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Draft:QBF Fraud

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Template:Infobox criminal case

The QBF fraud case (Russian: дело QBF) was a large-scale international Ponzi scheme operated by the QBF investment group between 2012 and 2021, defrauding over 2,000 investors of an estimated ₽5–7 billion (US$70–100 million).[1][2] The scheme involved a sophisticated network of offshore companies primarily based in Cyprus, making it one of the largest cross-border financial frauds in Russian history.

Background

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Company formation

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QBF (Russian: КьюБиЭф, originally QB Finance) was founded in 2008 by Roman Valerievich Shpakov (born 12 October 1988) in Moscow.[3] The company obtained licenses from Russia's Federal Financial Markets Service in 2009 for:

  • Brokerage activities
  • Dealer activities
  • Securities management
  • Depository operations

By 2014, QBF had joined the National Association of Securities Market Participants (NAUFOR) and established headquarters in Moscow City at Presnenskaya Embankment 8, Building 1.[4]

Business model

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QBF marketed itself as providing access to international capital markets, particularly U.S. stock exchanges, with promised annual returns of 15–20% through discretionary portfolio management.[5] The company targeted wealthy individuals, including government officials, military officers, and business executives.

Criminal scheme

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Mechanism

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According to court documents, QBF operated a criminal organization from June 2012 to May 2021 through:[6]

  1. Dual-contract system: Clients signed agreements with both Russian QBF entities and Cyprus-based subsidiaries
  2. Fund diversion: Client money was systematically transferred to offshore companies instead of being invested
  3. Falsified reporting: Investors received fabricated monthly statements showing non-existent profits
  4. Ponzi payments: Earlier investors received "returns" from new investor deposits
  5. Withdrawal obstruction: When clients attempted withdrawals, the company created various delays and excuses

Cyprus operations

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Offshore network structure

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Cyprus served as the primary hub for QBF's money laundering operations. Key entities included:[7]

  • QB Capital CY Ltd (HE 338967) – Primary vehicle for receiving client funds
  • Constance Investment Ltd (later Pruden Ventures Capital Ltd) – CySEC-licensed entity (CIF License 333/17)
  • NOA Circle Ltd – Corporate services provider allegedly facilitating the fraud
  • AeliusCircle – Affiliated company providing audit and accounting services

The offshore network extended to:

  • Cayman Islands: White Lake Management Ltd
  • Hong Kong: Simtelligence Company Limited
  • Belize: FFIN Brokerage Services Inc
  • United Kingdom: Final destination for laundered funds

Key Cyprus operators

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Linda Athanasiadou (also known as Linda Kovalenko), a KPMG alumna and Cypriot citizen, managed international operations. Court documents revealed she and her husband Apollon were "not mere nominees but proactive participants who took deliberate actions to hide their crimes."[8]

CySEC regulatory failures

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The Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission (CySEC) imposed only minimal administrative fines on QBF-related entities despite the fraud:[9]

Date Fine Violation
27 September 2023 €100 Late submission of QST-CIF Form
4 December 2023 €1,300 Late submission of RBSF-CIF Form
30 July 2024 €4,500 Anti-Money Laundering violations
18 December 2024 €20,000 Record-keeping failures
Total €25,900 (vs. €70-100 million in losses)

Whistleblowers criticized CySEC's response, noting reports were allegedly "lost or no further actions were taken."[10]

Criminal prosecution

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Investigation

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The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs opened criminal case number 12001450007000902 in April 2021. On 25–26 May 2021, law enforcement conducted coordinated raids at over 30 locations.[4]

Charges were filed under:

  • Article 159, Part 4 (large-scale fraud by organized group)
  • Article 210 (creating and participating in criminal organization)

Convictions

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Zelimkhan Munaev, co-founder and former Cyprus operations head, was sentenced on 21 September 2023 to 8 years imprisonment after pleading guilty and providing 239 volumes of testimony.[11]

On 11 March 2025, the Presnensky District Court convicted:[12]

  • Vladimir Pakhomov (branch network director): 18 years
  • Stanislav Matyukhin (CEO; grandson of ex-Central Bank chairman Georgy Matyukhin): 17 years
  • Evgenia Rossieva (legal department head): 15 years
  • Alexei Golubev (St. Petersburg office head): 13 years

International fugitives

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  • Roman Shpakov – Fled to UAE in January 2021; on Interpol Red Notice since October 2021
  • Linda Athanasiadou – Remains at large; wanted internationally

