30].

See also

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Notes

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  1. ^ The German troops failed at the Marne, the Austro-Hungarian Common Army had to abandon Galicia to the Russians and failed to subdue Serbia.
  2. ^ Two German cruisers, pursued by the British fleet, had taken refuge in the Straits; officially sold to the Ottomans, they remained under German command.
  3. ^ Following the Second Balkan War, the Bulgarians had to cede Vardar Macedonia to the Kingdom of Belgrade.
  4. ^ The Dual Monarchy and Bulgaria both sought to control the strategically important central region of Serbia.
  5. ^ An Ottoman corps participated in the offensive, supporting the Bulgarian units engaged against Romania.
  6. ^ The German Emperor had promised to satisfy Bulgarian territorial claims without any compensation during a meeting with Vasil Radoslavov shortly before.
  7. ^ The Austro-Hungarian monarch proposed ceding Alsace-Lorraine to France in exchange for the cession of Galicia to Poland, incorporated into the Reich.
  8. ^ This dominance was exercised while carefully maintaining the theoretical equality among the four alliance partners.
  9. ^ Bulgarian plenipotentiaries accepted, without negotiation, the conditions imposed on the defeated kingdom by Louis Franchet d'Espèrey on behalf of the Allies.

References

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  1. ^ Renouvin 1934, p. 205.
  2. ^ Renouvin 1934, p. 207.
  3. ^ Renouvin 1934, p. 259.
  4. ^ Renouvin 1934, p. 260.
  5. ^ Renouvin 1934, p. 318.
  6. ^ Fischer 1970, p. 367.
  7. ^ a b Laparra & Hesse 2011, p. 366.
  8. ^ a b Le Moal 2008, p. 116.
  9. ^ a b Fischer 1970, p. 326.
  10. ^ Fischer 1970, p. 325.
  11. ^ Fischer 1970, p. 324.
  12. ^ a b Le Moal 2008, p. 142.
  13. ^ a b Renouvin 1934, p. 339.
  14. ^ Le Moal 2008, p. 144.
  15. ^ Laparra & Hesse 2011, p. 105.
  16. ^ a b c d Ortholan 2017, p. 485.
  17. ^ Le Moal 2004, p. 86.
  18. ^ Bled 2014, p. 222.
  19. ^ Laparra 2006, p. 179.
  20. ^ Wilhelm II & William II.
  21. ^ a b c Bled 2014, p. 223.
  22. ^ Laparra & Hesse 2011, p. 100.
  23. ^ a b Laparra & Hesse 2011, p. 367.
  24. ^ Laparra & Hesse 2011, p. 101.
  25. ^ Bled 2014, p. 255.
  26. ^ Lacroix-Riz 1996, p. 27.
  27. ^ a b Renouvin 1934, p. 606.
  28. ^ Renouvin 1934, p. 599.
  29. ^ a b Renouvin 1934, p. 600.
  30. ^ Renouvin 1934, p. 608.

Bibliography

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  • Bled, Jean-Paul (2014). L'agonie d'une monarchie [The agony of a monarchy] (in French). Paris: Tallandier. p. 464. ISBN 979-10-210-0440-5.
  • Fischer, Fritz (1970). Les Buts de guerre de l'Allemagne impériale (1914-1918) [The War Aims of Imperial Germany (1914-1918)] (in French). Translated by Geneviève Migeon and Henri Thiès. Paris: Éditions de Trévise. p. 654.
  • Lacroix-Riz, Annie (1996) [2010]. Le Vatican, l'Europe et le Reich [The Vatican, Europe, and the Reich] (in French). Paris: Armand Colin. p. 539. ISBN 2-200-21641-6.
  • Laparra, Jean-Claude (2006). La machine à vaincre. L'armée allemande 1914-1918 [The machine to win. The German army 1914-1918] (in French). Paris: 14-18 éditions. p. 324. ISBN 978-2-9519539-8-7.
  • Laparra, Jean-Claude; Hesse, Pascal (2011). L'envers des parades [The other side of parades] (in French). Paris: 14-18 éditions. p. 388. ISBN 978-2-916385-77-8.
  • Le Moal, Frédéric (2008). La Serbie du martyre à la victoire. 1914-1918 [Serbia from martyrdom to victory. 1914-1918] (in French). Paris: Éditions Soteca, 14-18 Éditions. p. 257. ISBN 978-2-916385-18-1.
  • Ortholan, Henri (2017). L'armée austro-hongroise: 1867-1918 [The Austro-Hungarian army: 1867-1918] (in French). Paris: Bernard Giovannangeli Éditeur. p. 526. ISBN 978-2-7587-0180-4.
  • Renouvin, Pierre (1934). La Crise européenne et la Première Guerre mondiale [The European Crisis and the First World War] (in French). Paris: Presses universitaires de France. p. 779.