Draft:Breach of Aswan Dam

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Aswan High Dam AHD in Egypt poses a great threat to the country's population and economy because the vast majority of Egyptians live in the Nile valley and Nile Delta, below the Dam. After a failure of the Dam - a breach, everything in those areas would be destroyed and swept away by a flood volume of up to 209 cubic kilometers of contaminated water, heavy from sediment and debris.

Flood Control

The primary danger results from a conflict at Aswan High Dam: profit maximization currently overrides flood control. By filling the designated flood buffer zone (175m-182m ASL), operators leave no space to contain the water from a major flood (The crest of AHD is 190m ASL) This makes the dam vulnerable to overtopping and destruction if faced with an extreme Nile flood or a sudden 75 km³ release from a breached Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam GERD. The Millennium Reservoir of GERD has a capacity of 94 km³ after its fifth filling stage (at 160m ASL).

Chain of events

An earthquake destroying the GERD could cause the complete collapse ("leveling to the ground") of the dam, releasing all 75 km³ from the Millennium Reservoir. The resulting breach (1,200m wide, 100m deep) might allow floodwater to surge out at 2.4 million cubic meters per second, traveling up to 72 kilometers per hour (20 m/s). Maximum storage in the Millennium Reservoir is 80 km³. Reduced outflow could allow up to +0.7 km³/day inflow , but this minimally affects cumulative flood volume due to downstream dispersion and eventual return to the Nile channel. This study quantifies exclusively the added volume from GERD/AHD breaches, omitting routine Nile discharge. The 14.8 km³ dead storage fails to attenuate floods if the dam suffers complete structural failure. After 8 hours of the breach, Roseires dam in Sudan would overflow and be destroyed adding 7.4 km³. During the second day of the flood Sennar dam would be destroyed adding 0.6 km³. On day 7 Merove dam would be destroyed adding 12.4 km³. On day 10 the flood reaches lake Nubia and AHD on day 13. Overtopping begins at day 14. The accumulated flood amount into Nasser lake is 75 km³ from GERD + 7.4 km³ Roseires + 0.6 km³ Sennar + 12.4 km³ Merove = 98 km³ of combined flood volume including regular flow of 2.5 km³ in the given timeframe. Water losses are 6.6 km³ in the Sudan lowlands until Khartoum + 11.4 km³ until lake Nubia + 6.2 to overflow at Kerma = 24.2 km³. Water releases in Nasser lake are 4.3 km³ to Toshka canal + 8.0 km³ by the main flood gate and the dams to the East and West of AHD + 0.5 km³ over Nasser lake to evaporation = 12.8 km³. When measuring the distances between the important locations on satellite imagery for a flood-wave, distances are up to ~28% shorter than official values for the length of the Nile used in studies for flood events e.g., 470 km between Roseires and Khartoum and not 650 km. Shorter distances put the calculation on the safe side, because shorter flow-times mean less evaporation and seepage losses. After overflowing, the Nile river banks and spreading out into the wide landscape, the bulk volume of the flood traverses on a rather straight line between Roseires and Khartoum cutting a quarter of travel time. This is significant as the area between Roseires and Khartoum swallows up the entire water from the Millennium reservoir spreading it out up to 100 km from SW to NE and flattening it down to 1.4 m on average. A significant part of the flood volume is lost to evaporation, seepage, pond formation and silt-deposition reducing the flood from 83 to 76.4 km³. After spreading out in this area for a day, the flow-speed is greatly reduced to 2 m/s. If lake Nasser is at normal capacity below current levels, the flood causes overflow of 0.02 km³/day to the Toshka canal. There is no literal wave, but a slow flooding of 7.5 days reducing the flood water by evaporation on the lake’s surface which enlarges from 6 to 8.6 thousand square kilometers. The distance from AHD to Cairo is 820 km and another 180 km to the shore of the Mediterranean sea (for a flood cutting the curves of the Nile)

Casualties

The number of casualties in the aftermath of the flood will be significantly higher than that of floods in other countries, because the population in Egypt has grown based on the availability of the water from Nasser lake for food production. Compared to 1970 when AHD was finished, the population has grown by 326% to 113 million. The current agricultural production is dependent on year-round irrigation with water from Nasser lake. But the national irrigation infrastructure and the water from Nasser lake will not be available for a long time after the flood – until AHD might be rebuild. In consequence food production after the destruction of AHD will be reverted to single harvest volumes as in pre-AHD times when lands were flooded once a year and one harvest generated feeding 34 million people. Egypt will face an existential food shortage for a long time. Likewise, the industry will be set back without the energy from AHD. The economy will be weak and not able to provide basic needs for the population. The list of previous dam failures and casualties is not repeated here as it would be misleading. The consequences of the Breach of AHD would be more severe.