Major victims

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High-profile cases

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  • Anastasia Volochkova – Russian ballerina; lost ₽1.7 million of ₽3 million invested[13]
  • Ilya Borzenkov family – Former Yekaterinburg Deputy Mayor; transferred ₽974 million between 2016–2018[14]
  • Unnamed former official – Reportedly lost ₽1 billion
  • Multiple VIP clients – Individual losses of ₽200–300 million each

Victim demographics

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The fraud affected over 2,000 investors across eight Russian regions, with documented losses of ₽2.048 billion from 151 verified victims. Total estimated losses reach ₽5–7 billion.[1]

Many victims, particularly those with access to budget funds, declined to report losses due to inability to prove legal origin of invested funds.[15]

Regulatory aftermath

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Central Bank of Russia

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The Central Bank of Russia took the following actions:[16]

  • 3 June 2021: Suspended QBF operations
  • 8 July 2021: Revoked all licenses citing "systematic violations"
  • 21 September 2021: Appointed temporary administration
  • 2024: Initiated bankruptcy proceedings

International regulatory response

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In 2024, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) issued unprecedented Article 16 recommendations to CySEC—the first time such recommendations were issued to any National Competent Authority—requiring Cyprus to strengthen cross-border supervision and allocate more resources to monitoring.[17]

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The QBF case highlighted:

  • Vulnerabilities in cross-border financial regulation
  • Exploitation of Cyprus as offshore financial center
  • Challenges in prosecuting international financial crimes
  • Inadequate regulatory response to large-scale fraud

Civil litigation continues in multiple jurisdictions, with creditor claims exceeding ₽5 billion in bankruptcy proceedings.

See also

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References

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  1. ^ a b "Russian prosecutorial investigative report (Case No. 12001450007000902)" (PDF). Moscow Tverskoy District Court. Retrieved 17 July 2025.
  2. ^ "Секреты финансовых пирамид: почему возбудили дело против сотрудников QBF" [Secrets of financial pyramids: why a case was initiated against QBF employees]. Forbes Russia (in Russian). 15 June 2021. Retrieved 17 July 2025.
  3. ^ "Shpakov Roman Valerievich". TAdviser. Retrieved 17 July 2025.
  4. ^ a b "Инвестиции ушли в офшоры: полиция раскрыла финансовую пирамиду QBF" [Investments went offshore: police uncovered QBF financial pyramid]. Kommersant (in Russian). 31 May 2021. Retrieved 17 July 2025.
  5. ^ "Part 1 of Russian Prosecutorial Indictment (Case No. 12001450007000902)" (PDF). Russian Prosecutor's Office. Retrieved 17 July 2025.
  6. ^ "Part 2 of Russian Prosecutorial Indictment" (PDF). Russian Prosecutor's Office. Retrieved 17 July 2025.
  7. ^ "Burlaka Alina Evgenievna and others v NOA Circle Ltd - Case 525/2022". District Court of Limassol. 3 January 2023. Retrieved 17 July 2025.
  8. ^ "District Court of Limassol judgment". 16 March 2023. Retrieved 17 July 2025.
  9. ^ "CySEC Board Decision regarding Pruden Ventures Capital Ltd". CySEC. 27 September 2023. Retrieved 17 July 2025.
  10. ^ Christofi, Michalakis (2024). "CySEC: Incompetent, Complicit, or Both? A Whistleblower's Direct Challenge". Medium. Retrieved 17 July 2025.
  11. ^ "Moscow prosecutor's office press release on Munaev verdict" (in Russian). Prosecutor General's Office. 21 September 2023. Retrieved 17 July 2025.
  12. ^ "Court verdict in QBF case" (in Russian). Moscow City Court. 11 March 2025. Retrieved 17 July 2025.
  13. ^ "В числе пострадавших от финансовой пирамиды QBF оказалась Волочкова" [Volochkova among victims of QBF financial pyramid]. Forbes Russia (in Russian). 1 December 2021. Retrieved 17 July 2025.
  14. ^ "QBF case and 1 billion bribe". Rucriminal. Retrieved 17 July 2025.
  15. ^ "Настойчиво уговаривали: как пирамида QBF разорила россиян" [Persistently persuaded: how QBF pyramid ruined Russians] (in Russian). Gazeta.ru. 22 November 2021. Retrieved 17 July 2025.
  16. ^ "Bank of Russia press release #34640". Bank of Russia. 8 July 2021. Retrieved 17 July 2025.
  17. ^ "ESMA finds shortcomings in supervision of cross-border investment activities". ESMA. 2024. Retrieved 17 July 2025.
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