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Draft:CIDC-Sensika Disinformation Observatory

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CIDC-Sensika Disinformation Observatory
Formation2025
TypeResearch initiative and disinformation monitoring
FocusMonitoring and combating disinformation, analyzing malign narratives, defending democratic institutions, and promoting media literacy
HeadquartersBlagoevgrad, Bulgaria
OriginsAn initiative by Center for Information, Democracy & Citizenship and Sensika Technologies
Region served
Europe
MethodsAI-powered media monitoring; Strategic narrative analysis; Cross-platform data analytics; Public awareness campaigns; Policy advocacy and strategic reporting
Executive Director
Dr. Jacob Udo-Udo Jacob
WebsiteCenter for Information, Democracy & Citizenship Website

The CIDC–Sensika Disinformation Observatory is a joint initiative between the Center for Information, Democracy, and Citizenship (CIDC) at the American University in Bulgaria (AUBG) and the Sofia-based technology company Sensika Technologies. Launched in 2024, the Observatory aims to monitor, analyze, and counter disinformation targeting the Balkans and Eastern Europe through advanced AI-powered media monitoring tools and expert analysis.

The CIDC’s Disinformation Observatory Strategic Information Threat Reports (SITRep Series) explore cognitive influence strategies such as reflexive control, with a notable paper on the Kremlin-aligned Pravda Operations in Bulgaria. The paper was mentioned in reputable publications such as Euronews, Clubz, Svobodna Evropa, Bloomberhtv and Dnevnik.

Mission and Scope

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  • Monitoring, Tagging, and Analysis – Leveraging Sensika’s real-time AI monitoring platform, the Observatory collects, tags, and analyzes disinformation content across online, print, and broadcast media. This includes tracking malign narratives, synthetic media, and coordinated influence operations.
  • Research and Insights – Conducts in-depth studies on disinformation strategies, including cognitive influence techniques such as reflexive control. Reports aim to understand the societal and geopolitical impact of disinformation and inform public discourse and institutional response.
  • Public Awareness – Hosts workshops, briefings, and publishes accessible resources to educate journalists, students, and the broader public on recognizing and resisting disinformation.
  • Policy Advocacy – Works with local and international policymakers, civil society actors, and media organizations to propose evidence-based strategies and regulatory frameworks to counter disinformation and strengthen democratic resilience.

Activities

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Strategic Information Threat Reports (SITRep Series)

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The Observatory publishes the Strategic Information Threat Reports (SITRep) series, which focuses on long-term patterns of influence operations in Europe. Two prominent SITReps, published in 2025, investigate the structure and evolution of a pro-Kremlin influence network known as the Pravda network.

Report 1: The Pravda Ecosystem – An Analysis of the Kremlin’s Regional Disinformation Strategy (April 2025)

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This report analyzes a sprawling pro-Kremlin media network comprising over 190 websites in more than 30 languages. It documents how Pravda filled the vacuum left by the EU’s ban on Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik news agency, building an alternative information architecture optimized for search engine visibility and local appeal.

Key findings:
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  • The network targeted 83 countries, with a strong focus on regions where Kremlin geopolitical ambitions clash with Euro-Atlantic integration, such as Moldova, Bulgaria, the Baltics, and the Balkans.
  • Between December 2024 and March 2025, researchers analyzed 643,601 articles, identifying that over 52% of the disinformation output was aimed at post-Soviet and Balkan states, despite their relatively small populations.
  • Moldova was the most targeted country per capita – experiencing disinformation 56 times higher than the Western European average.
  • The network leverages automation, algorithmic optimization, and regional customization, often incorporating local languages and cultural references.
  • The ecosystem is believed to be connected to TigerWeb, a Crimea-based IT company reportedly linked to Russian intelligence networks.

Report 2: Strategic Threat Assessment of the Pravda Disinformation Operations – Bulgaria (June 2025)

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The second report narrows the focus to Bulgaria, identifying it as a critical testbed for reflexive control strategies – psychological manipulation tactics designed to shape the informational context rather than push overt propaganda.

Key findings:
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  • A 35% increase in disinformation targeting Bulgaria between December 2024 and April 2025.
  • Over 70% of harmful content was disseminated via multiple platforms – Telegram, Facebook, and X (formerly Twitter) – often amplified by local Bulgarian actors to enhance perceived authenticity.
  • The strategy shifted from Russian content toward Bulgarian-sourced narratives by Spring 2025, making attribution more difficult and the messaging more locally resonant.
  • Common themes included economic collapse, skepticism about the EU and NATO, and opposition to Bulgaria’s adoption of the euro.
  • The report documents the use of AI-enhanced reflexive control, in which narrative adaptation occurs dynamically based on real-time data, helping reinforce disinformation through emotional and cultural targeting.

The Observatory's reports emphasize that Pravda’s operations are not just about misinformation but are part of a broader geopolitical strategy to fragment the European information space and sow distrust in democratic institutions.

Recommendations from the SITRep series include:
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  • Creation of a pan-European strategic communication hub.
  • Investment in AI-powered disinformation monitoring tools.
  • Strengthening digital and cognitive resilience through public education and media literacy programs.
  • Development of shared diplomatic and regulatory responses to transnational influence operations.

The Team

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See Also

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References

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